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Given the importance of self-control for consumers’ well-being and success in life, my 
dissertation aims to provide novel theoretical insights to the self-regulation literature and inform 
practical interventions that work to consumers’ long-term benefit. Contrary to most extant 
research on the topic, my dissertation explores both individual and social dynamics of 
consumers’ self-regulation. My dissertation progresses from an internal, individual perspective 
on self-control to a socially-embedded, cooperative perspective.  
First, Essay 1 focuses on the internal state of the consumer, considering cognitive 
strategies used in self-control contexts. Specifically, I explore two dimensions of consumers’ 
recall of previous self-regulation acts - valence and subjective difficulty of recall– and how their 
interplay influences current self-control. Progressing toward understanding the social dynamics 
of self-control, in Essay 2 I examine two specific strategies that consumers use to cope with 
social identity threats – where individuals either highlight positive dimensions of the self or 
emphasize favorable intergroup differences, and compare their impact on subsequent self-
control. Finally, Essay 3 studies self-control through a purely social lens and compares the joint 
self-control decisions of three different dyad types - homogeneous high self-control, 
homogeneous low self-control, and mixed, to determine which lead to better self-control within 
the dyad and which prove detrimental to the achievement of shared long-term goals. 
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Hristina Dzhogleva, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2014
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Taken together, the three essays of my dissertation make novel theoretical contributions 
not only to the self-control literature, but also to the literatures studying metacognition, self-
perceptions, social identity, dyadic decision making, and marital well-being. Furthermore, the 
findings of my dissertation offer a series of practical implications and insights that can guide 
consumers, public policy makers, and managers to achieve a variety of objectives.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Behaving in accordance with long-term goals is not an easy endeavor. Consumers are constantly 
surrounded by alluring temptations that come in a variety of forms – a mouthwatering, but 
unhealthy meal, an expensive splurge in the clothing store, and maybe a sudden urge to yell to 
their spouse or boss. Consumers’ failure to resist such temptations impedes the achievement of 
their long-term goals and often leads to poor life outcomes. In fact, such self-control lapses 
appear to be the cause for many of the most alarming societal problems, such as obesity, alcohol 
abuse, drug addiction, and excessive amounts of household debt.  
Given the importance of self-control for consumers’ well-being and success in life, my 
dissertation aims to provide novel theoretical insights to the self-regulation literature and inform 
practical interventions that work to consumers’ long-term benefit. Contrary to most extant 
research on the topic, my dissertation explores both individual and social dynamics of 
consumers’ self-regulation. My dissertation progresses from an internal, individual perspective 
on self-control to a socially-embedded, cooperative perspective.  
First, Essay 1 focuses on the internal state of the consumer, considering cognitive 
strategies used in self-control contexts, such as the recollection of previous self-control 
behaviors. Specifically, I explore two dimensions of consumers’ recall of self-regulation acts - 
valence and subjective difficulty of recall– and how their interplay influences current self-
control. Progressing toward understanding the social dynamics of self-control, in Essay 2 I 
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examine two specific strategies that consumers use to cope with social identity threats and 
compare their impact on self-control. Finally, in Essay 3 I study self-control through a purely 
social lens and compare the joint self-control decisions of three different dyad types - 
homogeneous high self-control, homogeneous low self-control, and mixed, to determine which 
lead to better self-control within the dyad and which prove detrimental to the achievement of 
shared long-term goals. 
Taken together, the three essays of my dissertation make novel theoretical contributions 
not only to the self-control literature, but also to the literatures studying metacognition, self-
perceptions, social identity, dyadic decision making, and marital well-being. Furthermore, the 
findings of my dissertation offer a series of practical implications. In each essay I provide a 
roadmap that can guide consumers, public policy makers, and managers to achieve a variety of 
objectives. Specifically, the insights of my work can (1) aid consumers in improving their long-
term well-being through embracing healthy eating habits, spending wisely, and achieving their 
long-term goals, (2) provide public policy makers with easily implementable interventions for 
overcoming various societal pathologies (obesity, household debt, alcohol addiction) and 
promoting greater savings for retirement, (3) help marketers increase sales of both healthy and 
indulgent foods, and (4) assist managers in the development of successful and productive teams 
at the workplace. 
1.1 ABSTRACT OF ESSAY 1 
I explore two dimensions of consumers’ recall of past self-regulation acts - (1) valence of 
recalled acts (successes or failures) and (2) the metacognitive information provided by the 
3 
subjective ease of retrieval – and how their interplay influences self-control. Seven studies reveal 
that recalling failures promotes indulgence regardless of recall difficulty. However, when 
recalling successes, metacognitive information matters: easily-recalled successes prompt 
consumers to demonstrate increased self-control than when the recall of past successes is 
difficult. I document that these effects are driven by consumers’ perceptions about their self-
control ability, as formed on the basis of their recollections. Moderation results also provide 
support for this mechanism, demonstrating attenuation of effects in two situations: first, for 
consumers who do not tend to integrate their past behaviors into their self-perceptions and 
second, when consumers lack the certainty to use self-beliefs to guide their current behaviors. 
Taken together, this work enhances our understanding of self-control, self-perceptions, and 
metacognition. 
1.2 ABSTRACT OF ESSAY 2 
Past research demonstrates that coping with social identity threats undermines subsequent self-
control. Yet there are many different strategies consumers use to cope with these threats: are all 
strategies equally costly to self-control? This work examines two specific coping strategies – 
where individuals either highlight positive dimensions of the self (superior self aspects strategy), 
or emphasize favorable intergroup differences (inferior others strategy) – and compares their 
influence on self-control.  In one field study and seven experiments, using both naturally-
occurring and manipulated threats, explicit and subtle strategy prompts, and measuring both real 
and hypothetical self-control behavior, I find that the intergroup differences strategy damages 
self-control more than the self-focused coping strategy. These differences in self-control occur 
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because the inferior others strategy requires individuals to shift their thoughts from accessible 
self-knowledge to inaccessible out-groups knowledge and this consumes self-regulatory 
resources. Consistent with this mechanism, two experiments demonstrate that increasing the 
accessibility of out-groups knowledge diminishes the detrimental impact of the inferior others 
strategy on self-control. These findings highlight the importance of understanding the potential 
differences and similarities among various coping strategies and contribute to both the social 
identity and self-control literatures. 
1.3 ABSTRACT OF ESSAY 3 
Opposites may attract, but do they succeed together? This research compares the joint 
self-control decisions of homogenous high self-control, homogeneous low self-control, and 
mixed self-control dyads. Seven studies conducted with virtual and lab-created dyads, as well as 
actual married couples in four self-control domains, robustly reveal that in joint decisions, 
homogeneous high self-control pairs make less indulgent choices than both homogeneous low 
self-control and mixed pairs. However, there is no difference in the self-regulatory patterns of the 
latter two dyad types: having one high self-control partner in a dyad does not lead to more 
restraint than having none. I argue that this pattern exists because higher self-control individuals 
tend to prioritize prorelationship behaviors over their personal preference for restraint. Therefore, 
they assent to the lower self-control partner’s more indulgent preferences. Consistent with this 
explanation, results suggest that interventions that change individuals’ pro-relationship 
motivation can alter this pattern. Given the range of decisions consumers may make in couples or 
pairs, this research has implications for consumers, marketers, and public-policy makers.  
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2.0  ESSAY 1: HAUNTS OR HELPS FROM THE PAST: THE INTERPLAY OF 
VALENCE AND EASE OF RECALL ON SELF-CONTROL 
Thoughts about the past may clutter our minds when we make decisions in the present. Imagine 
standing in your favorite department store, trying to decide whether you should splurge on an 
expensive piece of clothing despite the fact that it is well beyond your budget. While walking 
around the store, you may think, “Hmm, I spent so much money on the getaway weekend with 
my friends last week; I went over my credit card limit last month …” Or instead of focusing on 
recalling a few of your past self-control failures, you might think about some of your past 
successes. For instance, you might recall instances in which you resisted splurging on 
unnecessary items and saved your money instead. How would your current decision be affected 
by the experience of recalling your past self-regulation successes or failures?  
To answer this question, I explore two dimensions of consumers’ recall of past self-
regulation behaviors - (1) the valence of the recalled acts (past successes or failures) and (2) the 
metacognitive information provided by the subjective ease of retrieval – and how their interplay 
influences self-control. I show that recalling failures promotes indulgence regardless of recall 
difficulty. However, when recalling successes, metacognitive information matters: easily-
recalled successes lead consumers to exhibit better self-control than when the recall of successes 
is difficult. Using a chain-of-experiments approach (Meyvis, Goldsmith, and Dhar 2012; 
Spencer, Zanna, and Fong 2005), I show that these effects occur because consumers use recall of 
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the past to form perceptions of their present self-control ability. They then act in accordance with 
their beliefs about themselves. Consistent with this mechanism, I demonstrate that these effects 
occur only for consumers who integrate their past behaviors into their self-perceptions. 
Furthermore, again in support of the self-perceptions mechanism, I also show that when 
consumers experience situationally-low self-certainty, they no longer use their self-perceptions 
to guide their current self-regulatory behaviors. As such, while I replicate the proposed effects 
under conditions of high self-certainty (i.e., conditions in which consumers are certain in their 
self-perceptions and rely on their beliefs to guide their current self-regulation), when consumers 
experience low self-certainty, the effect of recall on current self-regulation is attenuated.  
The present work contributes new insights to the self-regulation literature, but also 
contributes to our understanding of the effects of metacognition and self-perception. First, I 
demonstrate that it is not only the valence of recall that matters, but also the metacognitive 
information that accompanies recall. As a result, the effect of easy recall may be completely 
different from the effect of difficult recall. My focus on the importance of the metacognitive 
experience of recall thus extends the work of Mukhopadhyay, Sengupta, and Ramanathan 
(2008), who examined how the valence of recall of past food-related temptations affects 
consumers’ current indulgence differently depending on their chronic impulsivity. Second, I 
show that the ease-of-retrieval effects are not symmetric in the case of recalling past self-control 
behaviors; the ease-of-retrieval effects emerge when one recalls self-control successes but not 
when failures are recalled as the later type of recall adversely impacts individuals’ mood, which 
inhibits reliance on the ease-of-retrieval heuristic. Thus, I contribute to the ease of retrieval 
literature by responding to Ruder and Bless’ call for more research investigating the limiting 
conditions of the ease of retrieval effects (2003). Third, previous research demonstrates that after 
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an initial act of self-control, subsequent attempts at self-control are more likely to fail. Across 
numerous studies, such failure is shown to be greater among depleted as opposed to non-depleted 
individuals (Baumeister, Vohs, and Tice 2007; Muraven and Baumeister 2000; Vohs 2006). My 
research reveals that self-control failures can occur even in the absence of differential depletion 
simply due to different recall activity.  As such, this research extends recent work showing that 
consumers’ own mental operations can influence their present self-control even without actual 
depletion of self-regulatory resources (Job, Dweck, and Walton 2010). Finally, past work has 
focused on balancing and licensing as explanations for the effect of past behaviors on current 
behaviors (Dhar and Simonson 1999; Khan and Dhar 2006). I show that consumers’ certainty in 
their self-view is an important factor that determines when recall produces self-consistency 
versus switching (e.g., licensing or balancing), such that either pattern of outcomes may be 
observed under conditions of high and low self-certainty respectively.  
2.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1.1 How does recall influence consumers’ decisions? 
Consumers often use their past behaviors to guide their present decisions (Albarracín and Wyer 
2000; Bentler and Speckart 1981; Ouelette and Wood 1998; Taylor 1975), thus making the 
recollections of one’s past an invaluable source of information which can be used to guide one’s 
actions (Aarts and Dijksterhuis 1999). People seem to intuit this role of memory. For instance, 
from their early childhood, children are often encouraged to think about their past mistakes and 
learn from them. How successful will this strategy be in the domain of self-control? 
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Some insight into how this practice may influence consumers is provided by the work of 
Mukhopadhyay et al. (2008), who demonstrate that the recall of past food-related temptations, 
which were either successfully resisted or succumbed to (successes versus failures respectively), 
interacts with consumers’ chronic impulsivity to influence their current self-control behaviors. 
Mukhopadhyay et al. (2008) find that impulsive consumers exhibit switching patterns, meaning 
that they succumb to current temptations if they recall having resisted a similar temptation in the 
past and vice versa; in contrast, non-impulsive individuals show behavioral consistency – they 
resist (succumb to) current temptations if they recall having resisted (succumbed) in the past.  
I propose that the valence of recalled information may not fully explain the effect of 
recollection on self-control. Extant research suggests that the recall of one’s past experiences 
provides individuals with two separate sources of information: the content of the recollections 
(i.e., valence) and the subjective experience of ease or difficulty with which those past 
experiences come to mind (Jacoby, Kelley, and Dywan 1989; Schwarz 1998, 2004). Current 
judgments, decisions, and actions are thus shaped not only by the valence of retrieved 
information, but also by the subjective experiences and feelings that accompany the retrieval 
process (Dijksterhuis, Macrae, and Haddock 1999, Schwarz 2004; Schwarz and Clore 1996; 
Schwarz and Vaughn 2002; Schwarz et al. 1991; Strack 1992).  
Most relevant to my research, Schwarz et al. (1991) demonstrate that evaluations of the 
self are formed on the basis of not only the contents of one’s recollections, but also the 
experience associated with the retrieval process itself, that is how subjectively easy or difficult it 
is to bring these contents to mind. For example, in their studies, Schwarz et al. (1991) showed 
that participants who had to recall 12 instances of assertive (unassertive) behavior and thus 
experienced greater retrieval difficulty perceived themselves as less assertive (less unassertive) 
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than participants who had to recall 6 such instances and found the retrieval easy. Retrieval 
difficulty qualified the recall content to such an extent that participants’ judgments were opposite 
to the conclusions drawn from the content that was brought to mind (Schwarz et al. 1991). Given 
these findings, I suggest that the work of Mukhopadhyay et al. (2008) can be meaningfully 
extended by examining the interactive influence of both valence of recollections and the 
metacognitive experience accompanying recall on consumers’ present self-control. I next present 
a framework that integrates these sources of information and suggests a mechanism by which 
they may interact to influence consumers’ tendency to indulge in the present. 
2.1.2 The interplay of valence of recalled acts and ease of recall on self-control 
My conceptual framework begins with the proposal that recall of self-control acts will prompt 
consumers to form perceptions about their own self-control ability. I ground this prediction in 
analytical work by Battaglini, Bénabou, and Tirole (2005), who propose that people often 
attempt to infer their own ability to resist temptations from their past actions. Due to imperfect 
knowledge about one’s self-control ability, individuals perceive their past choices as “indicative 
of ‘what kind of person’ they are” (Bem 1972; Bénabou and Tirole 2004; Prelec and Bodner 
2003). Recent research also shows that consumers infer the strength of their willpower from the 
way in which they handle tempting opportunities (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2012).  My prediction 
is also in line with self-efficacy theory, which argues that successes contribute to the building of 
a sound belief in one’s efficacy, while failures tend to undermine it (Bandura 1994). Therefore, 
recalling self-control failures should lead to negative perceptions of self-control ability, whereas 
recalling successes will encourage positive perceptions of self-control ability. But how will the 
subjective ease or difficulty of consumers’ recall alter these perceptions?  
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First, consider recalling one’s past successes at self-regulation. Schwarz et al. (1991) 
reveal that experiences retrieved in a subjectively easy manner are considered to be more self-
descriptive than those recalled with greater subjective difficulty. Based upon this ease-of-
retrieval heuristic (Schwarz et al. 1991), I therefore propose that individuals who find it easy to 
recall their past self-control successes will perceive themselves as better at self-control than 
those whose recall of past successes is difficult. Thus, individuals will perceive themselves as 
good self-regulators when the recall of past successes is easy. But when recall is difficult, they 
may not believe themselves to be particularly good at self-regulation, as the metacognitive 
information provided by the retrieval difficulty tempers their self-view.  
But what about cases in which consumers recall their failures? If failures were treated 
like successes, difficulty during recall should provide a metacognitive cue that the recalled 
failures are not characteristic of a consumer’s overall self-control ability. As such, consumers 
having difficulty recalling past failures at self-regulation should, based on the ease-of-retrieval 
heuristic, infer that they are better at self-control than those whose recall of failures is easy.  
However, note that the ease-of-retrieval heuristic may not be activated in the case of 
recalled failures. First, I suggest that recalling past self-control failures will adversely impact 
consumers’ mood. Since self-control failures are seen as normatively negative both for the self 
and the society (unlike the outcomes of interest studied within ease-of-retrieval research, e.g., 
assertiveness in Schwarz et al. 1991) (Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice 1994; Tangney, 
Baumeister, and Boone 2004), I anticipate that individuals whose recollection is focused on their 
past failures will be in a more negative mood state than those who recollect their successes. 
Furthermore, I suggest that the more negative mood associated with recall of failures will inhibit 
reliance on the ease-of-retrieval heuristic relative to the more positive mood generated by recall 
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of successes. Past research highlights that more negative affective states reduce reliance on 
heuristic information processing and increase the use of analytic processing (Schwarz 1990) and 
the information at hand (Bless and Schwarz 1999; Schwarz 1990). In addition, prior research has 
explicitly demonstrated that as affective states become more negative, individuals rely on the 
activated content rather than the experienced ease or difficulty in their judgments (Ruder and 
Bless 2003; Greifeneder and Bless 2008).1  
Thus, I anticipate that consumers will not use the difficulty-of-retrieval heuristic when 
they recall self-control failures because of the adverse effect that such recall has on their mood. 
Rather, when recalling failures, individuals will base their self-control perceptions only on the 
content of their recollections. As a result, any recall of failures, whether relatively easier or more 
difficult, will lead consumers to believe that they have less self-control. Taken together: 
H1:  The two recall dimensions - valence of recalled acts and ease of recall – will 
interact to influence consumers’ beliefs about their own self-control. Specifically: 
 
a) When consumers recall self-control successes, they will perceive 
themselves as worse at self-control when the retrieval is difficult than 
when it is easy, and, 
 
b) When consumers recall self-control failures, they will tend to perceive 
themselves as equally poor at self-control no matter whether the retrieval 
is difficult or easy.  
 
                                                 
1 I note that past research has already shown the ease-of-retrieval effects occur even in cases when one thinks about 
negative information (e.g., unassertiveness in Schwarz et al. 1999; undesirable risks in Song and Schwarz 2009; 
unsafe situations in Caruso 2008). However, note that the self-control failures studied in our work are seen as 
normatively negative both for the self and the society.  As a result, since those failures have negative implications 
for the self, their recall makes mood less positive and reduces reliance on the ease-of-retrieval heuristic. By contrast, 
the outcomes of interest often studied within ease-of-retrieval research (e.g., unassertiveness in Schwarz et al. 1991; 
reasons against choosing a BMW in Wänke, Bohner, and Jurkowitsch 1997; undesirable risks in amusement parks in 
Song and Schwarz 2009) could be seen as more normatively ambiguous. The recall of normatively ambiguous 
information would not necessarily affect mood (I don’t feel that bad if I failed to be assertive in a given situation, 
generated reasons against choosing a BMW, or evaluated undesirable risks in amusement parks), and therefore, the 
ease-of-retrieval heuristic is used in these cases. 
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I further propose that consumers’ self-perceptions resulting from the recall will change 
their behaviors with regard to a present self-control related decision. People have a vested 
interest in seeing that their self-perceptions do not change (Swann, Jr. and Ely 1984). Therefore, 
people tend to behave in a manner consistent with these self-perceptions. Furthermore, 
inconsistency with one’s beliefs about themselves is often viewed as “a painful or at least 
psychologically uncomfortable state” (Zajonc 1960, p. 282), which individuals are typically 
motivated to avoid. In fact, the desire to be self-consistent is so powerful that consumers tend to 
act consistently with their self-views even when those self-views are negative (Kwang and 
Swann, Jr. 2010). In addition to escaping the negative consequences of inconsistency, individuals 
are also likely to act in keeping with their own self-perceptions simply because consistency 
offers a convenient heuristic for decision-making (Cialdini 1993). In sum, I anticipate that 
consumers will behave consistently with their perceptions about their self-control ability, such 
that they will indulge (restrain) when they perceive themselves as being low (high) in self-
control. Formally: 
H2:  Consumers will act consistently with their own perceptions about their self-
control ability, such that they will restrain (indulge) when they perceive 
themselves as good (bad) at self-regulation. This will lead to the following effects 
of the two recall dimensions – valence and ease of recall – on present self-control: 
 
a) When consumers recall self-control successes, they will indulge more 
when the retrieval is difficult than when it is easy, and, 
 
b) When consumers recall self-control failures, they will indulge no matter 
how difficult or easy the retrieval of the self-control acts is. 
 
I test these predictions in seven studies. The first two studies provide support for 
hypotheses 1 and 2, showing that the interplay of valence and ease of recall shapes consumers’ 
perceptions about their self-control ability (study 1A), which, in turn, influences their current 
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self-regulatory behaviors in a perceptions-consistent manner (study 1B). In studies 2A, 2B and 
2C, I demonstrate the interaction of valence and ease of recall on current self-control (hypothesis 
2). I do this using real self-control behaviors in two different task persistence contexts (i.e., 
persisting on a challenging task in study 2A and allocating time between a funny video and an 
educational video about financial planning in study 2C), a more ecologically valid setting in 
which advertising stimuli cue the recall of successes or failures (study 2B), as well as both 
manipulating (studies 2A and 2C) and measuring recall difficulty (study 2B). Importantly, study 
2C’s design also allows me to show that the ease-of-retrieval heuristic is not used in cases of 
failure recall because of the effect of such recall on mood. Finally, the last two studies 
demonstrate moderation consistent with the proposed self-perceptions mechanism, such that 
effects are attenuated either for consumers who do not integrate their past behaviors into their 
self-perceptions or in situations of low self-certainty when consumers doubt their self-beliefs and 
are less likely to use them to guide current behavior.  
 
2.2 STUDY 1 
I first designed two studies to test hypotheses 1 and 2. Recall that I proposed that recalling self-
control behaviors will prompt consumers to form perceptions about their overall self-control 
ability, which in turn will change their current self-control behaviors. To demonstrate this 
proposed process, I used a “chain of experiments” approach, recommended by Spencer, Zanna, 
and Fong (2005) to show psychological process, as used recently by Meyvis, Goldsmith, and 
Dhar (2012). I note that this design is more appropriate for the present research than the 
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traditionally used measurement-of-mediation design because the measurement of the mediator 
after the outcome variable would likely be contaminated by participants’ behavior in the self-
control task (i.e., participants’ responses to the questions designed to measure the perceptions of 
their self-control ability will not be a pure reflection of their recall but rather will be biased by 
their more recent response to the self-control dependent variable). Thus, in the “chain of 
experiments”, study 1A will demonstrate the effect of the independent variables on the mediator 
(i.e., the interaction of valence and ease of recall on consumers’ self-perceptions), and, study 1B 
will show the influence of the mediator on the outcome variable (self-perceptions on current self-
control).  
2.3 STUDY 1A 
2.3.1 Method 
Study 1A followed a 2 (valence of recalled acts: successes vs. failures) x 2 (ease of recall: easy 
vs. difficult recall) between-subjects design. Participants (n = 133; 50% female) were 
undergraduate students who completed the study in exchange for course credit. The participants 
were told that they were taking part in an experiment examining the writing styles of college 
students and, therefore, they would be asked to write about past events. Participants randomly 
assigned to the successes condition were asked to recall and describe as fully as possible 
instances in which they were faced with a spending temptation (e.g., being tempted to splurge on 
an expensive, but unnecessary item that they really liked; being tempted to spend beyond their 
budget) and they were able to successfully control their spending behavior. Respondents in the 
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failures condition recalled instances in which they were faced with a spending temptation and 
they were not able to control their spending behavior. Following Pham, Lee, and Stephen 
(2012), I manipulated recall difficulty by having respondents recall either 2 or 10 instances.  
Following the writing task, all participants answered questions regarding their 
perceptions about their self-control ability. Specifically, respondents indicated their agreement 
with the following three statements using a 7-point scale, anchored by 1 = “Strongly Disagree” 
and 7 = “Strongly Agree”: “I am good at controlling my own behavior.”, “I am generally a 
success at self-regulation.”, and “I have a long history of self-control failures.” Participants’ 
responses to these three statements (α = .82) were averaged to create a self-control perceptions 
index. Furthermore, the difficulty of the recall task was measured by participants’ responses to 
two questions (“How difficult did you find the task of retrieving the similar past self-control 
instances?”, anchored by 1 = “Not Difficult At All” and 7 = “Very Difficult”, and “How easy 
was it to recall the similar past instance you were asked to list and describe in details?”, anchored 
by 1 = “Not Easy At All” and 7 = “Very Easy” (reverse-coded)), which were averaged (α = .93) 
to form a recall difficulty index used as a manipulation check. Participants’ demographic 
information was also collected at the end of the experiment. 
 
2.3.2 Analysis and results 
In all studies partial data were provided by some respondents on some variables; where 
data are available, they are included in the analysis. 
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2.3.2.1 Manipulation check 
I conducted a two-way ANOVA on the recall difficulty index as a function of the valence 
condition, ease of recall condition, and their interaction. As anticipated, only the main effect of 
the ease of recall condition was significant, F(1, 129) = 48.37, p < .0001, such that participants 
who recalled 10 acts (M = 5.54, SD = 1.49) perceived the recall task to be significantly more 
difficult than those who recalled only 2 acts (M = 3.55, SD = 1.82). 
2.3.2.2 Perceptions about one’s self-control 
A two-way ANOVA was performed in which the self-control perceptions index was 
predicted by the valence condition, the ease of recall condition, and their interaction. Results 
revealed a significant main effect of the ease of recall condition on self-control perceptions, 
F(1,129) = 4.12, p = .04, which was qualified by a significant interaction of the valence of recall 
and ease of recall, F(1,129) = 4.12, p = .04 (see figure 1). Planned contrasts revealed that 
participants whose recall of self-control successes was easy (M = 5.56, SD = 1.00) perceived 
themselves to be better at self-regulation than those whose recall of successes was difficult (M = 
4.79, SD = 1.04), F(1,129) = 8.29, p < .01. In contrast, participants in the failures condition 
possessed perceptions of being low in self-control no matter whether their recall was easy (M = 
4.91, SD = 1.15) or difficult (M = 4.91, SD = 1.19), p = .99. 
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Figure 1. Interaction of Recalled Act Valence and Retrieval Difficulty on Perceptions about Self-Control 
2.3.3 Discussion 
Study 1A provides support for hypothesis 1 by demonstrating the significant impact of the 
interaction of valence and ease of recall on consumers’ perceptions of their self-control (i.e., the 
IV  mediator part of the proposed conceptual chain). Specifically, results revealed that when 
participants recalled self-control failures, they did not use the ease-of-retrieval heuristic; rather, 
they based their self-control perceptions only on the content of their recollections. Thus, any 
recall of failures, whether easier or more difficult, led them to believe that they had less self-
control. In contrast, when recalling successes at self-regulation, the ease of retrieval and valence 
of recalled acts jointly determined participants’ perceptions of their self-control ability, such that 
individuals whose recall of successes was easy perceived themselves to be better at self-control 
than those whose recall was more difficult. 
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Study 1B proceeds with testing whether this change in individuals’ self-perceptions 
induced by the interaction of the two recall dimensions indeed influences current self-control 
(Hypothesis 2; i.e., the mediator  DV part of the chain of experiments). 
2.4 STUDY 1B 
2.4.1 Method 
Study 1B used a 2 (valence of self-control perceptions: negative vs. positive) between-
subjects design. Participants (n = 88; 56% female) were told that they would be asked to 
complete several unrelated tasks provided by different researchers. The first task was an essay 
writing task which contained the manipulation of self-control perceptions (adapted from Polivy 
and Herman 1991). In this task I randomly assigned them to write about one of two topics: “How 
poor has your self-control been in the last 24 hours?” (negative self-control perceptions 
condition) and “How good has your self-control been in the last 24 hours?” (positive self-control 
perceptions condition). To strengthen the manipulation I also gave participants the following 
additional directions: “…This might include telling us about times that you ate some unhealthy, 
but indulgent foods, bought something on impulse, or could not control your emotions in your 
interactions with others.” (negative self-control perceptions condition) and “…This might 
include telling us about times that you resisted eating some unhealthy, but indulgent foods, 
refrained yourself from buying something on impulse, or successfully controlled your emotions 
in your interactions with others.” (positive self-control perceptions condition). Following the 
essay writing task, participants were presented with an imagination task, in which they were 
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asked to imagine as vividly as possible a scenario that contained a self-control dilemma, adapted 
from Dholakia, Gopinath, and Bagozzi (2005): 
"Imagine that you have gone to the mall and your total budget for the whole shopping trip is $40 
in cash. As you are walking through the mall, your eyes fall upon a great-looking shirt. The shirt is 
of a style that you have wanted to buy for a long time, and is in your favorite color. You try the 
shirt on and you are surprised how perfectly it suits. Moreover, the salesperson tells you that they 
have just one piece left in your size, and it is unlikely that they will get more pieces in this style in 
the future. Unfortunately, the price of the shirt is beyond your cash budget. If you decide to 
purchase it, you would have to put the remaining balance on your credit card. You are sitting in 
the store trying to decide whether you should stick to your budget and forgo buying the shirt or 
pamper yourself with it by putting the amount of money above your budget on your credit card." 
 
At the end of the scenario, participants were told that the shirt could cost between $60 
and $160 (or from $20 to $120 above their cash budget) and were asked to indicate how much 
money they were willing to charge on their credit cards in order to purchase the shirt. The 
amount of money which participants were willing to put on their credit cards (hereafter referred 
to as the debt amount) was measured on a slider scale ranging from $0 to $120 and constituted 
the outcome variable in this study. Participants’ demographic information was collected at the 
end of the study as well. 
2.4.2 Analysis and results 
2.4.2.1 Pretest 
I first conducted a pretest to establish the effectiveness of the self-control 
perceptions valence manipulation. A separate group of participants (n = 49; 49% female) 
from the same population were randomly assigned to write an essay about how poor their 
self-control had been in the last 24 hours (negative self-control perceptions manipulation) 
or how good their self-control have been in the last 24 hours (positive self-control 
perceptions manipulation). Immediately after this manipulation, participants indicated 
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their agreement with the same three self-control perceptions items as in Study 1A which 
were averaged (α = .87) to create a self-control perceptions index to serve as a 
manipulation check. Using the same three-item self-control perceptions measure (as a 
measure of the mediator in study 1A and as a manipulation check of the manipulated 
mediator in study 1B) ensured that the psychological process as it was measured in study 
1A and as it was manipulated in study 1B were in fact the same variable (Spencer et al. 
2005). Results confirmed the manipulation effectiveness and showed that participants in 
the negative self-control perceptions condition (M = 3.37, SD = 1.70) perceived 
themselves to be worse at self-regulation than participants in the positive self-control 
perceptions condition (M = 5.19, SD = 1.47), F(1,47) = 16.11, p < .001.  
2.4.2.2 Debt amount 
I performed a one-way ANOVA using participants’ debt amount as the dependent 
variable and the self-control perceptions condition as the between-subjects factor. Results 
revealed that participants in the negative self-control perceptions condition (M = $19.52, SD = 
20.47) were willing to incur more credit card debt than those in the positive self-control 
perceptions condition (M = $10.44, SD = 15.03), F(1, 86) = 5.15, p = .03, thus demonstrating 
that people act consistently with their self-perceptions and supporting hypothesis 2. 
2.4.3 Discussion 
Studies 1A and 1B provide support for the mechanism underlying the effect of the joint influence 
of valence and ease of recall on current indulgence. I demonstrate that the content and ease of 
recall together lead consumers to change their perceptions about their overall self-control ability 
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(study 1A) and that self-control behaviors in the present are then consistent with beliefs about 
one’s self-control tendencies (study 1B). Specifically, I show that when participants focused on 
their past self-regulation successes, they perceived themselves as better at self-control when the 
retrieval of the past behaviors was easy rather than difficult. In contrast, when individuals 
focused on their unsuccessful attempts at self-control, this led them to believe that they were low 
in self-control no matter whether their recall was associated with ease or difficulty. 
Subsequently, individuals who had positive perceptions about their self-control tended to restrain 
themselves better than those who had negative beliefs about their own self-control tendencies. 
These results suggest that recalling failures may not help consumers learn from the past but 
rather, may lead them to repeat their mistakes. Further, recalling successes as opposed to failures 
will only help consumers’ self-regulation in the present when such recall is easy, since easy 
recall of success allows the maintenance of positive self-perceptions. 
2.5 STUDY 2 
Studies 2A, 2B, and 2C test the interactive effect of valence of recalled acts (successes vs. 
failures) and ease of recall on consumers’ current self-control. Further, these three studies seek to 
demonstrate the robustness of these effects across different self-control contexts and decisions. 
Finally, in study 2C, I also test a major proposition of my theory: that recalling failures adversely 
affects individuals’ mood. This negative mood, in turn, precludes the use of the retrieval 
heuristic when forming one’s self-perceptions (Ruder and Bless 2003).  
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2.6 STUDY 2A 
2.6.1 Method 
Study 2A followed a 2 (valence of recalled acts: successes vs. failures) x 2 (easy vs. difficult 
recall) between-subjects design. English-speaking participants (n = 173, 56% female) were 
recruited through an online panel and completed the study in exchange for a small payment. 
Participants were told that they would perform several unrelated tasks for different researchers. 
The recall manipulation was presented as a part of the first task, which was supposedly designed 
to examine people’s memory for various events. Unbeknownst to respondents, they were all 
randomly assigned to one of two kinds of events to recall: participants were asked to recall and 
describe as fully as possible past instances when they had to persist on a challenging task and 
they were either “able to persevere until the end and completed the difficult task successfully” 
(past self-control successes) or “were not able to persevere until the end and gave up too soon” 
(past self-control failures). I manipulated the difficulty of recall by asking respondents to recall 
either 2 or 10 such instances, following Pham et al. (2012). 
After the writing task participants proceeded to the second presumably unrelated task, in 
which they worked on solving a set of four solvable and one unsolvable anagram. Following 
prior research (Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister 1998), I used participants’ persistence at 
attempting to solve the unsolvable anagram as a measure of their self-control (in seconds).  At 
the end of the study, respondents provided their demographic information.  
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2.6.2 Analysis and results 
I excluded six outliers from the analysis as their values on the dependent variable were more than 
2.5 standard deviations above the mean (following Tavassoli and Fitzsimons 2006). Including 
those observations does not change the results. 
Time spent working on the unsolvable anagram was significantly skewed (skewness = 
2.57; Shapiro Wilk’s W = .78, p < .0001). I therefore conducted a two-way ANOVA on the log-
transformed persistence time as a function of the valence of recalled acts condition, the difficulty 
of recall condition, and their interaction. I note that the results reported next hold even when we 
use the non-transformed dependent variable. Results revealed only a significant interaction of the 
two between-subjects factors, F(1, 163) = 4.35, p = .04, shown in figure 2. Planned contrasts 
showed that participants for whom the recall of self-control successes was easy (raw M = 95.57 
sec, SD = 99.36; log-transformed M = 4.08, SD = 1.11) persisted significantly longer than those 
for whom the recall of successes was difficult (M = 49.12 sec, SD = 43.45; log-transformed M = 
3.47, SD = 1.02), F(1, 163) = 7.55, p < .01. However, in line with my predictions, the simple 
main effect of recall difficulty was not significant in the failures condition (raw Measy failures = 
70.43 sec, SD = 51.87, log-transformed Measy failures = 3.95, SD = .86; raw Mdifficult failures = 66.27 
sec, SD = 36.16, log-transformed Mdifficult failures = 3.99, SD = .75), p = .83.  
24 
 
Figure 2. Interaction of Recalled Act Valence and Retrieval Difficulty on Time Persisting at an Unsolvable 
Anagram 
2.6.3 Discussion 
Using real self-control behavior, study 2A provided support for hypothesis 2. Results revealed 
that participants who recalled two past self-control successes (easy recall) exhibited better self-
control and persisted significantly longer on a challenging task than those who retrieved ten such 
instances (difficult recall). However, when recalling failures at self-regulation, the difficulty of 
recall did not alter participants’ current self-control; individuals who retrieved past unsuccessful 
attempts at self-control tended to give up earlier on the anagram-solving task no matter whether 
their recall was easy or difficult. The next study tests the robustness of these effects in a more 
ecologically valid situation. First, study 2B examines whether a more subtle cue to recall past 
behaviors, such as that which may be used in an advertising context, would lead to the same 
effects. Further, I test whether the same effects will emerge based upon idiosyncratic (measured), 
rather than manipulated, differences in recall difficulty. 
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2.7 STUDY 2B 
2.7.1 Method 
Study 2B followed a 2 cell (valence of recalled acts: successes vs. failures) between-subjects 
design with the difficulty of the past self-control acts retrieval as a second continuously 
measured factor. English-speaking participants (n = 151; 58% female; $37,562 mean income) 
were recruited through an online panel and completed the study in exchange for a small payment. 
Respondents were presented with an advertisement about the products of a fictitious bank 
designed to cue recall of past self-control failures or successes in the spending domain, as 
established in the pretest (see Appendix A). 
After viewing these ads, participants were presented with a scenario asking them to 
imagine that they had just started a new job and were allowed to contribute to their new 
company’s 401(k) plan. Investing in a 401(k) plan represents a commitment to long-term 
financial well-being and thus is an appropriate measure of self-control (Nenkov, Inman, and 
Hulland 2008). Thus, the outcome of interest was participants’ likelihood to contribute to the 
401(k) plan, which was measured on 7-point scale, anchored by 1 = “Very Unlikely” and 7 = 
“Very Likely.” Participants also answered two questions regarding the difficulty of their recall 
(When you viewed the ad about WDS Bank, how difficult did you find the retrieval of your past 
self-control acts in the spending domain?”, anchored by 1 = “Not Difficult At All” and 7 = “Very 
Difficult”, and “When you viewed the ad about WDS Bank, how easy was it to recall your past 
self-control behaviors in the spending domain?”, anchored by 1 = “Not Easy At All” and 7 = 
“Very Easy” (reverse-coded)), which were averaged (α = .73) to create a retrieval difficulty 
index. Finally, I asked participants one more question which served as an additional 
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manipulation check (“When you viewed the advertisement about WDS Bank and its savings 
products, did you recall your past self-control acts in the spending domain?”, where 1 = 
“Definitely Yes” and 7 = “Definitely No”) and collected demographic information. 
2.7.2 Analysis and results 
For all analyses, recall condition was contrast coded (-1 = recall of past failures; 1 = recall of 
past successes) and recall difficulty was mean-centered (M = 2.79, SD = 1.67). I also controlled 
for several demographic variables given the nature of our dependent measure (age, gender, 
education, employment, and socioeconomic status). None of the covariates had a significant 
impact on the outcome variable or interacted with our independent measures. 
2.7.2.1 Manipulation and confound checks 
I estimated an ANOVA using the valence of recalled acts condition to predict the extent 
to which participants recalled their prior self-control behaviors when viewing the two ads. 
Participants in the two ad conditions did not differ significantly in the extent to which they 
recalled their past self-control acts (p = .83).  
2.7.2.2 Likelihood to contribute to a 401(k) plan 
I estimated a regression model in which difficulty, valence of recall/ad condition, and 
their interaction predicted participants’ likelihood to contribute to the 401(k) plan. Results 
revealed a significant negative main effect of recall difficulty, b = -.22, t(133) = -3.00, p = .003, 
which was qualified by a significant interaction of recall valence and difficulty, b = -.15, t(133) = 
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-2.10, p = .04. Following Aiken and West (1991), I plotted the values of the resulting regression 
equation at +1 SD and -1 SD from the mean subjective difficulty value, as shown in figure 3.  
For participants who viewed the advertisement cueing recall of self-control successes, 
greater retrieval difficulty was associated with a significantly lower likelihood of contributing to 
the 401(k) plan, b = -.37, t(133) = -3.73, p = .0003. In contrast, for those participants presented 
with the advertisement cueing recall of self-control failures, difficulty of retrieval did not change 
the likelihood of contributing to the 401(k) plan, b = -.07, t(133) = -.69, p = .49. 
 
Figure 3. Interaction of Recalled Act Valence and Retrieval Difficulty on Likelihood to Contribute to 401(K) Plan 
Note: The graph depicts the values of the dependent variable at the mean values of all covariates. 
2.7.3 Discussion 
Results again support hypothesis 2. Specifically, study 2B shows that when recalling failures, 
metacognitive experiences of difficulty or ease did not alter current self-control. However, 
participants recalling successes integrated the metacognitive information into their present 
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behavior. As a result, recalling successes did not enhance present self-control when recall was 
difficult, but encouraged participants to exhibit commitment to their long-term financial well-
being when recall was easy. Importantly, study 2B suggests that external recall cues can create a 
similar pattern of effects as those that are more explicit, making our findings a potential source 
of intervention development. I return to this possibility in the general discussion.  
The next study seeks to replicate the findings of studies 2A and 2B using a real self-
control behavior in a different task persistence context. Importantly, in study 2C I seek to 
provide support for a basic assumption of our theoretical framework: the recollection of past self-
control failures adversely impacts consumers’ mood (relative to those recalling successes). 
Further, study 2C also introduces a unique method for assessing one’s self-control.  
2.8 STUDY 2C 
2.8.1 Method 
Study 2C followed a 2 (valence of recalled acts: successes vs. failures) x 2 (easy vs. difficult 
recall) x 2 (mood measurement: mood-only group vs. full-design group) between-subjects 
design. Participants (n = 219; 61% female; Mincome = $34,499) were recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk and completed the study online in exchange for a small payment.  
Participants were told that the study consisted of several unrelated tasks. As in study 2A, 
the recall manipulation was presented as a part of the first task, which was supposedly designed 
to examine people’s memory for personal events. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of 
two kinds of events to recall: participants were asked to recall and describe past instances “when 
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you managed your time poorly, and didn’t get things done you needed to do” (failures condition) 
or “when you managed your time well and, even though you might have preferred to have had 
fun, you got everything done you needed to” (successes condition). As in prior studies, difficulty 
of recall was manipulated by asking respondents to recall either 2 or 10 such instances.  
At this point, individuals in the mood-only group responded to the PANAS scale 
(Watson, Clark, and Tellegen 1988), which contained 10 positive ( = .92) and 10 negative items 
( = .89), provided their demographic information, and the study was terminated. This group 
allowed me to test whether recall itself alters moods in ways consistent with my theory.  
Full design participants continued to a purportedly unrelated task. Here, they were given 
two videos to watch – an educational video about financial planning and a funny video which 
contained selected moments from the TV show Friends.  The duration of both videos was about 
5-6 minutes. Participants were presented with the two videos side by side on the same screen and 
given a total of 5 minutes to watch the videos in any order and for any amount of time they 
choose. They were told that they could switch between the videos at any time and that they 
would be automatically advanced to the next screen when the 5-minute timer expires. Thus, 
participants were presented with the real self-control dilemma of doing something pleasurable in 
the short run that has no long-term benefits (watching the funny video) versus doing something  
less pleasant and more tedious in the short run that would help them better manage their finances 
in the long run (watching the educational video). I used the proportion of time spent watching the 
funny video as a measure of participants’ self-control (time spent watching the funny video in 
seconds divided/total time of 300s). This new procedure represents a more sensitive measure 
than prior research in which self-control is assessed through the choice between more highbrow 
or lowbrow options (e.g., Read, Loewenstein, and Kalyanaraman 1999; Wang et al. 2010),  
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After the videos watching task, to test for mood-related effects, full-design participants 
responded to the same PANAS scale used by the mood-only participants. Finally, respondents 
provided their demographic information. 
 
2.8.2 Analysis and results 
2.8.2.1 Pretest 
To ensure that the videos watching task presented participants with a self-control 
dilemma, I conducted a separate pretest in which we randomly assigned participants (n = 62) to 
watch either the funny or the educational video. Participants were asked to rate the videos as 
highbrow or lowbrow, and as a relative vice or a relative virtue using 9-point scales anchored by 
1 = “Lowbrow”/“More of a vice” and 9 = “Highbrow”/“More of a virtue” respectively (as in 
Khan and Dhar 2007). Respondents also rated the quality of the video, its length and 
comprehensibility, their likelihood to recommend the video to others, attention paid to the video, 
and interest in watching the video. Results revealed that the educational video was perceived as 
more of a virtue (Med = 7.88, SD = 1.63; Mfunny = 3.48, SD = 1.88; F(1, 60) = 96.87, p < .0001), 
and more of a highbrow video than the funny video (Med = 7.61, SD = 1.98; Mfunny = 2.48, SD = 
2.26; F(1, 60) = 96.87, p < .0001). The two videos did not differ in quality, length, 
comprehensibility, likelihood to recommend the video to others, attention paid to the video, and 
interest in watching the video (all p’s > .24). 
31 
2.8.2.2 Mood results 
For participants in the mood-only group (who responded to the mood measures 
immediately after the recall task), I estimated two separate ANOVAs using the valence of 
recalled acts, the difficulty of recall, and their interaction to predict participants positive and 
negative mood. Results revealed only a significant main effect of the valence of recalled acts 
condition on both the positive mood index (F(1, 103) = 3.91, p = .05) and the negative mood 
index (F(1, 103) = 5.00, p = .03). The main effect of recall difficulty (both p’s > .07) and the 
interaction of the two factors (both p’s > .66) were not significant. In line with my theory, 
participants who recalled their self-control failures had less positive and more negative mood 
(Mpos = 2.51, SD = .83; Mneg = 1.54, SD = .69) than those who recalled their successes (Mpos = 
2.82, SD = .93; Mneg = 1.29, SD = .42). These results support my theory that recalling self-control 
failures adversely affects mood. This should mean that participants who continued onto the self-
control task should only integrate the difficulty of recall into their self-perceptions if they 
recalled successes (but not failures) as the negative affect generated by the recall of failure 
reduces reliance on the ease-of-retrieval heuristic. Therefore, for individuals who recalled 
successes, participants should behave in ways consistent with successful past self-control only if 
their recall was easy as opposed to difficult. For individuals who recalled failures, only the 
content (valence) of recall should be integrated into their self-perceptions, and thus should lead 
to low self-control in the present irrespective of retrieval difficulty. 
The same analysis was conducted also for the full-design group participants. Here neither 
the main effects nor the interaction was significant on both the positive and negative mood 
indices (all p’s > .15). 
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2.8.2.3 Proportion of time spent watching the funny video 
For the full design group, I estimated an ANOVA using the valence of recalled acts 
condition, the difficulty of recall, and their interaction to predict the proportion of time 
participants spent watching the funny video. None of the main effects were significant (both p’s 
> .40); however, a significant interaction of the valence of recalled acts and the difficulty of 
recall emerged, F(1, 108) = 4.91, p = .03 (see figure 4). Planned contrasts revealed that, 
supporting hypothesis 2, participants for whom the recall of past self-control successes was easy 
watched the funny video for a significantly shorter amount of time than those for whom the 
recall of successes was difficult (proportion: Measy successes = .23, SD = .28; seconds: Measy successes = 
69.03 sec, SD = 82.68; proportion: Mdifficult successes = .44, SD = .37; seconds: Mdifficult successes = 
133.44 sec, SD = 111.22; F(1, 108) = 4.25, p = .04). However, as predicted, the simple main 
effect of recall difficulty was not significant in the failures condition (proportion: Measy failures = 
.37, SD = .38; seconds: Measy failures = 110.11 sec, SD = 112.75; proportion: Mdifficult failures = .27, 
SD = .34; seconds: Mdifficult failures = 81.40 sec, SD = 100.76 p = .31). These effects hold also when 
using the raw amount of time spent watching the funny video as a dependent variable. 
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Figure 4. Interaction of Recalled Act Valence and Retrieval Difficulty on Time Spent Watching the Funny Video 
(in Seconds) 
2.8.3 Discussion 
In line with my theory, results for the mood-only group suggest that the recall of self-control 
failures has a negative impact on individuals’ mood in comparison to recalled successes, which, 
according to past research (Ruder and Bless 2003), reduces the use of the ease-of-retrieval 
heuristic in the formation of the beliefs about one’s self-control ability resulting from the 
recollection of previous behaviors. Then, consistent with these findings, the results for the full-
design group revealed that the difficulty of recall affected current indulgence only in the case of 
recalled successes but not in the case of recalled failures. More specifically, individuals whose 
recall of past self-control successes was easy showed more restraint by limiting the amount of 
time that they watched the funny video than those whose recall of successes was difficult 
presumably in an effort to maintain their positive self-perceptions. However, when consumers 
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recalled failures at self-regulation, they tended to indulge by watching the funny video no matter 
how difficult the recall of those past acts was.  
Thus far, results have provided robust evidence for hypotheses 1 and 2, suggesting that 
recall alters self-perceptions, which in turn shape behavior in a perceptions-consistent manner. 
The last two studies aim to provide additional support for the proposed self-perceptions 
mechanism underlying the effects of the valence and difficulty of recall on current self-control. 
2.9 STUDY 3 
My theory proposes that consumers’ recollection of their previous self-control acts (the 
interaction of valence and difficulty of recall) alters consumers’ beliefs about their self-control 
ability, which in turn influences their current self-control. However, one could argue that in 
certain situations or domains, some people might not necessarily integrate their past self-control 
behaviors into their self-perceptions. Therefore, we should see the hypothesized effects of 
valence and difficulty of recall on current self-control only in situations, domains, or for groups 
of people who habitually base their self-perceptions on their recalled self-control behaviors. 
To test this prediction, I had to find a domain in which there is identifiable variation in 
the extent to which people tend to base their self-perceptions on their past behaviors. Based on 
past research, we know that men and women differ in the way they think about diet and nutrition 
(e.g. Campbell and Mohr 2011; Dewitte, Bruyneel, and Geyskens 2009; Fishbach, Friedman, and 
Kruglanski 2003). Given that women tend to process these decisions more extensively (e.g., 
Wardle et al. 2004), I anticipated that they might be more likely to recruit recalled information 
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when forming their self-perceptions and thinking about their future choices. I tested this 
proposition in a short pretest described next. 
2.9.1 Pretest 
Participants (n = 93; 58% female) were undergraduate students at a large public university in the 
United States who completed the study in exchange for course credit. I asked participants to 
imagine that they were trying to determine how good of a self-controller they are when it comes 
to food. I asked them to indicate how much they would use each of the following sources of 
information to inform their own perceptions of themselves as a controlled eater: “how I have 
handled previous food temptations (i.e., whether I successfully resisted them or succumbed to 
them),” and “how well I have been able to control my eating behavior, historically.” I averaged 
these two items (r = .53, p < .0001)2 to form an index measure of the extent to which past self-
control behaviors are integrated in one’s own perceptions of a good self-controller in the eating 
domain (i.e. a controlled eater). A one-way ANOVA conducted on this index as a function of 
participants’ gender revealed that women are significantly more likely than men to integrate their 
past eating self-control behaviors in their current self-perceptions (Mfemale = 5.26, SD = 1.38; 
Mmale = 4.17, SD = 1.54; F(1, 91) = 3.85, p < .001).
3  
This pretest suggests that the recollection of previous acts in the eating domain affect 
self-perceptions more for women than for men. This means that in the eating domain, women 
                                                 
2 The results hold when we analyze these two items separately. The results were as follows: “how I have handled 
previous food temptations (i.e., whether I successfully resisted them or succumbed to them),” (Mfemale = 5.33, SD = 
1.43; Mmale = 4.05, SD = 1.73; F(1, 91) = 15.26, p < .001); “how well I have been able to control my eating behavior, 
historically” (Mfemale = 5.19, SD = 1.64; Mmale = 4.28, SD = 2.00; F(1, 91) = 5.72, p = .02). 
3 In this pretest I also included some unrelated items measuring the extent to which present self-control behaviors or 
future eating plans are integrated into one’s perceptions of being a controlled eater (e.g., “My current weight or diet 
goals,”  “My future eating plans”), but there are no gender differences on any of these items (all p’s > .30). 
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should exhibit the pattern of self-control behaviors resulting from the interaction of valence x 
ease of recall whereas the interaction should not be significant for men. This prediction was 
tested in study 3. 
2.9.2 Method 
The study followed a 2 (valence of recalled acts: successes vs. failures) x 2 (easy vs. difficult 
recall) design with participants’ gender as a third measured factor. Participants (n = 116; 42% 
female; Mage = 21.4 years) were undergraduate students at a large US public university, who 
completed the study for course credit. Participants were first told that they would complete a task 
for researchers interested in examining the writing styles of college students. Respondents were 
told that they would need to write about events that have happened to them in the past. 
Participants were asked to recall and describe as fully as possible instances when they were 
tempted to eat something delicious but very fattening and unhealthy and they either “were able 
to resist the temptation and refrained from it” (past self-control successes) or “succumbed to this 
temptation” (past self-control failures). As in prior studies, I manipulated the difficulty of recall 
by asking respondents to recall either 2 or 10 such instances. 
Immediately after the writing task participants proceeded to a presumably unrelated food 
tasting task, in which they were given a cup of 50 grams of cheeseballs and asked to taste and 
evaluate the snack on several dimensions (e.g. crunchiness, deliciousness, overall quality). Then 
all respondents completed filler tasks for about 10 minutes (e.g. read an article, watched a short 
video) and were invited to eat as much of the snack as they wanted while working on the 
remaining part of the study. The amount of cheeseballs (in grams) consumed by participants 
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during the experiment was used as a measure of self-control. Finally, participants provided their 
demographic information and were dismissed. 
2.9.3 Analysis and results 
One outlier was removed from analysis as its value on the dependent variable was more than 2.5 
standard deviations above the mean (following Tavassoli & Fitzsimons, 2006). 
I conducted a three-way ANOVA on the amount of cheeseballs eaten by participants 
predicted by the valence of recalled acts condition, the difficulty of recall condition, and 
participants’ gender. Results revealed a significant three-way interaction of valence of recalled 
acts x difficulty of recall x gender, F(1, 107) = 6.80, p = .01. Follow-up analysis demonstrated 
that the two-way interaction of valence x difficulty of recall was significant for female, F(1, 44) 
= 4.54, p = .04 (see figure 5), but not for male participants, p = .14. 
To follow up on the significant two-way interaction in the group of female participants, I 
ran planned comparisons. Results showed that females whose recall of self-control successes was 
easy (M = 7.36, SD = 5.97) ate significantly less cheeseballs than those whose recall of successes 
was difficult (M = 30, SD = 23.71), F(1, 44) = 9.21, p < .01. However, there was no difference in 
the amount of cheeseballs consumed by female participants in the easy (M = 16.69, SD = 18.30) 
and difficult recall of failures conditions (M = 18.14, SD = 16.14), p = .83.4 
                                                 
4 A separate posttest revealed that such gender differences in the extent to which past behaviors are integrated into 
the one’s self-perceptions do not exist in the domains of spending self-control (p = .71) and task persistence (p = 
.53). This suggests that the moderating effect of gender in the eating self-control study does not invalidate any of the 
previous studies which were conducted in the domains of spending self-control (Studies 1A, 1B, 3, and 5) and task 
persistence (Studies 2A and 2B). It is only the eating domain in which women and men integrate their past behaviors 
into their self-perceptions to a different extent; that is why the three-way interaction of valence of recall x ease of 
recall x gender emerges only in this study. 
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Figure 5. Interaction of Recalled Act Valence and Retrieval Difficulty on Amount of Cheeseballs Consumed 
(Female Participants Only) 
2.9.4 Discussion 
Results provide evidence of the underlying process by demonstrating that the hypothesized 
effects of valence and difficulty of recall on self-control emerge only for consumers who use 
their past self-control behaviors to inform their beliefs about their self-control ability but not for 
those who are less likely to base their self-perceptions on their past behaviors. Results showed 
that women are more likely than men to integrate their past behaviors into their self-perceptions 
in the eating domain. Thus, women (but not men) exhibited the predicted interactive effects of 
valence and difficulty of recall on current self-control when faced with a real eating temptation. 
Thus, by demonstrating a moderation of the recall (valence and difficulty) – self-perceptions link 
in our conceptual model, Study 4 provides evidence of the mechanism underlying the effects of 
valence and difficulty of recall on current self-control. The next study again provides process 
evidence but by showing a moderation of the self-perceptions – current self-control link in our 
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model and highlighting that consumers use their self-perceptions to guide their current behaviors 
in some situations but not in others. 
2.10 STUDY 4 
Recall that my theory suggests that the recall of self-control acts prompts consumers to form 
beliefs about their overall self-control ability and that consumers tend to act consistently with 
those self-control beliefs formed on the basis of their recollections. However, past research 
suggests that individuals’ self-beliefs usually differ in the certainty with which they are held 
(Baumgardner 1990). Self-certainty reflects the degree to which people believe that they know 
themselves well and are certain in the type of person they are or the traits that they possess 
(Baumgardner 1990; DeMarree, Petty, and Brinol 2007). Past research also reveals that people 
with a certain self-view (i.e., people who believe that they know themselves relatively well) are 
more likely to use their self-knowledge to guide their decisions and behaviors (DeMarree at el. 
2007; Petty et al. 2007; Setterlund and Niedenthal 1993; Visser, Bizer, and Krosnick 2006). In 
contrast, lack of certainty usually inhibits the use of the construct which an individual is 
uncertain about (DeMarree et al. 2007; Petty et al. 2007; Visser et al. 2006); thus, for individuals 
with an uncertain self-view, their self-conceptions are less likely to influence their actions. Based 
on this research and given my theory, I anticipate that consumers will use their self-control 
perceptions to guide their current decisions only when they are certain about those self-
conceptions. In contrast, when consumers are prompted to doubt their self-conception, they will 
not use those beliefs as a guide for their self-regulation. In other words, I expect that I will 
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replicate the effects of valence and ease of recall on current self-control in conditions of high 
self-certainty, but the effects will be attenuated in conditions of low self-certainty.  
2.10.1 Method 
My past studies have uniformly found null results when failures are recalled. As such, study 4 
focuses on testing the moderating effect of self-certainty in the recall of past self-control 
successes condition. Consequently, study 4 used a 2 (easy vs. difficult recall of successes) x 2 
(low vs. high self-certainty) between-subjects design. English-speaking participants (n = 98, 60% 
female, $38,147 mean income) were recruited through an online panel and asked to complete 
several unrelated tasks in exchange for a small payment. The first task, which was framed as a 
personality test, included both the recall difficulty and the self-certainty manipulations. 
Specifically, participants responded to a set of personality questions and were asked to recall and 
describe past experiences as a part of the personality test. Participants in the easy recall condition 
described 2 past instances in which they were faced with a spending temptation and they were 
able to successfully control their spending behavior; participants in the difficult recall condition 
were asked to retrieve 10 such instances. At the end of the personality test, participants were 
given bogus feedback regarding their personality profile. Participants in the high self-certainty 
condition were told that based on their responses, the computer program was able to easily 
construct a clear and consistent personality profile of who they were. In contrast, participants in 
the low self-certainty condition were told that the computer program could not compute a clear 
personality profile (following Morrison and Johnson 2011).  
In the second task participants were asked to prepare a monthly budget and allocate a 
total monthly budget of $2,500 among three categories: necessities, luxuries, and savings. In 
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order to ensure the effectiveness of the self-certainty manipulation, participants were also asked 
to indicate their agreement with the following statement: “The personality test results made me 
feel certain about who I am.” on a 7-point scale anchored by 1 = “Strongly Disagree” and 7 = 
“Strongly Agree.”. Finally, participants also provided their demographic information. 
2.10.2 Analysis and results 
2.10.2.1 Manipulation check 
I ran a two-way ANOVA on the self-certainty measure as a function of the recall 
difficulty condition, the self-certainty condition, and their interaction. Results revealed only a 
significant main effect of the self-certainty condition, F(1, 93) = 14.31, p < .001, such that 
respondents in the low self-certainty condition (M = 3.70, SD = 1.54) were less certain in their 
self-view than those in the high self-certainty condition (M = 4.78, SD = 1.30). 
2.10.2.2 Preference for luxuries versus necessities 
I was interested in consumers’ relative preference for luxuries as opposed to necessities 
when creating a monthly budget. As savings in this case could be available in the short-term, it 
could be subsequently used for either luxuries or necessities. Hence, the amount in savings in 
this case cannot be cleanly interpreted as a measure of self-control. However, the inclusion of the 
savings category allows the two amounts to be mathematically independent of one another 
(following Poynor and Haws 2009). Thus, for this study my outcome variable was created by 
dividing the amount of money budgeted for luxuries by the amount of money budgeted for 
necessities (hereafter referred to as the indulgence ratio).  
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I estimated a two-way ANOVA in which participants’ indulgence ratio was predicted by 
the recall difficulty condition, the self-certainty condition, and their interaction. Results revealed 
only a significant interaction of the two factors, F(1, 94) = 7.52, p < .01, shown in figure 6. 
Follow-up analyses showed that in the high self-certainty condition results replicated our 
previous findings: participants whose recall of self-regulation successes was easy budgeted 
significantly less money toward luxuries relative to necessities (M = .38, SD = .27) than those 
whose recall was difficult (M = .63, SD = .73), F(1, 94) = 4.65, p = .03. In contrast, in the low 
self-certainty condition I see a marginally significant reversal of the previously observed effects: 
respondents who recalled two self-control successes (easy recall) allocated slightly more money 
toward luxuries relative to necessities (M = .51, SD = .30) than those who retrieved ten such 
instances (difficult recall, M = .30, SD = .22), F(1, 94) = 2.98, p = .09).5  
 
Figure 6. Interaction of Retrieval Difficulty and Self-Certainty on Indulgence Ratio (Successes Condition Only) 
                                                 
5 Given the nature of the data and the dependent variable in this study, I checked whether there were any significant 
main or interactive effects of participants’ income. Results revealed no main effects or interactions of income with 
the manipulated variables, all p’s > .23. 
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2.10.3 Discussion 
Study 4 both provides replication of our prior findings and shows moderation consistent with our 
theoretical account. Specifically, in conditions of high self-certainty, individuals whose recall of 
past successes was easy exhibited significantly better self-control than those for whom the 
recollections of past self-regulation successes was more difficult. In contrast, in conditions of 
low self-certainty, results showed that the previously demonstrated effects were attenuated and 
even reversed to some extent. In cases when participants were uncertain about their self-view, 
individuals who recalled two past self-control successes (easy recall) were more likely to indulge 
than those who recalled ten successes (difficult recall). Since consumers who are uncertain about 
their self-views are less likely to use their self-perceptions as a guide for their actions (DeMarree 
et al. 2007; Petty et al. 2007; Visser et al. 2006), they might use the recalled experiences in a 
completely different way (Schwarz 2004). It may be that low self-certainty individuals simply 
use the past behaviors as data points to gauge the frequency of their past indulgences and 
restraints (Aarts and Dijksterhuis 1999). Thus, when the recall of self-control successes is 
difficult, individuals may assume that they restrained fairly infrequently in the past. By contrast, 
when recall of self-control success is easy, consumers feel that they have restrained fairly 
frequently. As a result, they are more likely to indulge when they believe that they have 
restrained enough in the past (easy recall of successes) than when they believe that their past 
restraints are insufficient to justify a present indulgence (difficult recall of successes). I note that 
my results are inconclusive regarding this possibility, however, and that future research may 
explore this further. 
Finally, it should be noted that the findings from both Studies 3 and 4 rule out depletion 
as an alternative account of the proposed effects of valence and ease of recall on current self-
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control. For instance, an alternative explanation for the reported findings might be that the 
interplay of valence and ease of recall creates different levels of depletion, leading to differences 
in current indulgence. If that were the case, we would expect that in the last two studies our 
pattern of effects would emerge irrespective of participants’ gender (study 3) and the self-
certainty manipulation (study 4). However, the moderation results of the last two studies rule out 
depletion as an alternative mechanism because it is unreasonable to expect that women and men 
experienced different levels of depletion resulting from the recall task or that the self-certainty 
manipulation could have changed participants’ felt depletion. 
2.11 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Across seven studies, I explore two dimensions of consumers’ recall of past self-regulation 
behaviors - (1) the valence of recalled acts (successes or failures) and (2) the metacognitive 
information provided by their subjective ease of retrieval – and how their interplay influences 
current self-control. Seven studies provide evidence that recalling failures is less helpful to 
present self-control than is recalling successes: in the domain of self-control, thinking positively 
may be a better strategy than is dwelling on past failures. However, this advice should be given 
with a caveat: recalling success is only beneficial for long-term goal pursuit when the retrieval of 
those acts is subjectively easy. I note that these effects hold in eating (study 3), spending (study 
1B, willingness to incur debt; study 4, ratio of luxuries to necessities in budgeting), and savings-
related decisions (study 2B, contribution to a 401K plan), as well as real self-control behaviors in 
the task persistence domain (study 2A, persistence on a challenging task; study 2C, time 
allocation).  
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Furthermore, results suggest that the joint impact of valence and ease of recall on current 
indulgence is driven by consumers’ perceptions of their self-control ability formed on the basis 
of their recollections of past self-regulation behaviors. I also highlight that the impact of recall on 
current self-control is attenuated for consumers who do not integrate their past self-control 
behaviors into their self-beliefs and in situations of low self-certainty when one’s self-
perceptions are no longer used to guide current behavior. 
This research makes a number of important theoretical contributions. First, my work 
emphasizes the importance of considering both the valence of recall and the metacognitive 
information provided by the subjective ease or difficulty of retrieval when examining how recall 
of self-regulation episodes affects current self-control. My work thus builds directly on recent 
work in self-control, extending prior findings in ways that are both practically and theoretically 
important. First, I extend the work of Mukhopadhyay et al. (2008), who show that the recall of 
past food-related temptations, which were either successfully resisted or succumbed to (success 
versus failure respectively), interacts with consumers’ chronic impulsivity to influence their 
current self-control behaviors. I first extend their work by demonstrating that the valence of 
recalled acts interacts not only with individual factors, but also with contextual variables, such as 
the subjective difficulty of one’s recall, to influence self-control. Further, I show that the joint 
impact of valence and ease of recall on current indulgence interacts with consumers’ self-
certainty, showing that it alters the way in which information from memory is used.   
Second, I build on the body of literature arguing that consumers’ own mental operations 
can influence their present self-control even when a depletion of self-regulatory resources might 
not be at play. The present research also extends the work of Job et al. (2010) who showed that 
individuals’ lay theories about willpower as a limited or unlimited resource can affect their self-
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control. While Job et al. (2010) focused on people’s general theories about the depletability of 
self-regulatory resources and their effect on self-control, my research emphasizes that 
individuals’ beliefs about their own self-control tendencies derived from the recall of past 
episodes also play an influential role in determining how well they self-regulate in the present, 
and do so without observable depletion effects. 
Third, my work contributes also to the ease-of-retrieval literature by showing that the 
ease-of-retrieval heuristic has asymmetric effects in the case of recalling prior self-control 
behaviors. That is, consumers use the ease-of-retrieval heuristic when they recall successes but 
not when they retrieve failures because the negative impact that failures recall has on mood 
reduces reliance on the ease-of-retrieval heuristic. Thus, I respond to the call of Ruder and Bless 
(2003) for further research into the conditions limiting the use of metacognitive information. 
Fourth, past research has focused on balancing and licensing as explanations for the 
effect of past behaviors on present actions (Khan and Dhar 2006). I show that at least in some 
situations, recollection may influence present behavior simply due to a tendency to be self-
consistent, showing consumers’ adoption of a less-complex decision-making heuristic. The need 
for self-consistency is often described as fundamental human motive (Lecky 1945), comparable 
to other drivers such as hunger and thirst (Festinger 1957). The desire to be self-consistent is so 
powerful that individuals have great interest in acting consistently with their self-views even 
when those views are negative (Kwang and Swann, Jr. 2010). My research extends such findings 
by showing that the desire for self-consistency also drives self-regulation, even when depletion 
does not appear to be operating and when doing so may lead to repeated failures.  
Fifth, I demonstrate that consumers’ self-certainty determines when recall of past 
episodes produces self-consistency versus switching behaviors (e.g., licensing or balancing). My 
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research reveals that when consumers are certain in their self-beliefs, they behave consistently 
with their self-control perceptions formed by their recall of past behaviors. On the other hand, 
when consumers experience low self-certainty, they are more likely to engage in switching 
behaviors. Thus, it appears that in high self-certainty conditions, individuals may use the past to 
form global, impactful self-evaluations, while in low self-certainty conditions, consumers use 
past information in a more heuristic sense, simply to determine their next action by virtue of the 
perceived frequency of past actions. 
Finally, my work also makes a methodological contribution by introducing a novel real-
behavior self-control task which could be of interest to other self-control researchers. 
Specifically, in study 2C I designed and pretested a videos watching task which presents 
individuals with a real self-control dilemma of how to allocate their time and which could easily 
be implemented online. Given the current ease of collecting data online, I believe that this videos 
watching task would allow researchers to easily incorporate real-behavior self-control dependent 
variables into their work in the self-regulation domain. 
Practically, my findings are relevant to consumers, practitioners, and public policy 
makers who wish to overcome problems such as obesity, procrastination, and consumer debt. I 
show that while recalling successes seems like a good idea, in cases when such recall is difficult, 
this strategy may backfire. And compared to easy recall of successes, recalling failures does little 
to enhance self-control, despite conventional wisdom that one learns from their past mistakes. In 
fact, my results instead argue that focusing on one’s past mistakes may doom us to repeat them. 
Furthermore, my findings suggest implementable tools that can be used to impact consumers’ 
behaviors. For instance, external advertising cues can create effects consistent with those created 
by explicit recall directions (study 2B). Therefore, messages that aim to increase retirement 
48 
savings and decrease debt, as well as financial advisors might be able to influence consumers’ 
spending behaviors by simple messages that prompt them to reflect on their past self-control 
successes in a subjectively easy manner or uncomplicated setting.  
Finally, my findings also offer interesting possibilities for future research. Here, I 
allowed participants to think about whatever came most easily to mind when recalling successes 
or failures. Future research, however, could explore whether a more direct cue to think about the 
negative consequences of failures would lead to better self-control. Notably, there are likely 
circumstances for which recall of past failures is quite useful as a self-control strategy, and 
having people focus on the consequences of their behavior may be one way to enhance the 
effectiveness of recall of past indiscretions. Further, we do not know how the strategy of 
recalling past self-regulation behaviors might compare to other self-control strategies (e.g., Hoch 
and Loewenstein 1991). Future research may explore the question of when recall strategies are 
most effective, or when other approaches would yield better results while building on our present 
framework regarding the valence, difficulty, and self-perceptions involved with self-control 
operations.  
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3.0  ESSAY 2: STRATEGIES TO COPE WITH SOCIAL IDENTITY THREATS: 
DEFENDING THE SELF WITHOUT SABOTAGING SELF-CONTROL 
People often encounter situations when important aspects of their identities are negatively 
evaluated and threatened. Imagine a diehard football fan who watches his beloved team lose 
miserably to an objectively “worse” opponent. Consider a college student majoring in business 
who reads that business students perform worse than engineering students in college. Or even 
imagine the experience of a young computer scientist who while waiting for a table in an upscale 
restaurant overhears people laughing about how computer scientists are nerdy, boring, and 
awkward. Situations such as these are called social identity threats and they abound in our lives, 
devaluing or undermining key elements of who we are, and causing us to seek effective ways to 
cope with them.  
Extant research reveals that social identity threats cause aversive psychological 
consequences (Baumgardner 1990), which motivate individuals to seek ways to cope with those 
threats and repair their self-worth (Steele 1988; Tajfel and Turner 1986). Unfortunately, the act 
of coping with social identity threats has detrimental downstream consequences for people, such 
that it hinders their self-regulation and ability to act in accord with their long-term goals (e.g., 
Inzlicht and Kang 2010; Inzlicht, McKay, and Aronson 2006). For instance, a growing body of 
research reveals that sports defeats, which are significant identity threats for fans, are associated 
with increased domestic violence incidences (Card and Dahl 2011), driving fatalities 
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(Redelmeier and Stewart 2003; Wood, Mcinnes, and Norton 2011), aggression- and alcohol-
related criminality such as DUIs, vandalism, and assaults (Rees and Schnepel 2009), and poor 
food choices (Cornil and Chandon 2013). Furthermore, Inzlicht and Kang (2010) demonstrate 
that individuals who experienced a stereotype threat (a form of social identity threat) exhibited 
impaired self-control in subsequent decisions, behaving more aggressively, consuming a greater 
amount of an unhealthy food, and making less rational decisions in comparison to non-threatened 
individuals.  
In summary, research suggests that coping with social identity threat damages 
individuals’ self-control in subsequent decisions. However, previous research has treated the 
process of coping with identity threats as a unitary construct or even as a “black box.” In other 
words, while researchers have been focused primarily on studying the consequences of social 
identity threat coping, little attention has been given to understanding and differentiating the 
various strategies that people could potentially use to cope with an identity-threatening situation. 
Thus, there are few insights as to whether the different coping strategies individuals use to 
manage social identity threats are equally costly to self-control. An interesting question, then, is 
whether certain coping strategies are more damaging to self-control than others. Might some 
strategies allow people to restore their self-worth following a social identity threat without 
undermining self-control? For instance, would the computer scientist choose a healthier dinner if 
he manages the social identity threat using certain strategies rather than others? 
The present research addresses this question. Like research on emotion-focused coping 
that has examined the advantages and disadvantages of different emotional regulation strategies 
(e.g., suppression versus reappraisal; Gross 1998), I argue that research on social identity threats 
coping can also be enriched by exploring the deeper question of how the different coping 
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strategies might have differential downstream consequences. I take the first step towards 
addressing this gap in the literature and examine the impact of two strategies for coping with 
social identity threats on self-control. Specifically, I look at two common strategies, namely the 
social creativity strategies suggested by Tajfel and Turner (1979; 1986), which involve 
“highlighting positive dimensions of the self” on which the in-group is superior to the out-group 
or “emphasizing intergroup differences that reflect positively on the in-group”. I refer to these 
strategies as superior self-aspects and inferior others respectively, and demonstrate that while 
they are equally effective at repairing the self, they differentially impact subsequent self-control. 
Specifically, the superior self-aspects strategy leads to better self-control in later tasks than does 
the inferior others strategy.  
Furthermore, I identify the mechanism underlying the proposed effects: accessibility of 
self- versus out-groups-knowledge. I demonstrate that a social identity threat activates the self, 
making self-knowledge more accessible. The superior self-aspects strategy, which highlights 
additional self-dimensions, maintains a mental focus on the accessible self, conserving self-
regulatory resources. However, the inferior others strategy requires the individual to shift his 
thoughts from active self-knowledge to relatively less accessible out-groups knowledge, 
consuming self-regulatory resources and undermining subsequent self-control. As a result, 
individuals perform better in self-control challenging situations after the use of the superior self-
aspects strategy than after the inferior others strategy.  
The present research contributes to both the social identity and self-regulation literatures. 
First, our work contributes to the social identity literature in two key ways. Specifically, I shed 
light on the use and effects of two social creativity strategies for coping with identity threats 
(Tajfel and Turner 1986) that are frequently used but largely unexamined by researchers. 
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Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first research to examine differences between 
the various coping strategies used to manage social identity threats. While past research has 
studied different coping strategies in isolation from one another (e.g., Branscombe and Wann 
1994; Cheryan and Monin 2005; Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears 1995; Maas et al. 2003; White 
and Argo 2009), currently there are few insights about the costs of each strategy, whether certain 
strategies are more appropriate to use than others, when and under what conditions this is the 
case, and why. This research takes a first step toward filling this gap in the literature by 
comparing two different coping strategies, while focusing on how they influence individuals’ 
subsequent self-control.  
Second, this work contributes to research focused on studying the interrelationship 
between social identity and self-control. While past research demonstrates that coping with 
social identity threats leads to poor self-control (Cornil and Chandon 2013; Inzlicht and Kang 
2010; Inzlicht et al. 2006), I show that this relationship depends on the specific coping strategy 
used, with certain strategies allowing people to repair their self-worth without significantly 
undermining self-control. Precisely, my contribution above and beyond the related work is 
twofold: (1) I examine the specific coping strategies that individuals use to cope with a social 
identity threat (treated as a “black box” in previous research); (2) my work shows that not all 
coping strategies negatively impair subsequent self-control; in fact, my findings reveal that the 
self-control exhibited by individuals using the superior self strategy was comparable to that of 
non-threatened individuals.  
Finally, the current research has important implications for individuals’ well-being and 
contributes to the self-control literature by revealing an effective strategy that reduces the 
negative impact of social identity threats on self-control. My research suggests that individuals 
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can benefit from knowing the differences and self-regulatory costs of the two social creativity 
strategies, revealing that the superior self-aspects approach preserves limited self-regulatory 
resources and allows people to make healthier food choices and wiser spending decisions. 
In what follows, I briefly review research on social identity threats, develop the 
hypotheses regarding the differential impact of the two coping strategies on self-control and the 
mechanism underlying these differences, and then present a series of field and lab studies that 
provide empirical support for my propositions. I conclude with a discussion of the theoretical 
contributions, practical implications, and directions for future research. 
3.1 SOCIAL IDENTITY THREATS 
Identity theory defines an individual’s self-concept through two aspects: personal identity, 
comprised of the individual’s traits and attributes, and social identity, derived from his 
membership in different social groups (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Social identity has gained 
considerable attention by researchers (e.g., Davis, Spencer, and Steele 2005; Ethier and Deaux 
1994; Logel et al. 2009; Nadler, Harpaz-Gorodeisky, and Yael 2009; Oyserman 2009; 
Oyserman, Fryberg, and Yoder 2007; Reed et al. 2012; Sinclair, Hardin, and Lowery 2006; Van 
Vugt and Hart 2004; White and Dahl 2007), as research has found that behavior is better 
predicted by discrete social identities than by the global self-concept (Kleine, Kleine, and Kernan 
1993).  
As social identities provide both organization and coherence to the self-concept, 
individuals are motivated to maintain positive views of their social identities (Abrams and Hogg 
1998). Yet they often find themselves in situations where their social identities are negatively 
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valued or threatened. Such social identity threats are characterized by thoughts, feelings, 
behaviors, or experiences that challenge the positive view of one’s social identity (Breakwell 
1983) and can occur in various forms, such as in-group value threats, stereotype threats, 
prototypicality threats, and distinctiveness threats (Branscombe et al. 1999). Individuals who see 
the threat as relevant to important self-structures (Boninger, Krosnick, and Berent 1995; 
Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 2002) then experience numerous aversive consequences, such as 
weakened task performance (Steele 1997), avoidance of situations in which the in-group is 
threatened (Major et al. 1998), and diminished physiological and psychological well-being (Cole, 
Kemeny, and Taylor 1997; Major and O’Brien 2005). To avoid or reduce such negative 
consequences, individuals often implement various strategies aimed at repairing the self (e.g., 
Branscombe and Wann 1994; Cheryan and Monin 2005; Steele 1988; Tajfel and Turner 1986). 
While coping with social identity threats repairs self-worth, it also undermines 
subsequent self-control (Inzlicht and Kang 2010; Inzlicht et al. 2006). As identity-threatening 
situations require individuals to alter their thoughts and behaviors to restore the positive view of 
their social identity, such efforts consume self-regulatory resources and subsequently lead to 
self-control lapses (Karoly 1993; Muraven and Baumeister 2000).  For instance, Inzlicht and 
colleagues (2006) demonstrate that stigmatized individuals use their limited self-control 
resources to repair their devalued social identities and then exert less self-control in other 
domains compared to non-stigmatized individuals. In addition, coping with stereotype threats (a 
form of identity threat) depletes individuals and leaves them unable to control their subsequent 
behaviors, leading them to behave more aggressively, eat more unhealthy foods, and make 
riskier decisions (Inzlicht and Kang 2010).  
55 
However, do all coping strategies equally impair subsequent self-control? My work 
extends this research by examining whether different strategies for coping with social identity 
threats are equally detrimental to subsequent self-control, and the process through which these 
differences may occur. I focus on two common strategies for coping with social identity threats 
which have remained largely unexamined by previous researchers, namely the two social 
creativity strategies identified by Tajfel and Turner (1986). In the next section, I describe these 
strategies in greater details and derive my predictions regarding their differential effects on 
subsequent self-control.  
3.2 STRATEGIES FOR COPING WITH SOCIAL IDENTITY THREATS AND 
THEIR IMPACT ON SELF-CONTROL 
I examine two specific strategies for coping with social identity threats: both are social creativity 
strategies, in that they seek “positive distinctiveness for the in-group by redefining or altering the 
elements of the comparative situation” (Tajfel and Turner 1986).  In other words, these two 
strategies attempt to modify the threat-producing judgment to produce more positive evaluations 
of the in-group, thus repairing the threatened social identity. Two approaches could make the 
threatening comparison less intimidating: one could emphasize other good identity traits instead 
of focusing on the threatened dimension, or one could bring to mind other out-groups that 
perform even worse than the in-group on the threatened dimension 
The first coping strategy is referred to as superior self-aspects and involves “comparing 
the in-group to the out-group on some new dimension” (Tajfel and Turner 1986).  For example, 
Lemaine (1966) demonstrated that children’s groups which compared unfavorably to other 
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groups in terms of constructing a hut (because of poor building materials) used other comparison 
dimensions on which they performed better than the out-group, such as the hut’s surroundings. 
Lalonde (1992) showed that hockey teams at the bottom of the league emphasized the fact that 
top teams tended to play “dirty”; thus, those threatened hockey players essentially changed the 
comparison dimension from game performance to ethical sportsmanship to restore their positive 
self-view. In practical terms, this strategy implies that the individual ignores or downplays the 
threatened self-aspect and instead focuses on or emphasizes other positive self-aspects on which 
they are superior to the contrasting out-group. For instance, a sports fan who reads that fans of 
his favorite team are considered “ruder and more ignorant” than other fans might instead think, 
“we may not be polite, but we are more loyal and enthusiastic fans than them.”  
The second strategy for dealing with social identity threats involves “changing the out-
group with which the in-group is compared” to avoid using a higher-status out-group as a 
comparison point (Tajfel and Turner 1986). In other words, when coping with a social identity 
threat, individuals may strategically compare themselves with out-groups that tend to perform 
worse on the threatened identity dimension and emphasize intergroup differences which reflect 
positively on their in-group (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Evidence for the use and effectiveness of 
this strategy was shown by Rosenberg and Simmons (1972), who found that when African-
Americans made self-comparisons to other African-Americans their self-esteem was higher than 
when Caucasians were used as a comparative frame of reference. In essence, this strategy 
(referred to as inferior others) suggests that individuals remain focused on the poor-performance 
dimension, but selectively think about other groups that perform even worse on that dimension. 
For example, the threatened NFL fan might acknowledge the crassness of his hometown fans but 
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bring to mind the fans of other cities who are even worse, thinking “Steelers fans might not be 
polite, but at least they aren’t as rude as Eagles fans—they have no decency at all!”  
While other strategies for coping with social identity threats have been proposed, such as 
individual mobility or social competition (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), I focus on the two social 
creativity strategies for both theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, these strategies are 
conceptually similar as they both involve cognitive processes aimed at changing elements of the 
comparative situation to restore the positive social identity. Practically, both strategies offer 
subtle and easily implementable cognitive forms of coping with social identity threats, which 
could be executed in almost any identity threatening situation. While other strategies, such as 
individual mobility (leaving the threatened group) or social competition (engaging in direct 
competition with the out-group) might be impossible in some circumstances (e.g., if an 
individual’s ethnic identity is threatened, he cannot simply leave the threatened group), the two 
social creativity strategies can be applied to most social identity threats as they only require 
subtle cognitive changes and thus are more frequently used by people than other strategies.6  
To make predictions about the effects of the two coping strategies on self-control, it is 
first necessary to propose a framework for the cognitive effects of an identity threat. I propose 
that a threat to a specific dimension of an individual’s social identity will activate and make this 
particular threatened attribute of the self more accessible. Past research demonstrates that 
identity threatening situations lead to increased identity salience and stronger in-group 
identification (Christian et al. 1976; Forehand, Deshpandé, and Reed 2002). Importantly, this 
heightened activation of the identity and its accompanying knowledge structures should only 
                                                 
6 A pilot study (n = 122) assessed the frequency of using the four different coping strategies proposed by Tajfel and 
Turner (1986). Results revealed that two social creativity strategies (Msuperior self =5.47; Minferior others = 4.10) are more 
commonly used by people than the individual mobility (Mind mobility = 3.20) and social competition (Msoc competition = 
3.44) strategies (all p’s < .01).  
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occur for those individuals who strongly identify with the threatened social identity (Ellemers et 
al. 2002). Individuals who only weakly identify with, or do not possess, the threatened identity 
should find the threatening situation irrelevant; and thus experience no salience effects. 
Furthermore, due to spreading activation (Anderson 1983), the activation of the 
threatened aspect of the self should lead to activation and increased accessibility of other aspects 
of individuals’ self-concept (Kleine et al. 1993). Spreading activation can be incorporated into 
the proposed effects of coping strategy on self-control as it is widely recognized that an 
individual’s self-concept is a unique knowledge structure in memory (Kleine et al. 1993; Markus 
1977). Consequently, spreading activation processes, characteristic of general human knowledge, 
are also likely to occur in an individual’s identity knowledge structure. In sum, after the 
experience of a social identity threat, an individual’s self-knowledge (i.e., knowledge of all traits 
defining one’s identity) becomes more accessible and salient for use in further cognitive 
processing (Carver 1975; Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne 1998). 
Once the social identity threat has registered with the individual and activated his self-
knowledge, he is motivated to cope with the threat and repair his social identity. In the coping 
process, the individual might rely on one of the two social creativity strategies focused on in this 
research. As described above, while both strategies share the characteristic of changing the social 
comparison, each does so through distinct routes. The inferior others strategy requires 
individuals to think about out-groups that perform worse on the threatened dimension, creating a 
favorable intergroup comparison between the second-rate out-group and the in-group. This 
implies that implementing the inferior others coping strategy shifts thoughts from active self-
knowledge to relatively inactive others-knowledge. Specifically, previous research has found that 
when the self becomes the focus of attention, individuals are particularly likely to behave in 
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accordance with internal self-traits (Carver 1975; Macrae et al. 1998). Therefore, shifting away 
from active self-knowledge requires effortful, controlled processing (Greenberg et al. 1994) 
which depletes self-regulatory resources and increases self-control failures in subsequent 
situations. Past research also shows that thought-control depletes the limited pool of self-
regulatory resources (Wegner et al. 1987), as does strategically altering one’s thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviors (Ellis and Ashbrook 1989; Gailliot, Schmeichel, and Baumeister 2006). Thus, I 
propose that utilizing the inferior others coping strategy requires individuals to effortfully shift 
their thoughts from the active self to the inactive others, reducing their self-regulatory resources 
and leading to subsequent self-control failures. In contrast, the superior self-aspects strategy 
requires individuals to highlight other positive dimensions of the self, remaining focused on 
accessible concepts. As the social identity threat has activated both the threatened self-dimension 
and broader self-aspects, I predict that this coping strategy will not consume a significant amount 
of self-regulatory resources. Even though both strategies involve changing one element of the 
comparison situation, I propose that changing the comparison attribute (as required by the 
superior self-aspects strategy) would be easier for people than changing the comparison group 
(as required by the inferior others strategy) since individuals’ self-knowledge has been activated 
as a result of the identity threat experience. In sum, I hypothesize:  
H1:  Individuals who use the superior self-aspects strategy to cope with a social 
identity threat will exhibit better self-control in subsequent situations than those 
who implement the inferior others strategy. 
 
H2: The differential effect of coping strategy on subsequent self-control will only be 
true for individuals who strongly identify with the threatened social identity. 
 
I further predict that these differences in self-control occur because: 
H3:  A social identity threat will activate the self and heighten the accessibility of self-
knowledge. 
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H4:  The shift in thoughts  from accessible self-knowledge to inaccessible out-groups 
knowledge, required by the inferior others strategy will consume self-regulatory 
resources; in contrast,  the superior self-aspects strategy will not require self-
regulatory resources to enact since it involves retaining the thoughts on the 
accessible self. 
 
I test these hypotheses in one field study and seven experiments. The field study 
demonstrates that the inferior others strategy is more detrimental to subsequent self-control than 
the superior self-aspects strategy using a real-world setting, a naturally occurring social identity 
threat, and participants’ actual food purchases as a measure of self-control. Again with actual 
food consumption, study 1 replicates these findings in a controlled lab environment, with a 
different social identity. Studies 2A and 2B consider the interplay of the two coping strategies 
and people’s identification with the threatened social group on subsequent indulgence. Using two 
different self-control domains (spending and eating), these two experiments demonstrate that the 
inferior others strategy is more detrimental to subsequent self-control than is the superior self-
aspects, but only for individuals who identify strongly with the threatened in-group and not those 
with weak in-group identification for whom the threat is not relevant (non-threatened 
individuals). Study 3 replicates these findings using advertising stimuli in which I embed both 
the social identity threat and coping strategy cues, demonstrating that even subtle manipulations 
of the coping strategies can lead to the predicted effects. Finally, the last three experiments 
provide evidence for the proposed mechanism: study 4A demonstrates that encountering a social 
identity threat increases the accessibility of the self; studies 4B and 4C show that increasing the 
accessibility of out-groups knowledge reduces the detrimental impact of the inferior others 
strategy on self-control.7  
                                                 
7 I note that we do not cross the coping strategy condition with a threat vs. no threat condition in any of the 
experiments because the strategy implementation is not possible in the absence of a threat. I instead examine the 
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3.3 FIELD STUDY 
The field study tests whether utilizing the two different strategies to cope with social identity 
threats differentially impacts subsequent self-control. I conducted this study in a coffee shop, 
used a naturally occurring social identity threat in the environment, and assessed participants’ 
self-control by examining their actual purchases. 
3.3.1 Method 
To take advantage of a naturally-occurring social identity threat, I conducted the study on the 
days following two painful losses of the local NFL team (hereafter called Team X). I intercepted 
participants at the entrance of a coffee shop located on-campus of a large public university and 
asked them to participate in a short study in exchange for $2. Respondents (n = 38, 37% female) 
were individuals who indicated that they considered themselves to be fans of Team X and who 
had watched the game the previous night. The study used a 2 (Coping Strategy: superior self-
aspects, inferior others) group design. In order to remind participants of the social identity threat, 
a large poster notified them that they could participate in a quick survey about the “loss of Team 
X last night” and displayed the game score. The survey contained two parts. In part 1, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the two coping strategies and were asked to 
complete five sentences in response to Team X’s loss the previous night. Participants in the 
superior self-aspects condition completed sentences beginning with: “Yesterday Team X made 
                                                                                                                                                             
moderating effect of strength of identification with the threatened identity and use participants with weak in-group 
identification (in studies 2A, 2B, and 3) as a proxy for the no-threat condition. 
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more mistakes than Team Y, but Team X were still better than Team Y at…”. In contrast, 
respondents in the inferior others condition filled out five sentences beginning with: “Yesterday 
Team X made more mistakes than Team Y, but at least they did not mess up as badly as…” 
Participants were told that they could fill out as many sentences as they want. The average 
number of sentences completed was 4 and did not differ between the two conditions (p = .37).  
After completing part 1 of the survey, participants entered the café to purchase their 
meals and/or drinks, and were asked to come back to the experimenter to complete the second 
part of the survey. In part 2, participants answered demographic questions, described their 
purchases, provided their receipts, and received payment. 
3.3.2 Analysis and results 
I obtained the nutritional information of all participants’ meals and drinks from the website of 
the coffee shop. I used the total grams of fat and amount of calories in participants’ purchases as 
a measure of their self-control, such that higher fat and calories content signaled less self-control 
(Fujita and Han 2009).  
Consistent with previous research (e.g., Tavassoli and Fitzsimons 2006), before 
proceeding with the analysis I screened the data for outliers and excluded one respondent whose 
values on the dependent variables were more than 2.5 standard deviations above the mean. To 
account for the relationship between the two dependent variables (r = .846, p < .0001), I 
conducted a one-way MANOVA on the total grams of fat and number of calories in participants’ 
purchases predicted by the strategy condition. Results revealed a significant main effect of the 
strategy condition, Wilks’s lambda = .842, multivariate F(2, 34) = 3.19, p = .05. The purchases 
of participants in the inferior others condition contained significantly more fat and calories (Mfat 
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= 16.52g, SD = 10.76; Mcal = 463, SD = 202.95) than those of respondents in the superior self-
aspects condition (Mfat = 8.87g, SD = 8.83; Mcal = 287, SD = 212.82), F(1, 35) = 5.19, p = .03 
and F(1, 35) = 6.46, p = .02 respectively.  
3.3.3 Discussion 
This field study provides the first evidence in support of my prediction, using a real world setting 
in which people’s social identity was threatened by a naturally occurring event (the loss of their 
favorite football team) and where the differential impact of the two coping strategies on self-
control was reflected in their actual purchasing behaviors. In line with my theory, participants 
who used the superior self-aspects strategy to cope with the loss of their favorite football team 
made healthier choices and purchased foods containing less fat and calories than those using the 
inferior others strategy. In fact, individuals who used the latter strategy consumed meals which 
had 86% more fat and 61% more calories than those who utilized the former strategy. These 
results build on the findings of Cornil and Chandon (2013) who showed that sports defeats 
increase unhealthy eating; but importantly I highlight that the strategy that people use to cope 
with the identity-threatening experience moderates this effect. Thus, this initial field study 
suggests that individuals may attenuate the negative impact of identity threats on self-control by 
using the superior self-aspects strategy rather than the inferior others one.  
Given that the field experiment demonstrated the differential impact of the two social 
creativity coping strategies on self-control in a naturalistic consumption setting, the next study 
aims to provide evidence of this proposition in a controlled lab environment. In study 1 I induce 
a social identity threat and manipulate coping strategy usage, and use participants’ actual food 
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consumption as a measure of their self-control. Moreover, in study 1 I threatened a different 
social identity of our participants - their identity as business students. 
3.4 STUDY 1 
3.4.1 Method 
Study 1 used a 2 (Coping Strategy: superior self-aspects, inferior others) group design. 
Participants (n = 44, 64% female) were students pursuing a business degree at a large public 
university and completed two ostensibly unrelated studies for course credit. Specifically, 
participants encountered the identity threat and were directed to use a specific coping strategy in 
the first study. I manipulated the social identity threat by asking participants to imagine that they 
were having a conversation with a group of friends in the school cafeteria. While chatting, one 
friend mentioned a recent newspaper article that discussed how business students tend to perform 
significantly worse academically than engineering students (see Appendix B). After reading the 
article, participants were asked to imagine how they would respond to the criticisms of business 
students. At this point, participants were assigned to one of the two coping strategies.  
In both conditions participants completed five sentences that began with precise phrases 
designed to cue the appropriate coping strategy. Specifically, in the superior self-aspects 
condition, participants completed five sentences, all of which began: “I might not be as 
intelligent as the engineering students but I am…” This phrase prompted respondents to come up 
with other positive self-aspects. In contrast, participants in the inferior others condition 
completed five sentences, beginning with: “I might not be as intelligent as the engineering 
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students but at least I am not as unintelligent as…” This prompt made them think about other 
groups of people who perform worse than them on the threatened dimension. The effectiveness 
of this manipulation was confirmed in a separate pretest reported in Appendix C, section C.1. 
In the second seemingly “unconnected” study, participants took part in a food tasting 
task, in which they were given a cup of 80 grams of M&M’s  and asked to taste and evaluate the 
candies on several dimensions (e.g., crunchiness, sweetness). Then they completed several filler 
tasks (e.g., watched a short video and answered questions about it) and were invited to have as 
many M&M’s as they wanted while working on those tasks. At the end of the filler tasks, the lab 
administrator collected and weighed the remaining grams of M&Ms for each participant. 
Unbeknownst to respondents, the amount of M&M’s consumed during the experiment was used 
as a measure of self-control (following Ward and Mann 2000). 
3.4.2 Analysis and results 
One outlier was removed from analysis as its value on the dependent variable was more than 2.5 
standard deviations above the mean (Tavassoli and Fitzsimons 2006). 
I conducted a one-way ANOVA using the grams of M&M’s consumed by each 
participant as the dependent variable and the coping strategy condition as the between-subjects 
factor. Results revealed that individuals who used the superior self-aspects strategy consumed a 
significantly smaller amount of M&Ms (M = 20.13g, SD = 11.48) than those who implemented 
the inferior others strategy (M = 38.25g, SD = 29.29), F(1, 41) = 5.25, p = .03.  
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3.4.3 Discussion 
Using more controlled laboratory conditions in which I induced a social identity threat 
and manipulated coping strategy use, study 1 provides additional evidence for my prediction. In 
line with the theory and the findings in the field study, the results demonstrate that the inferior 
others coping strategy leads people to exhibit poorer self-control and consume a greater amount 
of an indulgent snack than does the superior self-aspects strategy.  
3.5 STUDY 2 
Past research demonstrates that social identity threats mainly affect those that identify closely 
with the threatened in-group (Boninger et al. 1995; Ellemers et al., 2002). Consequently, we 
should observe the predicted effects of the two strategies on self-control only for individuals who 
identify strongly with the threatened in-group but not for those with weak identification, for 
whom the social identity threat is not relevant (Maass et al., 2003). I test this proposition in the 
next two experiments in which I again threatened participants’ business student identity but used 
a more diverse sample with greater variation in individuals’ identification with the threatened 
group. In contrast to study 1 which was conducted only with business students, the samples in 
the next two studies included college students pursuing degrees in a variety of disciplines and 
thus the extent to which they identified themselves with the threatened in-group varied. Three 
additional objectives of studies 2A and 2B were to: (1) provide support for the differential 
impact of the two coping strategies in a non-eating self-control domain (study 2A); (2) rule out 
mood as an alternative explanation (studies 2A and 2B); (3) assess the strategies’ effectiveness, 
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showing that they are equally successful at restoring the self after a social identity threat (study 
2B). 
3.6 STUDY 2A 
3.6.1 Method 
Study 2A followed a 2 (Coping Strategy: superior self-aspects, inferior others) between-
subjects design with participants’ in-group identification as a second continuously-measured 
factor. Participants (n =141; 65% female) were students at a large private university and 
completed three seemingly unrelated studies; they were paid $10 for a one-hour session.  
First, participants rated their identification with the group of business students on a four-
item scale (e.g., “I see myself as a business student; Hogg & Hains, 1996) anchored by 1 = 
“Strongly Disagree” and 7 = “Strongly Agree”. These four items were averaged (α = .92) to 
create a business student identity index.  Then participants encountered the identity threat and 
were directed to use a specific coping strategy (as in study 1). Finally, participants proceeded to 
the third “unrelated” study, in which they faced a self-control challenging situation. All 
respondents were asked to read and imagine as vividly as possible the following scenario, 
adapted from Dholakia, Gopinath, and Bagozzi (2005): 
“Imagine that you have gone to the mall to buy a few pairs of socks. As you are 
walking through the mall, your eyes fall upon a fashionable and attractive 
sweater. It happens to be in your size and favorite color. The salesperson tells 
you that the piece on display is the last one left, and they are unlikely to get 
more of the sweaters in this particular style in the future. You are trying to 
decide whether you should stick to your budget and purchase only the socks you 
need or pamper yourself with the fashionable sweater as well.” 
 
68 
The outcome of interest was their likelihood to indulge and purchase the attractive 
sweater instead of sticking with their budget, measured on a 9-point scale, anchored by 1 = 
“Definitely will stick to my budget and buy only the pair of socks” and 9 = “Definitely will 
pamper myself with the fashionable sweater in addition to buying the socks.” Finally, to rule out 
mood as an alternative explanation, I collected four mood measures on a 7-point scale anchored 
by “Very Unhappy/Very Happy”, “In a Bad Mood/In a Good Mood”, “Very Negative/Very 
Positive”, and “Very Satisfied/Very Dissatisfied” (reverse-coded). These four measures were 
averaged (α = .93) to create a mood index.  
3.6.2 Analysis and results 
I excluded nineteen participants from the analysis because they were either engineering students 
or did not indicate their major. As the manipulation threatened the business student identity 
while at the same time elevating the engineering student identity, all participants who either 
majored in engineering or did not indicate their major were excluded. Furthermore, seven 
participants did not respond to the self-control measure. In all subsequent analyses the coping 
strategy condition was contrast coded (-1 = inferior others; 1 = superior self-aspects) and 
participants’ business student identity was mean-centered (M = 3.60, SD = 1.80). 
3.6.2.1 Confound checks 
The mood index was regressed on participants’ business student identity, the coping 
strategy condition, and their interaction. Results showed no significant interaction of business 
student identity and coping strategy condition (p = .65), suggesting that results are not due to 
systematically different moods created by the threat or the coping strategy. Similar results were 
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obtained in study 2B and thus they are not discussed further. Moreover, a separate study in which 
participants’ mood was measured immediately after they implemented the coping strategy also 
revealed no systematic mood differences between the two strategy conditions (p = .75)8. This 
alleviates potential concerns with the mood measurement in studies 2A and 2B that the mood 
induced by the strategies use might have dissipated or might have potentially changed by the 
time participants responded to the mood measures.  
3.6.2.2 Likelihood of indulging 
I estimated a regression model in which business student identity, the coping strategy 
condition, and their interaction predicted participants’ likelihood to indulge. Results revealed 
only a significant interaction of the coping strategy and participants’ business student identity, b 
= -.41, t(112) = -3.35, p = .001; neither main effect was significant (both p’s > .21). Following 
Aiken and West (1991), I plotted the values of the regression equation at +1 SD and -1 SD from 
the mean business student identity (see figure 7).  
Probing at various levels of participants’ business student identity reveals that for 
participants with strong in-group identification, the likelihood of indulgence depended on the 
coping strategy used: individuals who used the superior self-aspects strategy were significantly 
less likely to indulge than those who utilized the inferior others strategy, b = -.76, t(112) = -2.39, 
p = .02. In contrast, for participants with weak in-group identification, who did not experience an 
identity threat, the effect of the strategy condition was also significant but in the reverse 
direction, b = .72, t(112) = 2.35, p = .02).  
                                                 
8 More details about this study are available from the author. 
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Figure 7. Interaction of Coping Strategy and Business Student Identification on Likelihood of Indulgence 
3.6.3 Discussion 
Study 2A provides further support for my prediction that the specific ways in which individuals 
cope with social identity threats differentially undermines self-control. As anticipated, however, 
the differential impact of the two coping strategies on self-control emerged only for participants 
who actually experienced a threat (i.e., with high business student identity; Ellemers et al. 2002) 
but not for those who did not experience a threat (i.e., with low business student identity). 
Participants who identified strongly with the business students group and were prompted to use 
the superior self-aspects strategy exhibited better self-control than those who utilized the inferior 
others strategy.  
In contrast, for participants with weak identification with the threatened in-group the 
inferior others strategy led to better self-control than the superior self-aspects strategy. This 
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result was unexpected as our research probes the effect of the two coping strategies on self-
control after individuals’ social identity has been threatened, and past research suggests these 
“low identifiers” did not experience an identity threat (Ellemers et al. 2002; Schmitt and 
Branscombe 2001). However, I speculate that this result may be due to the fact that as this group 
of participants did not identify with the business student group, but were forced to think about 
that group (through the threat and sentence completion prompts), thus they effectively had their 
out-group knowledge made accessible (i.e., the group of business students was an out-group for 
those participants). Thus, the inferior others strategy may be less taxing because they had been 
thinking about out-groups through the threat and sentence completion task, yet the superior self 
strategy required them to come up with aspects about an identity they did not possess, requiring 
greater self-regulation, and thus resulting in the pattern of effects observed. I explore the effects 
of activating out-group knowledge as a potential moderator of my theory in studies 4B and 4C. 
3.7 STUDY 2B 
3.7.1 Method 
Study 2B used a 2 (Coping Strategy: superior self-aspects, inferior others) group design with 
participants’ in-group identification as a second continuously-measured factor. In this study I 
also included a control no threat condition (a “hanging” control condition) to compare the self-
control performance of threatened participants using the two strategies with that of non-
threatened individuals. Participants (n = 105, 56% female) were college students, who took part 
in this experiment in exchange for course credit. The procedure was similar to study 2A with the 
72 
one exception being that self-control was examined in a different domain. Participants first rated 
their identification with the group of business students using the same four-item scale ( = .91) 
as in study 2A. Then participants were presented with the social identity threat and prompted to 
utilize one of the two coping strategies (as in the previous two experiments). Respondents in the 
control no threat condition read a neutral article regarding the African elephant taken from 
National Geographic and completed five sentences related to it (“I learned from the article about 
the African elephant that…”). Finally, all participants responded to the self-control challenging 
task, in which they imagined that they were at the grocery store and had all of their basics 
covered, but were looking for some snack food. As a measure of self-control, participants 
indicated their likelihood of purchasing a healthy but less tasty snack (granola/nutrition bars) 
which they saw in the store.9 
This study also incorporated two measures to assess the effectiveness of the coping 
strategies at repairing self-worth after a threat: performance and social state self-esteem 
(Heatherton and Polivy 1991), both measured on 7-point scales anchored by 1 = “Strongly 
Disagree” and 7 = “Strongly Agree”. The performance state self-esteem scale includes seven 
items to measure an individual’s self-evaluation of their performance ability (e.g., “I feel 
confident about my abilities.”), averaged (α = .87) to create a performance state self-esteem 
index. The social state self-esteem scale includes seven items which assess an individual’s social 
confidence (e.g., “I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure”), averaged 
(α = .88) to form a social state self-esteem index. State self-esteem has been demonstrated to be 
an appropriate measure of momentary changes in the different components of the self-concept 
                                                 
9 A separate pretest indicated that granola/nutrition bars are considered to be healthy (M = 5.34 vs. scale midpoint = 
4, t(31) = 7.83, p < .0001) and virtuous (M = 5.52 vs. scale midpoint = 4, t(30) = 7.96, p < .0001) food options. 
Thus, the use of likelihood of purchasing granola/nutrition bars as a measure of self-control is warranted. 
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(Heatherton and Polivy 1991). Past research suggests that social identity threats diminish 
individuals’ self-esteem (Branscombe and Wann 1994; Frable et al. 1994), so state self-esteem 
should capture the effectiveness of the two coping strategies.  
3.7.2 Analysis and results 
As in study 2A, I excluded from analyses eight participants who were either engineering students 
or did not indicate their major. This left eighty-four participants in the threat conditions and 
thirteen participants in the control (no threat) condition. In all analyses the coping strategy 
condition was contrast coded (-1 = inferior others; 1 = superior self-aspects) and participants’ 
business student identity was mean-centered (M = 3.76, SD = 1.80). 
3.7.2.1 Likelihood of purchasing a healthy snack 
I regressed participants’ likelihood of purchasing the healthy snack on their level of 
business student identity, the coping strategy condition, and their interaction. Neither main effect 
was significant (both p’s > .47). As predicted, however, the interaction of in-group identification 
and coping strategy was significant, b = .30, t(80) = 2.85, p < .01). I plotted the values of the 
resulting regression equation at +1 SD and -1 SD from the mean value of the participants’ in-
group identification (see figure 8). 
I examined the high and low levels of participants’ business student identity using 
spotlight analysis (+1 SD and -1 SD; Aiken and West 1991) to identify the pattern of differences 
on participants’ likelihood to purchase the healthy snack. As in study 2A, participants who 
identified strongly with business students were influenced by the coping strategy used: those 
participants who used the superior self-aspects coping strategy indicated greater likelihood of 
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purchasing the healthy snack than participants who utilized the inferior others strategy, b = .55, 
t(80) = 2.03, p < .03. Consistent with the results in study 2A, for participants with low in-group 
identification, the effect of the coping strategy was also significant but in the reverse direction, b 
= -.53, t(80) = -2.01, p = .05.  
 
Figure 8. Interaction of Coping Strategy and Business Student Identification on Likelihood of Purchasing a Healthy 
Snack 
 
Further insights were provided by the control (no threat) condition, in which participants 
responded to the self-control scenario without having encountered a threat to their social identity. 
The control no threat condition was treated as a hanging control condition in the analysis. Results 
revealed that participants who identified strongly with the group of business students and used 
the inferior others strategy to cope with the social identity threat (M = 4.17) were significantly 
less likely to purchase the healthy snack than participants in the control no threat condition (M = 
5.31), t(80) = -2.68, p < .01. In contrast, high business student identity individuals, who utilized 
the superior self-aspects strategy (M = 5.27), exhibited self-control comparable to that of non-
threatened participants and were equally likely to purchase the healthy snack (p = .90). 
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Furthermore, participants with low business student identity (i.e., who did not experience a 
threat) in the inferior others strategy condition (M = 5.53) had similar self-control to those in the 
control no threat condition (p = .57). However, low business identity participants in the superior 
self-aspects condition (M = 4.46) had significantly less self-control than those in the control 
condition, t(80) = -2.34, p = .02). 
In sum, the control comparison suggests that while using the inferior others strategy to 
cope with a social identity threat significantly impaired individuals’ self-regulation in subsequent 
situations, utilizing the superior self-aspects strategy did not inhibit participants’ self-control, as 
seen in their similar degree of restraint as unthreatened individuals. Furthermore, consistent with 
my earlier results, for individuals with low in-group identification it was the superior self-aspects 
strategy that was detrimental to self-control rather than the inferior others one as the threat 
activated out-groups knowledge rather than self-knowledge. 
3.7.2.2 Strategy effectiveness 
I performed two separate multiple regressions in which participants’ social and 
performance state self-esteem were predicted by their in-group identification, coping strategy, 
and the interaction of the two variables. The results of the two regressions did not reveal any 
significant main or interaction effects (all p’s > .10), suggesting that the two coping strategies 
were equally successful in restoring the positive view of the self.10 Furthermore, the performance 
and social state self-esteem of high business student identity participants who experienced a 
                                                 
10 A separate study in which the state self-esteem measures were taken immediately after participants implemented 
the two strategies also revealed no significant differences in the performance and social state self-esteem of 
participants in the two strategy condition (both p’s >.60). In this study, I also measured participants’ state collective 
self-esteem (adapted from Luhtanen and Crocker 1992); results again revealed no significant differences between 
the two conditions (p = .92). 
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threat and coped with it in two distinct ways was similar to that of low business student identity 
respondents for whom the social identity threat was not relevant. These results suggest that the 
two strategies are equally effective in restoring the self-worth of the threatened participants to the 
level of their unthreatened counterparts.  
3.7.3 Discussion 
Study 2B replicates the earlier findings, but in a different self-control domain. The results 
again show that the impact of the two coping strategies on self-control varied significantly for 
participants who identified strongly with the threatened group and thus actually experienced a 
social identity threat. Specifically, participants with strong in-group identification who were 
prompted to use the inferior others strategy after encountering a social identity threat were 
significantly less likely to purchase a healthy but less tasty snack than those who used the 
superior self-aspects strategy.  
Furthermore, study 2B demonstrated that only the inferior others strategy impaired 
subsequent self-regulation: the self-control exhibited by high business student identity 
participants assigned to the inferior others strategy condition was significantly lower than the 
self-control of non-threatened participants. However, there were no significant differences in the 
self-regulatory patterns of high business student identity individuals who used the superior self-
aspects strategy and control non-threatened respondents. Finally, the results of study 2B show 
that the two coping strategies were equally effective for coping with social identity threats, as 
evidenced by participants’ similar performance and social state self-esteem in the two strategy 
conditions, and their similarity to the unthreatened low business student identity group. This 
finding further emphasizes the importance of the different negative impact of the two coping 
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strategies on people’s self-control: as both strategies are equally successful at restoring self-
worth, implementing the superior self-aspects appears to be the better option since it helps 
people preserve their limited self-regulatory resources. 
The purpose of study 3 was to examine whether the same effects of the two coping 
strategies on self-control would emerge when: (1) the social identity threat is embedded in an 
advertising stimulus; (2) individuals are subtly cued by the advertisement text to use one of the 
two strategies as a way to cope with the presented threat; and (3) the strategy execution is subtle 
(i.e., without explicit writing of responses to the threat). If the effects hold under these 
conditions, this would reinforce the practical implications of my findings—demonstrating that 
each coping strategy can be easily prompted and implemented.   
3.8 STUDY 3 
3.8.1 Method 
Study 3 used a 2 (Coping Strategy: superior self-aspects, inferior others) group design 
with participants’ in-group identification as a second continuously-measured factor. Participants 
(n = 50, 39% female) were English-speaking college students, who took part in this experiment 
in exchange for course credit. Respondents completed two ostensibly unrelated tasks. First, 
participants rated their identification with NFL fans on the same four-item scale as in studies 2A 
and 2B (α = .95). Respondents were then randomly assigned to view one of two advertisements. 
Both advertisements contained the social identity threat: “People say football fans are more 
obnoxious, loud, and annoying than baseball fans.” Furthermore, each advertisement also cued 
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the use of one of the two coping strategies. The text of the superior self-aspects strategy ad read: 
“But c’mon! We know that they are plenty of positive sides to football fans too…Just think of a 
few of those: 1… 2… 3…”; while the text of the inferior other strategy ad was as follows: “But 
c’mon! We know that they are plenty of fans that are more crude than you…Just think of a few 
of those: 1… 2… 3…” The two advertisements did not differ in any other aspect (see Appendix 
D). To be consistent with the cover story, after being exposed to the ads, participants rated them 
on several dimensions (e.g., attractiveness, persuasiveness).  
As part of a subsequent “unrelated” task participants imagined that they would receive a 
snack for their participation and indicate how much that they would like to eat each item on a list 
of snacks on a 7-point scale anchored by 1 = “Not At All”, and 7 = “Very Much So”. The list of 
snacks included both unhealthy (e.g., potato chips) and healthy (e.g., apple) options (Laran 
2010). Participants also imagined that they had to choose one snack and indicated their choice.  
3.8.2 Analysis and results 
Three participants were excluded from the analysis because they were not familiar with 
American football (i.e., NFL).  In all analyses, the coping strategy/ad condition was contrast 
coded (-1 = inferior others; 1 = superior self-aspects) and participants’ strength of identification 
with the group of NFL fans was mean-centered (M = 4.85, SD = 1.76). 
3.8.2.1 Appeal of unhealthy snacks 
The main dependent variable was the appeal of the unhealthy snacks which was created 
by averaging the appeal ratings of all unhealthy snacks (α = .87). The appeal of the unhealthy 
snacks was then regressed on participants’ NFL fan identity, the coping strategy/ad condition, 
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and their interaction. Results revealed a significant main effect of strength of NFL fan identity, b 
= .28, t(43) = 2.24, p = .03, which was qualified by a significant interaction of participants’ NFL 
fan identity and the coping strategy/ad condition, b = -.33, t(43) = -2.64, p = .01. The values of 
the regression equation were plotted at +1 SD, the mean value, and -1 SD from the mean of 
participants’ in-group identification, shown in figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Interaction of Coping Advertisement and NFL Fan Identity on Appeal of Unhealthy Snacks 
Using spotlight analysis, I probed the pattern of differences on the appeal of the 
unhealthy snacks at the high and low levels of individuals’ NFL fan identity (+1 SD and -1 SD). 
As in studies 2A and 2B, participants who strongly identified with the group “NFL fans” were 
influenced by the coping strategy used: participants who were exposed to the superior self-
aspects strategy advertisement found the unhealthy snacks less appealing than participants who 
saw the inferior others strategy ad, b = -.77, t(43) = -2.69, p = .01. In contrast, those participants 
who only weakly identified with NFL fans had no difference in their self-control based on the 
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type of strategy in the ad (p = .22). Similar results were obtained when we used the ratio of the 
appeal of the unhealthy snacks to the appeal of all snacks or the ratio of the appeal of the 
unhealthy snacks to the appeal of the healthy snacks as the dependent variables. 
3.8.2.2 Snack selection 
A logistic regression was also run on participants’ snack choice (coded as 1 = healthy 
snack; 0 = unhealthy snack) predicted by participants’ NFL fan identity, the coping strategy/ad 
condition, and their interaction. Results showed a significant interaction of strength of in-group 
identification and coping strategy, b = .44, Wald χ2 (1) = 4.03, p = .04. Follow-up analyses 
revealed that for participants who identify strongly with the NFL fan identity, those who viewed 
the superior self-aspects strategy ad were 2.4 times more likely to select a healthy snack than 
participants who were cued with the inferior others strategy, b = .88, exp(b) = 2.41, Wald χ2 (1) = 
3.43, p = .06. There was no difference in the likelihood of choosing a healthy snack between the 
two strategies for participants with weak NFL fan identity (p = .23). 
3.8.3 Discussion 
The results of study 3 replicate the previous findings and provide convergent evidence for 
my theoretical propositions. However, in contrast to the previous experiments which used 
relatively strong manipulations of the social identity threat and coping strategy, this study 
embedded both the threat and strategies in adverting stimuli, demonstrating that the proposed 
effects occur even in more practical situations. Specifically, the results show that participants 
who were exposed to the inferior others strategy ad were significantly more tempted by 
unhealthy snacks and made unhealthier snack choices than those who were exposed to the 
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superior self-aspects ad. In sum, this study highlights that even unobtrusive strategy prompts lead 
to the same differences on subsequent self-control, thus suggesting that the findings can be used 
by practitioners for designing interventions to improve self-control in identity threatening 
situations. In addition, these findings can benefit marketers who may want to tailor their 
advertisements in a way that prompts consumers to indulge or exercise self-control, influencing 
sales of unhealthy or healthy products. These possibilities are further discussed in the General 
Discussion.  
3.9 STUDY 4 
Thus far, support for the main proposition that the inferior others coping strategy leads to poorer 
self-regulation than does the superior self-aspects strategy has emerged. However, there is yet no 
evidence of the process underlying these effects. This issue is addressed in the next three 
experiments: study 4A demonstrates that a social identity threat increases the accessibility of the 
self, while studies 4B and 4C  moderate the effects of the two coping strategies on self-control 
and show that accessibility of out-group knowledge is driving the detrimental effects of the 
inferior others strategy.  
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3.10 STUDY 4A 
3.10.1 Method 
Study 4A utilized a 2 group (threat vs. control) design and was conducted only with individuals 
who belonged to the threatened in-group. Participants (n = 82, 59% female) were students 
pursuing a business degree at a large university and completed the study online in exchange for 
course credit. Participants in the threat condition were asked to imagine a scenario which 
contained the social identity threat manipulation (same threat to the business student identity as 
in previous studies), while respondents in the control condition read a neutral article from 
National Geographic. Then all participants indicated their agreement with seven items, designed 
to assess the amount of self-knowledge activated on a 7-point scale with 1 = “Strongly Disagree” 
and 7 = “Strongly Agree” as its anchors (e.g., “While imagining the scenario (reading the 
article), I thought primarily about myself and my own traits and abilities.”, “The traits that 
describe "who I am" are vivid in my mind now.”). The seven items were averaged (α = .83) to 
form an activation of self index. Respondents also indicated the extent to which their self was 
activated using a different, more visual measure in which different degrees of the self activation 
were signified by small man figures with varying degrees of highlighting (see Appendix E).  
Finally, since participants completed this study at home, I included also a measure 
designed to identify individuals who did not read the instructions carefully (Oppenheimer, 
Meyvis, and Davidenko 2009; as used by Nelson and Simmons 2009).  
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3.10.2 Analysis and results 
I excluded 13 participants who failed the instructional manipulation check (Oppenheimer, 
Meyvis, and Davidenko 2009). One participant provided partial responses to the self-activation 
measures; where data are available, they are included. Two one-way ANOVAs conducted on the 
two activation of self measures (scale and visual) as a function of the experimental condition 
revealed that participants in the threat condition (Mscale = 5.11, SD = .91; Mvisual = 4.44, SD = .69) 
had their self activated to a greater extent than those in the control condition (Mscale = 3.37, SD = 
.94; Mvisual = 3.88, SD = 1.05), F(1, 66) = 60.30, p < .0001 and F(1, 67) = 7.04, p < .01 
respectively.  
3.10.3 Discussion 
Study 4A shows that the experience of a social identity threat leads to an activation of 
individuals’ self-knowledge and provides support for the first link in the proposed process. With 
the link from identity threats to self-knowledge activation established, studies 4B and 4C seek to 
understand whether activating others-knowledge will reduce the regulatory costs of the inferior 
others strategy. 
Studies 4B and 4C provide evidence for the proposed mechanism underlying the different 
impacts of the two coping strategies on self-control. I predict that the shift in thoughts from the 
self to others (from accessible self-knowledge to inaccessible out-groups knowledge) required 
for the implementation of the inferior others strategy consumes self-regulatory resources, which 
in turn results in self-control failures.  
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In order to test the proposed mechanism, studies 4B and 4C manipulate the accessibility 
of out-groups-knowledge in two different ways. I predict that when the accessibility of out-
groups is increased, the implementation of the inferior others strategy will become easier and this 
will reduce its detrimental impact on self-control. Specifically, I predict that when the 
accessibility of out-groups-related concepts is low, the findings from the previous studies would 
replicate: we should see poorer self-control after the use of the inferior others strategy than the 
superior self-aspects. However, when the accessibility of out-groups knowledge is high, there 
should be no differences on self-control between the two coping strategies.   
3.11 STUDY 4B 
3.11.1 Method 
Study 4B utilized a 2 (Coping Strategy: superior self-aspects, inferior others) x 2 
(Accessibility of Out-Groups Knowledge: high, low) between-subjects design. As in study 4A, 
only members of the business student group were used. Participants (n = 55, 63% female), were 
business students at a large public university and completed two ostensibly unrelated studies for 
course credit. Participants both encountered the identity threat and were directed to use a specific 
strategy in the first study, while the second “unrelated” study incorporated the self-control 
measures (same self-control decision as in study 2A). Importantly, prior to the social identity 
threat, participants in the high out-groups knowledge accessibility condition wrote about groups 
to which they do not belong (manipulation instructions: “In the space provided below please list 
any social groups which you are not part of. For example, if you are a female, you could list 
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“fraternity” or “football players”, because you are not part of those groups. Make sure to list only 
those groups which you do not consider yourself to be part of. List as many groups as you can 
come up with.”). I expected that requiring participants to think and write about various out-
groups would increase the accessibility of out-groups-related knowledge structures, and would 
make it easier to implement the inferior others strategy, thus reducing its detrimental impact on 
self-control.  
3.11.2 Analysis and results 
I ran a two-way ANOVA on participants’ likelihood to indulge using the coping strategy and 
accessibility of out-groups knowledge conditions as the two between-subjects factors. While the 
two main effects were not significant (both p’s > .60), a significant interaction of coping strategy 
and accessibility of out-groups knowledge emerged, F(1, 51) = 5.45, p = .02 (see figure 10). 
When out-group related concepts were not accessible, previous results were replicated: 
participants using the superior self-aspects strategy (M = 4.93, SD = 2.46) were less likely to 
indulge than those using the inferior others strategy (M = 6.69, SD = 1.84), F(1, 51) = 3.94, p = 
.05. However, when accessibility of out-groups knowledge was increased, the inferior others 
strategy was no longer more detrimental to participants’ self-control: there were no significant 
differences in likelihood to indulge between the superior self-aspects (M = 6.14, SD = 2.07) and 
inferior others (M = 5.00, SD = 2.72) conditions (p = .20). Furthermore, planned comparisons 
also revealed that among participants using the inferior others strategy, those in the high out-
groups knowledge accessibility condition were less likely to indulge than those in the low 
accessibility condition, F(1, 51) = 3.63, p = .06. Finally, for participants in the superior self-
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aspects condition there was no significant difference in the likelihood to indulge based on the 
accessibility of out-groups-related concepts (p = .17).  
 
Figure 10. Interaction of Coping Strategy and Accessibility of Out-Groups Knowledge on Likelihood of Indulgence 
3.11.3 Discussion 
Study 4B provides evidence for the proposed mechanism underlying the effects of the two 
coping strategies on self-control. When the accessibility of out-groups knowledge was low, my 
previous results replicated: individuals using the superior self-aspects strategy exhibited lower 
likelihood of indulgence in a subsequent decision than those who relied on the inferior others 
strategy. However, increasing the accessibility of out-groups-related knowledge structures 
significantly diminished the detrimental impact of the inferior others strategy on self-control. 
Thus, in the high accessibility of others condition, respondents in the two coping strategy 
conditions did not differ in the amount of self-control exerted in the following spending decision. 
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The final experiment manipulates the accessibility of the self- and others-related concepts 
differently, providing additional evidence for the proposed process. 
3.12 STUDY 4C 
3.12.1 Method 
Study 4C used a 2 (Coping Strategy: superior self-aspects, inferior others) x 2 
(Accessibility: self, others) between-subjects design. Participants (n = 73, 62% female) were 
business students at a large public university and completed the study in exchange for course 
credit. The procedure was similar to the procedure used in study 4B. The only exception was 
that, prior to exposing participants to the social identity threat, I manipulated the accessibility of 
the self and others by adapting a procedure from Gardner et al. (1999). Specifically, participants 
in the self-accessibility condition were asked to read a short paragraph and count the number of 
first-person pronouns (e.g., “I”, “me”, “my”, “myself”), while those in the others-accessibility 
condition read a similar paragraph and counted the number of other-people pronouns (e.g., 
“they”, “them”, “their”, “themselves”). The two paragraphs were identical except for the 
pronouns used. This manipulation was pretested in a separate study (see Appendix C, section 
C.2). Finally, participants were exposed to the social identity threat, the strategy manipulation, 
and the self-control scenario (as in study 4B). 
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3.12.2 Analysis and results 
I conducted a two-way ANOVA on participants’ likelihood to indulge using the accessibility and 
coping strategy conditions as the between-subjects factors. While neither of the main effects 
were significant (both p’s > .37), a significant interaction of the two factors emerged, F(1, 69) = 
6.87, p = .01 (see figure 11). Follow-up analyses revealed that when the self was made accessible 
prior to the threat, results replicated the previous findings such that participants who used the 
inferior others strategy (Minferior others = 7.20, SD = 1.70) were more likely to indulge than those 
who used the superior self-aspects one (Msuperior self = 5.29, SD = 2.75), F(1, 69) = 5.55, p = .02. 
However, when others-related concepts were made accessible, there was no difference in the 
likelihood to indulge of participants in the two strategy conditions (Msuperior self = 6.27, SD = 1.83 
vs. Minferior others = 5.18, SD = 2.75, p = .18). Finally, the negative impact of the inferior others 
strategy on self-control was significantly reduced in the others-accessibility condition relative to 
the self-accessibility condition, F(1, 69) = 6.28, p = .01; there was no difference in the self-
control of participants using the superior self-aspects strategy between the two accessibility 
conditions (p = .23). 
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Figure 11. Interaction of Self- vs. Others-Accessibility and Coping Strategy on Likelihood of Indulgence 
3.12.3 Discussion 
Using a different manipulation of accessibility of self- versus others-related concepts, study 4C 
provides additional evidence for the process through which the two coping strategies impact 
differently individuals’ self-control. In line with my theory which proposed that the superior self-
aspects strategy leads to better self-control because it retains thoughts on the active self, the 
results showed that when the self was made more accessible, the previous findings replicated and 
the superior self-aspects strategy led participants to indulge less than the inferior others strategy. 
However, as in study 4B, increasing the accessibility of others-related concepts reduced the 
detrimental impact of the inferior others strategy, leading individuals using the two coping 
strategies to demonstrate equally successful self-control. 
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3.13 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Previous research on social identity threats has primarily examined their effects on various 
threat-related outcomes, such as performance decrements following a stereotype threat (e.g., 
Schmader 2002). Relatively less work examines how social identity threats impact behavior in 
threat-unrelated domains, but the few exceptions have shown depletion of self-regulatory 
resources following a threat, evidenced by individuals consuming fattier foods (Cornil and 
Chandon 2013) or behaving aggressively (Inzlicht and Kang 2010). In all of these studies, 
however, the methods individuals use to cope with threats have been unexamined; either the 
individual copes with the threat or does not, and this mediating process has been left as a “black 
box.” The research reported here unpacks the coping process and compares two social creativity 
strategies for coping with social identity threats, examining their impact on individuals’ self-
control in threat-unrelated domains. One field study and seven experiments demonstrate that the 
use of the superior self-aspects strategy is less detrimental to self-control than the inferior others 
strategy. These effects hold using both scenario-based measures of self-control (studies 2A, 2B, 
3, 4B, and 4C) and real food consumption (field study and study 1) in two important domains: 
eating and spending. Most importantly, the effects are robust even in real world settings (a café), 
in situations involving naturally occurring social identity threats (loss of the favorite NFL team), 
and in conditions in which both the social identity threat and cues prompting the strategies use 
are subtle (advertisements). Furthermore, the differential cost of the two coping strategies on 
self-control is noteworthy given that they are equally successful at restoring positive views of the 
self. Finally, in the last three studies we examine the process underlying these differences: we 
show that experiencing a social identity threat increases the accessibility of self-knowledge; thus, 
the inferior others strategy impedes self-control because it requires one to shift thoughts from 
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accessible self-concepts to inaccessible out-groups-related concepts, which taxes individuals’ 
self-regulatory resources. 
It is important to note that the findings that the superior self-aspects strategy leads to 
better self-control than the inferior others strategy cannot be explained by extant research linking 
self-affirmation and self-control. Self-affirmation comprises cognitive and behavioral events that 
enhance the “perceived integrity of the self, its overall adaptive and moral adequacy” (Steele 
1988, p. 291). Research on self-affirmation shows that it replenishes previously depleted self-
regulation resources and reduces the likelihood of subsequent self-control lapses (Schmeichel 
and Vohs 2009). However, since both coping strategies constitute acts of self-affirmation, as 
both improve self-worth equally (Sherman and Cohen, 2006; Fein and Spencer 1997), the 
differential impact of the two strategies on self-control cannot be explained by self-affirmation. 
3.13.1 Theoretical contributions 
Taken together, this research makes a number of contributions to the social identity and self-
regulation literatures. Table 1 summarizes prior research on the topic of coping with social 
identity threats and its downstream effects on behavior.11  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 This table does not provide an exhaustive list of all papers on the topics but rather aims to provide a succinct 
overview of prior research which has studied coping with social identity threats and its consequences on consumer 
behavior.  
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Table 1. Overview of Prior Research on Coping with Social Identity Threats 
Paper Type of Threat Coping Strategy Consequences in 
Threat-Relevant 
Domain 
Consequences in 
Threat-Irrelevant 
Domain 
Type of DV 
Scale Real 
Behavior 
Branscombe and Wann (1994) group value threat out-group derogation X    
Carr and Steele (2011) stereotype threat/group 
value threat 
unspecified 
 X  X 
Cheryan and Monin (2005) prototypicality threat identity assertion  X  X  
Maas et al. (2003) legitimacy, group value, 
distinctiveness, and 
prototypicality threats 
out-group derogation  
X  X X 
White and Argo (2009); White, 
Argo, and Sengupta (2012) 
group value threat (dis)associative 
responses  
X  X  
Schmader (2002) stereotype threat/group 
value threat 
unspecified 
X   X 
Schmitt and Branscombe (2001) prototypicality threat evaluations of in-
group members X   X 
Inzlicht and Kang (2010) group value threat unspecified  X X X 
Inzlicht, McKay, and Aronson 
(2006) 
stigma/stereotype threat unspecified  
X X X 
Cornil and Chandon (2013) group value threat unspecified  X X X 
The present research group value threat Superior self-
aspects; Inferior 
others  
 
X X X 
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 A review of the prior literature reveals some important trends. First, most of the 
research on the topic has focused on understanding the consequences of social identity threats in 
threat-relevant domains. For example, researchers studying the effects of stereotype threats 
primarily investigate individuals’ performance in the stereotyped domains (i.e., how a stereotype 
threat regarding women’s intelligence affects their performance on a math test; Schmader 2002). 
The few exceptions to this trend have examined the spillover effects of coping with social 
identity threats in threat-irrelevant domains, linking identity threats to increased loss-aversion 
and risk aversion (Carr and Steele 2011) and diminished self-control (Inzlicht and colleagues, 
2006; 2010; Cornill and Chandon 2013).  
Second, most of the extant research on the topic of social identity threats has studied only 
one coping strategy in isolation, which has, to a certain degree, limited our understanding of the 
differences and similarities among the strategies, as well as potential advantages and 
disadvantages of certain strategies over others. In addition, in some cases even the nature of the 
coping strategy is not identified by the authors and is rather left unknown. This is exactly the 
case in the research linking social identity threats and self-control (e.g., Cornil and Chandon 
2013; Inzlicht and Kang 2010) which has focused on demonstrating the detrimental 
consequences of threat coping in different self-control domains without considering the different 
strategies that might be used in the coping process. Finally, the superior self aspects and inferior 
others strategies, which are the focus of the present work, have been largely unexamined since 
they were first discussed by Tajfel and Turner (1986).  
Therefore, Table 1 highlights that this research makes the following four key 
contributions. First, I contribute to the relatively limited research that examines the consequences 
of coping with social identity threats in threat-irrelevant domains by bridging the social identity 
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and self-control literatures. Second, I extend the prior work linking social identity threats with 
impaired self-control (Cornil and Chandon 2013; Inzlicht and Kang 2010) by illuminating the 
“black box” between the social identity threat experience and self-control and examining two 
specific coping strategies and their self-regulatory costs. Specifically, I show that the negative 
impact of coping with social identity threats on self-control depends on the specific coping 
strategy that individuals use and also elucidate the process through which these differences 
occur. In my work, I demonstrate that while the inferior others strategy hindered participants’ 
self-control in a subsequent task, this was not the case with the implementation of the superior 
self-aspects strategy. This suggests that long-term goal-directed behaviors do not necessarily 
have to be impeded by coping with social identity threats, but that individuals should be careful 
in the selection of the specific strategy they use to deal with a threat to the self.  
Third, I bring attention to potential differences that could exist among the various 
strategies for coping with social identity threats. As seen in Table 1, most of the research on 
social identity threats has studied only one coping strategy in isolation, which has limited our 
understanding of the positive and negative consequences of their use. Further, in some cases the 
coping strategy is not even identified by the authors and is rather left as a uni-dimensional, 
unspecified, construct (e.g., Cornil and Chandon 2013; Inzlicht and Kang 2010). The present 
work is a first step toward addressing this gap by studying two different coping strategies, and 
examining their differences and similarities with the hope to offer recommendations as to which 
is more beneficial for individuals. I note that the two strategies might be similar in their ability to 
successfully repair the self after a social identity threat, but are substantially different in their 
impact on self-control. Thus, the broader contribution of this research is that it highlights that the 
social identity literature can be enriched by more inquires into the question of how the various 
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coping strategies differ. Finally, I contribute to the social identity literature by studying the two 
social creativity strategies - the superior self aspects and inferior others strategies, which are the 
focus of the present work, have been largely not researched since their introduction by Tajfel and 
Turner (1986). 
3.13.2 Practical implications 
Given that the demonstrated effects are robust in real world settings (i.e., in actual consumption 
decisions, with naturally occurring social identity threats, and when the strategies are subtly cued 
and executed), the current research has significant practical implications. Self-control is essential 
for people’s success in life (Mischel and Ayduk 2004). Past research has linked high self-control 
to a variety of positive outcomes including but not limited to better interpersonal functioning and 
healthier relationships, better work and school performance, and greater psychological well-
being (Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone 2004; deRidder et al. 2012). Furthermore, researchers 
have also suggested that poor self-control is at the root of many of the most alarming problems in 
the society, such as obesity, consumer debt, inadequate savings for retirement, smoking, alcohol 
and drug addiction, and criminality (e.g., Baumeister and Heatherton 1996; Baumeister, Vohs, 
and Tice 2007; deRidder et al. 2012; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990; Patton, Stanford, and Barratt 
1995; Vohs and Faber 2007). 
Thus, while my findings have implications for general well-being because of the vast 
range of important benefits of self-control in different aspects of people’s lives, I believe that this 
work will be particularly beneficial to both individuals struggling with various self-control 
problems, such as obesity and credit card debt, as well as practitioners who wish to design 
effective interventions for overcoming such problems. For instance, it is possible that one of the 
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reasons why many people often fail at their attempts to start eating healthily or to pay off high 
interest rate credit cards is because they often encounter identity threats and cope with them in a 
sub-optimal way, which inevitably sabotages their self-control progress. Since such identity 
threats are common in people’s lives, it is essential for them to know not only that coping with 
such experiences can undermine their self-regulation, but also that there are ways in which they 
can repair the self without incurring a cost on their self-control efforts.  
Furthermore, practitioners providing assistance to individuals dealing with various self-
control problems should be aware that these individuals may be particularly vulnerable to threats 
to their already “shaken” self and that those threats can inadvertently subvert the progress made 
by their patients. Therefore, practitioners might increase the success of their interventions if they 
consider teaching their patients the effective ways in which they can cope with identity threats 
without undermining their self-control. Various programs (e.g., workplace and school dieting 
programs, commercial weight programs such as Weight Watchers, smoking cessation groups, 
and consumer debt management and support groups) designed to assist individuals with 
overcoming important self-control problems might also benefit from this advice, which would 
allow them to improve their success rates.  
Finally, given that the effects occurred even when the strategies use was subtly cued by 
advertisements, I believe that marketers might benefit from these findings as well. For instance, 
marketers of both healthy and unhealthy foods may want to target consumers with specific social 
identities (e.g., sports fans, stay-at-home moms) and tailor their advertising messages in a way 
that prompts them to indulge or exercise self-control and thus increase the sales of their products. 
Moreover, marketers of sports team apparel and fan gear might be able to induce consumers to 
splurge on expensive items by embedding a social identity threat in marketing communication 
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materials along with cues to use the inferior others strategy as a way to cope with the presented 
threat. 
3.13.3 Future research 
This research also offers some interesting directions for future research. This paper focused on 
the effect of the two coping strategies on self-control after the experience of one particular type 
of social identity threat, namely a threat to group value. However, Branscombe et al. (1999) 
suggest that individuals’ social identity can be threatened in a variety of ways and offer a 
taxonomy that distinguishes between four basic types of threats: threat to group value 
(information suggesting that the in-group is valued less or performs worse than an out-group), 
category threat (people feel threatened because they are categorized in a particular group against 
their will), acceptance or prototypicality threat (information challenging an individual’s status as 
a prototypical group member), and  distinctiveness threat (information that questions the 
distinctiveness of the in-group from an out-group).  Of these four types of threats, the threat to 
group value is considered to be the most central within social identity theory (Giguére and 
Lalonde 2009). However, it would be insightful to examine whether the theory presented here 
would hold also for experiences of the other three threats. In particular, the proposed mechanism 
of accessibility may hold across all forms of self-threats, however, what concepts become 
accessible following the threat may change. For instance, one could predict that category 
threat—where individuals are mis-categorized into an undesirable group—might make out-
groups more accessible, possibly reversing the pattern of effects seen in our work. Considering 
what self-, other-, and group concepts are made accessible through each threat, and how these 
concepts influence the coping process and self-control may be a fruitful area for future research.  
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Furthermore, in the present research I assume that individuals prioritize coping with 
social identity threats before any other self-control tasks. In other words, people choose to first 
repair the self due to the aversive psychological consequences associated with social identity 
threats and then use the remaining self-regulatory resources for subsequent self-control tasks. 
However, there may be some conditions where individuals forgo restoring their positive social 
identities in order to save their limited self-regulatory resources for future use. Given past 
research which shows that people do in fact engage in such strategic use of self-control and 
prioritize certain self-control uses over others (Muraven, Shmueli, and Burkley 2006), future 
research could examine how individuals choose to divide their limited self-regulatory resources 
between restoring the self after a threat and other self-control challenging tasks, as well as look 
further into the conditions which could give priority to one over the other. 
3.13.4 Conclusion 
The present research examined two social creativity strategies for coping with social identity 
threats – emphasizing superior self-aspects or thinking of inferior others – and compared their 
impact on self-control. The results revealed that using the inferior others strategy leads to poorer 
self-control than does the superior self-aspects strategy, as individuals must change their focus 
from accessible self-knowledge to relatively inaccessible out-group knowledge. While past 
research had demonstrated that coping with social identity threats has a detrimental impact on 
individuals’ self-regulation, this work emphasizes that there are significant differences in the 
self-regulatory costs of the various coping strategies and highlights that the superior self-aspects 
strategy allows people to restore the positive view of the self without significantly sabotaging 
their subsequent self-control success.  
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4.0  ESSAY 3: SHOULD BIRDS OF A FEATHER FLOCK TOGETHER? 
UNDERSTANDING SELF-CONTROL DECISIONS IN DYADS 
Despite the fact that consumers’ ability to exercise self-control is recognized as partially 
socially-determined (Battaglini, Bénabou, and Tirole 2005; Heatherton and Vohs 1998; 
Pachucki, Jacques, and Christakis 2011), the bulk of research in consumer behavior focuses on 
independent behaviors. For example, a single individual might be asked to allocate money 
between repaying debt and spending on immediate consumption (Haws, Bearden, and Nenkov 
2011), choose menu items (Wilcox, Kramer, and Sen 2011), or determine how they will spend 
their time (Hung and Mukhopadhyay 2012). To the extent that individuals exhibit indulgence in 
these choices, we say that they possess low self-control, and with it, may fall prey to a wide 
range of pathologies – debt, obesity, or poor job performance (Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone 
2004).   
In reality, however, many decisions involving self-regulation are made in concert with 
others. That is, self-control is essentially a social enterprise (Finkel et al. 2006; Fitzsimons et al. 
2005; Heatherton and Vohs 1998; Pachucki et al. 2011, VanDellen and Hoyle 2010). As such, 
one stream of research has focused on tasks performed independently that are influenced by the 
mere presence (Ackerman et al. 2009; Herman, Roth, and Polivy 2003; McFerran et al. 2010; 
VanDellen and Hoyle 2010) or thoughts of others (Martjin et al. 2007). However, little work 
considers decisions that are actively made as a collaborative process between two individuals. 
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For example, a pair of friends may decide together whether to study for an upcoming exam or go 
to a movie. Similarly, a pair of workplace colleagues may decide together whether to order a 
healthy lunch from the vegan restaurant or opt for the wings and pizza combo. Furthermore, a 
couple may go grocery shopping together, create a monthly household budget together, or decide 
jointly whether to indulge on a luxurious vacation beyond their budget. We call such decisions 
joint self-control decisions: decisions in which the two partners in a couple provide input into the 
decision-making process, ultimately reach one decision, and experience the outcomes related to 
their decision together. Such joint self-control decisions fall under the category of “joint 
decision, joint consumption” in the typology proposed by Gorlin and Dhar (2012) or conjunctive 
tasks (i.e., tasks on which all members must succeed for the dyad to be successful) in the 
typology of Steiner (1966). Interestingly, little research has focused on how dyads perform on 
such decisions. 
To address this gap in the literature, I examine the joint self-control decisions of three 
dyad types, formed on the basis of different combinations of partners’ trait self-control levels. 
Specifically, I study dyads containing two low self-control individuals (homogeneous low self-
control), dyads composed of one low self-control and one high self-control individual (mixed 
self-control), and dyads containing two high self-control partners (homogeneous high self-
control). Seven studies demonstrate that homogeneous high self-control dyads display more 
restraint in their joint self-control decisions than both homogeneous low self-control and mixed 
dyads. Importantly, though, despite the presence of a higher self-control partner, the mixed 
dyad’s joint decisions are no less indulgent than those of the homogeneous low self-control pair. 
Building on Finkel and Campbell (2001), I argue that this pattern exists because higher self-
control individuals have higher ability and stronger motivation to engage in prorelationship 
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behaviors than do lower self-control individuals. Thus, in a mixed dyad, higher self-control 
partners resolve conflict with a lower self-control partner’s preferences by assenting to their 
indulgent tendencies. Supporting this account, I show that increasing (decreasing) the 
prorelationship motivation of low self-control (high self-control) individuals in mixed dyads 
improves the mixed dyads’ joint self-control. 
The present work contributes novel theoretical insights to prior research. First, though 
past research has studied dyadic decision-making in a variety of contexts, including but not 
limited to negotiations (Ten Velden, Beersma, and De Dreu 2010), organizational dyadic 
relationships (Basu and Green 1995), and joint marital decisions (Corfman and Lehmann 1987; 
Ferber and Lee 1974; Park 1982; Rosen and Grandbois 1983; Su, Fern, and Ye 2003), to my 
knowledge, little work examines how dyads navigate self-control challenges together. Therefore, 
the present work responds to Fitzsimons and Finkel’s recent call (2010) for inquiries into the 
interplay of self’s and others’ self-regulation goals. Second, past research suggests that high self-
control has generally positive outcomes, such as better job and academic performance, healthier 
interpersonal relationships, and greater physiological and psychological well-being (de Ridder et 
al. 2012; Tangney et al. 2004). My work suggests that high self-control might be a double-edged 
sword in dyadic decisions, since the tendency to engage in prorelationship behaviors may in fact 
threaten long-term financial and health outcomes. 
Finally, recent work on relationship quality and marital well-being (Rick, Small, and 
Finkel 2011; Vohs, Finkenauer. and Baumeister 2011) has focused on the effect of partners’ self-
control levels or spending tendencies on relationship quality outcomes. I extend this work by 
examining how the different combinations of partners’ self-control scores affect their success at 
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joint self-regulation tasks (e.g., joint spending, saving, and food decisions), which may have far-
reaching consequences both for the relationship and the individual dyad members. 
I next describe the theoretical framework for my predictions about self-control decisions 
in dyads. I then report seven studies involving lab, virtual, and real dyads in three different self-
control domains, each of which robustly demonstrates our predicted pattern of effects. I close 
with a discussion of implications, limitations, and opportunities for future research.  
4.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1.1 When tendencies agree: homogeneous dyads 
One way to approach the question of joint self-regulation is to consider the way that dyads may 
be composed. Individuals can be classified as chronically low or high at trait self-control based 
on their responses to a validated measure of self-control (Baumeister 2002; Brief Self-Control 
Scale, Tangney et al. 2004). Trait self-control is an individual difference in the amount of self-
regulatory resources one possesses that forms a stable aspect of personality (Baumeister 2002). 
Across different situations and time, some individuals are better than others at overriding their 
automatic urges and forgoing short-term temptations that would otherwise impede the 
accomplishment of long-term or higher-level goals (Ainslie and Haslam 1992; Baumeister 2002; 
Heatherton, and Tice 1994; Tangney et al. 2004; Thaler 1991; Trope and Fishbach 2000; 
Wertenbroch 1998). As a result, trait self-control has been shown to reliably predict a wide range 
of behaviors such as school and work performance, financial management, eating, addictive 
behavior, affect regulation, deviant behavior, interpersonal functioning, planning and decision 
103 
making (Baumeister et al. 1998; deRidder et al. 2012; Muraven and Baumeister 2000; Tangney 
et al. 2004).  
Given this understanding of trait self-control, consider the case of a homogeneous high 
self-control couple, which consists of two high self-control partners. I predict that when two high 
self-control individuals work together on a self-regulatory decision or task, they will jointly 
make decisions associated more with long-term goals than with immediate indulgence: they will 
choose healthier, but likely less tasty foods, resist the temptation to incur debt to pursue 
indulgence, or persevere rather than give up at challenging tasks. By contrast, often despite 
stated beliefs that they care about long-term outcomes, lower self-control individuals are more 
likely to chronically pursue short-term indulgences (Poynor and Haws 2009). Thus, when two 
low-self-control individuals are paired, I anticipate they will both lean toward more indulgent 
options than those selected by homogeneous high self-control dyads. Formally: 
H1:  Homogeneous high self-control dyads will make less indulgent choices in joint 
self-regulation decisions than homogeneous low self-control dyads. 
 
4.1.2 When tendencies conflict: mixed dyads and prorelationship behaviors 
The more interesting case involves mixed dyads, where one member of the couple has high and 
the other one has low trait self-control. Understanding these dyads is particularly important in 
light of prior findings that in many marriages, “opposites attract,” that is, members of couples are 
likely to differ in their self-control (Vohs et al. 2011).  
A number of possibilities exist for the exhibited self-control of mixed dyads. First, it is 
possible that the presence of a high self-control partner will create accountability in the dyad 
(Seeley and Gardner 2006; Tetlock 1983). Since virtues are usually more easily justified than 
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vices (Okada 2005), an accountability mechanism would lead low self-control individuals to lean 
toward more virtuous options than they would on their own. It is also possible that high self-
control individuals’ observable achievements will act as social proof, suggesting that the high 
self-control individual’s tendencies offer the surest route to success (VanDellen and Hoyle 
2010). Such an effect would make the high self-control partner the more confident and trusted 
voice in the decision-making. Further, higher self-control individuals’ ability to present 
themselves well or deal with difficult partners (Baumeister, Vohs, and Tice 2007; Vohs, 
Baumeister, and Ciarocco 2005) may raise their ability to persuade, prompting the low self-
control individual to temporarily adopt their pursuit of long-term goals and agree to show 
restraint. If any of these mechanisms were at play in mixed dyads, we would see such pairs 
perform more like homogeneous high self-control than like homogeneous low self-control dyads.  
However, I argue that the conflict of chronic inclinations created in mixed dyads leads to 
quite a different outcome than might be predicted by work focusing mostly on individual-level 
phenomena. This is because in a mixed dyad, high and low self-control partners’ chronic 
inclinations are likely to be in conflict: while the high self-control individual is likely to focus on 
long-term goals, the low self-control individual will be drawn to immediate gratification 
(Tangney et al. 2004).  
To resolve the conflict arising from the incompatible inclinations of the partners in a 
mixed dyad, one partner will need to put aside their chronic choice tendencies in the interest of a 
more prorelationship behavior, such as avoiding conflict and maintaining the harmony in the 
interaction (Finkel and Campbell 2001; Finkel and Rusbult 2008; Kelley and Thibaut 1978). 
Whether one engages in prorelationship behaviors depends on both the motivation and ability to 
do so (Finkel and Campbell 2001).  
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I propose that higher self-control individuals are likely to be both more able to engage in 
prorelationship behaviors and more motivated to do so than are their lower self-control partners. 
Past work suggests that inhibiting one’s gut-level impulses to act in a self-interested manner in 
favor of more prorelationship behaviors tends to be associated with a higher chronic level of self-
regulatory resources (Baumeister and Exline 1999, 2000; Yovetich and Rusbult 1994). Since 
high self-control individuals chronically possess more self-regulatory resources than low self-
control individuals, they are better equipped to engage in prorelationship behaviors (Finkel and 
Campbell 2001). Further, past work suggests that high self-control individuals are more 
motivated to protect higher-level goals such as relationship harmony and success, even when 
doing so requires sacrifice on their part (Rawn and Vohs 2006; Tangney et al. 2004). Thus, high 
self-control individuals are more motivated to act in manners that preserve harmony such as 
accommodation in the face of relationship stressors (Finkel and Campbell 2001), forgiveness 
(Balliet, Li, and Joireman 2011; Pronk et al. 2010), promise-keeping (Peetz and Kammrath 
2010), less aggression (DeWall et al. 2007), and more empathy (Tangney et al. 2004). 
What will a prorelationship behavior look like in a joint decision-making context? Given 
that low self-control individuals will be more drawn to indulgent, short-term outcomes, we 
propose that the prorelationship behavior of the high self-control partner will be evidenced by a 
compromise toward greater indulgence in the joint decision.  By assenting to their low self-
control partner’s preference, high self-control individuals avoid conflict that could arise from the 
differences in the partners’ chronic inclinations and thus preserve the harmony in the interaction 
and the relationship. Therefore, rather than being enhanced by the presence of a high self-control 
partner, a mixed dyad’s performance may instead be comparable to that of a homogeneous low 
self-control pair. 
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I note that my theory corroborates the view of individual self-control as being influenced 
by the person-situation interaction (Metcalfe and Mischel 1999). Specifically, Metcalfe and 
Mischel (1999) suggest that trait self-control may be displayed differently based on contextual 
factors, such that such factors may lead higher self-control individuals to indulge, or conversely, 
may prompt lower self-control individuals to exhibit restraint. Thus, while the tendency of higher 
trait self-control individuals is to exhibit restraint in their individual decisions (Tangney et al. 
2004), in the context of a mixed dyad joint self-control task, I predict that they will assent to the 
other person’s indulgent preferences in order to preserve the harmony in the interaction and the 
relationship. 
I will refer to more indulgent or short-term gratification-oriented joint decisions as 
exhibiting less joint self-control, while joint outcomes that show more restraint or persistence are 
referred to as higher joint self-control decisions. I note that this is not to suggest that high trait 
self-control individuals demonstrate individual low self-control in this situation.  Rather, given 
the lower self-control partner’s preference for indulgence or short-term gratification, the higher 
self-control partner’s prorelationship tendency may in fact lead to an indulgent decision, one that 
undermines both partners’ ability to meet long-term goals such as saving money or eating a 
healthy diet, a pattern associated with low self-control in past literature (Baumeister 2002; 
deRidder et al. 2012; Tangney et al. 2004).  
Formally, I therefore predict that: 
H2:  While homogeneous high self-control dyads will exhibit better self-control than 
will mixed self-control dyads, there will be no significant difference in the 
restraint displayed by mixed and low self-control dyads.  
H3: As self-control rises, so do ability and motivation to behave in a prorelationship 
manner in joint decision-making contexts. 
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I test these hypotheses in seven studies (see table 2). Using arbitrarily created dyads in a 
lab setting, studies 1A and 1B support  hypotheses 1 and 2 in both hypothetical (study 1A: 
selection of menu items) and real (study 1B: persistence on a difficult task) joint self-control 
tasks. In each study, homogeneous high self-control dyads exhibit more restraint than both 
homogeneous low self-control and mixed dyads; however, consistent with my predictions, there 
is no significant difference in the self-regulation of the latter two dyad types. Studies 2A and 2B 
reveal that actual married couples exhibit the same self-regulatory patterns as seen in the 
arbitrary lab pairings of individuals in studies 1A and 1B.  Studies 3, 4A, and 4B examine the 
underlying mechanism driving these effects. Specifically, study 3 shows that higher self-control 
individuals possess greater motivation and greater ability to engage in prorelationship behaviors 
than do lower self-control individuals. Building on this finding, study 4A reveals that externally 
raising the prorelationship motivation of low self-control individuals significantly improves the 
mixed dyad’s joint restraint, while study 4B shows that externally decreasing the high self-
control individuals’ prorelationship motivation can also elevate the mixed dyad’s joint self-
control. Thus, in addition to providing process evidence via a moderation-of-process design 
(Spencer, Zanna and Fong 2005), the last two studies also identify simple, practical messages 
that could be used to improve consumer well-being.  
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Table 2. Summary of Studies 
Study Dyads Creation Procedure Dyad Type H(s) Dependent Variable(s) 
Study 1A Participants were randomly paired in the lab. Dyads 
were classified post-hoc as one of the three dyad 
types. 
lab-created dyads H1, H2 Total grams of fat in selected menu 
Study 1B lab-created dyads H1, H2 Persistence on an unsolvable anagram (in sec) 
Study 2A Dyads were married couples. One spouse rated the 
trait self-control of both partners. Couples were 
classified post-hoc as one of the three dyad types. 
married couples H1, H2 Frequency of eating fast food, joint saving 
habits, retirement income, household savings 
(in $), joint spending habits, joint credit card 
debt (in $), frequency of paying joint credit 
card balance in full, and frequency of paying 
overall obligations on schedule 
Study 2B Dyads were married couples. Each spouse rated their 
own trait self-control individually. Couples were 
classified post-hoc as one of the three dyad types. 
married couples H1, H2 Willingness to incur credit card debt to 
purchase a luxurious vacation (in $) 
Study 3   
(process) 
N/A N/A H3 Ability and motivation to engage in 
prorelationship behaviors 
Study 4A 
(process and 
intervention) 
 
Virtual dyads were created by modeling non-
respondent spouse’s preferences in ways consistent 
with respondent spouse’s self-control ratings of their 
partner. 
virtual dyads H1, H2, H3 Preference for a $50 groceries gift card 
relative to a $50 restaurant gift card; 
likelihood of selecting each gift card; amount 
allocated to each gift certificate; gift card 
choice  
Study 4B 
(process and 
intervention) 
Participants were randomly paired in the lab based on 
their trait self-control to create mixed dyads. 
lab-created dyads H1, H2, H3 Restaurant gift card preference  
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4.2 STUDY 1: SELF-CONTROL IN LAB-CREATED DYADS 
Studies 1A and 1B test hypotheses 1 and 2. In both studies, lab participants were paired with 
another participant in their session to form the three focal dyad types (homogeneous low self-
control, mixed self-control, and homogeneous high self-control dyads). All dyads were then 
given an opportunity to make a joint self-control decision, either involving choices from a lunch 
menu (study 1A) or the length of time for which to persist at a challenging task (study 1B).  
4.3 STUDY 1A 
4.3.1 Method 
Study 1A used a 3 (dyad type: homogeneous low self-control, mixed, homogeneous high self-
control) group design. A total of 74 individual participants (61% male; Mage = 20.5 years) from 
an introductory marketing course at the University of Pittsburgh completed the study in 
exchange for course credit.  
First, all participants filled out the 13-item self-control scale designed to measure 
individual differences in trait self-control (Tangney et al. 2004). All respondents were then given 
a series of unrelated tasks to work on for approximately 15 minutes. While participants were 
working on these tasks, the lab administrator calculated each individual’s trait self-control score 
and classified participants as low or high self-control  depending on whether their score was 
110 
below or above the average self-control in the population, determined by a separate pretest (M = 
4.20, SD = .63). Then, the lab administrator paired each participant with a partner of either a 
different or similar self-control level in order to create the three types of self-control dyads: 
homogeneous low self-control (n = 12), mixed (n = 19), and homogeneous high self-control (n = 
6). Participants in each dyad were then asked to work together on a subsequent menu selection 
task, with instructions intended to ensure that they treated the task as a joint task and did not 
select their own individual menus instead: 
“Now imagine that you and your partner in this study have decided to have lunch 
together at a small local restaurant located close to the school. The restaurant has an 
ongoing lunch promotion called “A Lunch Menu for 2 for Half the Price”, which 
basically means that you will get 50% discount off your bill if you both order the same 
meals. You and your partner decide to take advantage of this promotion. You both have 
the goal of staying in shape this semester. So you agree to try to balance your desire to 
choose something healthy – low in fat and calories – with something delicious that you’ll 
both like.” 
 
Each pair was then given a lunch menu and asked to circle the foods they would like to 
order together. The menu contained a list of the available lunch options along with information 
about their caloric and fat content. After completion of the menu selection task, all participants 
provided their demographic information, were thanked for their participation, and dismissed. 
A separate group of participants (n = 101) was given to read a description of this scenario 
and asked to indicate how realistic it is, as well as how realistic it is in general to share meals in 
order to take advantage of an available promotion at a restaurant. Results revealed that the 
scenario is realistic (M = 5.21, SD = 1.53 vs. 4 (scale midpoint); t(100) = 7.93, p < .0001) and 
that it is realistic to decide to share meals to utilize an available promotion when eating out (M = 
6.08, SD = 1.25 vs. 4 (scale midpoint); t(100) = 16.76, p < .0001). 
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4.3.2 Analysis and results 
In all experiments partial data were provided by some respondents on some variables; where data 
are available, they are included in the analysis. 
4.3.2.1 Partners’ self-control in the three dyad types 
I first checked to ensure that low self-control and high self-control individuals had 
equivalent self-control scores no matter whether they were placed in homogeneous or mixed 
dyads. As intended, the high self-control partners in the homogeneous high self-control and 
mixed dyads had significantly higher self-control scores than the low self-control partners in 
homogeneous low self-control and mixed dyads (all p < .0001). Furthermore, the mean self-
control score of high self-control individuals placed in homogeneous dyads (M = 4.67, SD = .30) 
was not significantly different from that of high self-control individuals placed in mixed dyads 
(M = 4.82, SD = .54; p = .37); the mean self-control of low self-control partners in homogeneous 
dyads (M = 3.83, SD = .61) was slightly higher than that of low self-control partners in mixed 
dyads (M = 3.49, SD = .48; p = .05).  To ensure that this inadvertent difference does not 
confound our results, I conduct the same analysis in all other studies; this issue did not arise in 
any of them.  
4.3.2.2 Total grams of fat in selected menu 
I used the total grams of fat in the selected menu as our measure of self-control, such that 
higher fat content signaled less self-control (Fujita and Han 2009; Giner-Sorrola 2001). To 
account for the unequal number of pairs in the three conditions resulting from the nature of the 
participants in the sessions, a weighted-means ANOVA was estimated (Keppel and Zedeck 
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1989) using the total grams of fat in the selected menu as the dependent variable and the dyad 
type as the between-subjects factor. Results revealed a significant main effect of the dyad type on 
the total amount of fat, F(2, 34) = 3.34, p < .05 (see figure 12). As predicted in hypotheses 1 and 
2, planned contrasts showed that the homogeneous high self-control dyads (M = 20.17, SD = 
6.13) selected lunch menus that contained significantly less fat than did the homogeneous low 
self-control dyads (M = 54.83, SD = 10.26), F(1, 34) = 5.65, p = .02. The homogeneous high 
self-control dyads also chose less fatty menus than did the mixed dyads (M = 50.26, SD = 11.23), 
F(1, 34) = 4.26, p < .05. However, the menus selected by homogeneous low self-control and 
mixed pairs did not differ significantly from each other in terms of their fat content (p = .76). We 
obtained the same results when we used the total amount of calories in the selected menu as the 
dependent variable; amount of calories and grams of fat in the chosen menu are highly correlated 
(r = .97, p < .0001). 
 
Figure 12. Total Grams of Fat in the Selected Menus by the Three Dyad Types 
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4.4 STUDY 1B 
Given the use of a hypothetical, scenario-based self-control measure, it might be argued that the 
observed differences in the self-regulation of the three dyad types in study 1A are due to 
differences in their lay theories about how they would behave in such situations. That is, higher 
self-control individuals might intuit that they would assent to their partner’s preferences on such 
a choice, but might show stronger adherence to self-regulation in an actual task. Therefore, I 
sought to replicate these effects using a real self-control behavior in study 1B. Furthermore, 
study 1B also aims to replicate the effects using a larger sample size to account for the small cell 
sizes in study 1A. 
4.4.1 Method 
Study 1B used a 3 cell (dyad type: homogeneous low self-control, mixed, homogeneous high 
self-control) design. Individual participants (n = 240; 57% male; Mage = 20.4 years) were students 
at the University of Pittsburgh who completed the study for course credit.  
Participants first filled out the Brief Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al. 2004), worked 
individually on several unrelated filler tasks taking approximately 25 minutes, and then were 
randomly paired with a partner from the same experimental session. All dyads were then asked 
to work together on an anagram solving task, which contained four solvable and one unsolvable 
anagram. Following prior research (Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister 1998), I used the persistence 
of the dyads at attempting to solve the unsolvable anagram as a measure of their self-control. 
Persisting on a challenging task requires overriding an easy, appealing response (i.e., quitting) 
and hence constitutes a self-control task (Muraven et al. 1998). The experimenter was present in 
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the lab session to ensure that both members of the dyads participated in the anagram task jointly, 
and noted that in no cases did it appear that the task was simply delegated to one or the other 
member of the group. I note that this was a joint self-control task as both partners had to jointly 
decide whether to keep working on the anagrams or proceed with the study and ultimately leave 
the lab. It was not possible for one partner to proceed with the study and leave the lab without the 
other partner.  
4.4.2 Analysis and results 
I excluded from the analysis seven pairs in which one or both of the partners did not provide 
responses to the self-control scale and thus could not be assigned to a condition, as well as 13 
additional pairs that encountered logistical issues during the study administration (i.e., were 
interrupted or had computer problems during the anagram solving task). For the remaining pairs, 
I used the average self-control in the sample (M = 4.31, SD = .59) to classify participants as low 
or high self-control individuals. Then, depending on each partner’s classification, we classified 
each pair as one of the three dyad types under study – homogeneous low (n = 30), mixed (n = 
48), and homogeneous high self-control dyads (n = 22).  
4.4.2.1 Partners’ self-control scores in the three dyad types 
Similarly to study 1A, I ensured that both low and high self-control individuals had 
comparable self-control scores irrespective of whether they were placed in homogeneous or 
mixed dyads (both p’s > .35). Moreover, high self-control partners in both homogeneous and 
mixed dyads had higher self-control than low self-control partners in homogeneous and mixed 
dyads (all p’s < .0001). The mean self-control levels of the partners in the three dyads were as 
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follows: homogeneous low self-control dyads: M = 3.85, SD = .33; homogeneous high self-
control dyads: M = 4.78, SD = .34; high self-control partners in mixed dyads: M = 4.83, SD = 
.32; low self-control partners in mixed dyads: M = 3.92, SD = .32. The same analyses were 
conducted in all other studies; the results were similar and thus are not discussed further. 
4.4.2.2 Persistence time 
I first note that there were no significant differences among the three dyads in the time 
spent on the four solvable anagrams (all p > .23). This result is not surprising given the fact that 
those anagrams were relatively easy and were thus solved by almost all dyads. Time spent 
working on the unsolvable anagram was significantly skewed (skewness = 1.13; Shapiro Wilk’s 
W = .912, p < .0001). I therefore conducted a one-way ANOVA on the log-transformed 
persistence time as a function of the dyad type condition. Results revealed a significant main 
effect of dyad type, F(2, 97) = 6.10, p = .003 see figure 13). Homogeneous high self-control 
dyads persisted significantly longer (log-transformed M = 4.61, SD = .48; raw M = 111.9 sec, SD 
= 53.84) at attempting to solve the unsolvable anagram than both the homogeneous low self-
control (log-transformed M = 4.06, SD = .54; raw M = 66.7 sec, SD = 37.72; F(1, 97) = 11.98, p 
< .001) and mixed dyads (log-transformed M = 4.24, SD = .62; raw M = 82.3 sec, SD = 48.78; 
F(1, 97) = 6.44, p = .01). Again consistent with study 1A, there was no significant difference 
between the persistence of the latter two dyads (p = .17).  
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Figure 13. Time Persisting at an Unsolvable Anagram of the Three Dyad Types 
4.4.3 Discussion 
Studies 1A and 1B provide support for hypotheses 1 and 2, showing that homogeneous high self-
control dyads made more healthy choices and showed greater persistence than did both 
homogeneous low self-control and mixed self-control pairs, as reflected in both hypothetical and 
actual joint self-control decisions. However, as predicted, there were no significant differences in 
the self-regulatory behaviors of the latter two types of dyads. Essentially, these results suggest 
that having one high self-control individual in the dyad might not be enough to ensure its 
successful self-control in joint endeavors.  
The advantage of using lab-created dyads in the first two studies is that the manipulation 
of the dyad type eliminates any self-selection concerns. However, since the dyads in the first two 
studies were ad-hoc pairings, it might be argued that the results might not persist or might be 
completely different in enduring relationships. Perhaps over the course of a longer relationship, a 
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high self-control individual would enforce their standards on a low self-control partner, thus 
enhancing the overall performance of the dyad. Further, it could be argued that the decisions 
made in these studies, while requiring self-regulatory resources, were somewhat atypical and did 
not have long-term consequences for the dyads, making it less important for the higher self-
control partner to preserve their chronic tendencies. Therefore, studies 2A and 2B test 
hypotheses 1 and 2 using actual married couples to see if results persist when long-term patterns 
of behavior may lead to different life outcomes for both individuals. Furthermore, using married 
couples allows me to see if our results hold in a situation where the high self-control partner’s 
observable achievements might act as social proof and thus could elevate the self-control 
performance of mixed dyads to that of homogeneous high self-control.    
4.5 STUDY 2A: SELF-CONTROL IN MARRIED COUPLES 
4.5.1 Method 
Married members of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk panel (n = 205, 35% males; Mage = 37.4 years) 
completed the survey online in exchange for a small payment. Participants were first asked to 
rate their own trait self-control using the Brief Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al. 2004; α = .90). 
After that, similar to Righetti and Finkenauer (2011), respondents used a modified version of the 
same scale to rate their spouse’s trait self-control (α = .88; sample items: “My spouse is good at 
resisting temptation,” “Pleasure and fun sometimes keep my spouse from getting work done.”). 
To assess participants’ knowledge of their spouses and confidence in their ability to judge their 
partners’ self-control, I asked them to answer the following questions: “How well do you know 
118 
your spouse?” and “How confident are you in your ability to judge your spouse's self-control?”, 
both measured on a seven-point scale anchored by 1 = “Not At All” and 7 = “Very Much”. 
After a filler task designed to clear working memory, participants completed a set of 
measures of the couple’s joint self-control success in the three self-control domains of interest 
(eating, saving, and spending): frequency of eating fast food, joint saving habits, retirement 
income, household savings (in $), joint spending habits, joint credit card debt (in $), frequency of 
paying joint credit card balance in full, and frequency of paying overall obligations on schedule. 
All measures were objective measures (rather than perceptions-based) and can be found in table 
3. Finally, I included also a measure designed to identify individuals who did not pay attention 
carefully (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 2009; as used by Nelson and Simmons 2009).  
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Table 3. Joint Self-Control of Married Couples (Measures, Means, and Standard Deviations) 
Self-Control Dependent Variable Mhom LSCa   Mmixed SC  Mhom HSC  
Joint Self-Control at Eating 
How often does your family eat fast food?  Please enter a number below that indicates how 
many times per month your family eats fast food. 
4.54 (3.78)b 
Mlog = 1.52 (.64) 
4.66 (5.14) 
Mlog = 1.41(.81) 
2.92 (2.85)  
Mlog = 1.17 (.64) 
Joint Self-Control at Saving 
How would you describe your and your spouse's joint saving habits? (a seven-point scale, 1 = 
We do not save at all, 7 = We save regularly by putting money aside each month) 
4.05 (1.90) 4.39 (2.02) 5.59 (1.73) 
How would you rate the retirement income you and your spouse receive (or expect to 
receive) from Social Security and job pensions? (a seven-point scale,1 = Totally Inadequate,   
4 = Enough to Maintain Living Standards, 7 = Very Satisfactory;  modified from the Federal 
Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances) 
3.05 (1.62) 3.24 (1.61) 3.79 (1.53) 
At the household level, approximately how much money do you and your spouse have in 
saving and investment accounts (i.e., combined money in saving and investment accounts)? 
$66,340 (119,576) 
Mlog = 8.39 (3.99) 
$80,372 (269,139) 
Mlog = 8.17 (3.78) 
$110,956 (201,394) 
Mlog = 9.63 (3.15) 
Joint Self-Control at Spending 
How would you describe your and your spouse's joint spending habits? (a seven-point scale, 
1 = Usually spend more than our income, 4 = Usually spend as much as our income, 7 = 
Usually spend less than our income; modified from the FRB Survey of Consumer Finances) 
4.41 (1.70) 4.83 (1.47) 5.58 (1.31) 
Approximately how much joint credit card debt do you and your spouse currently have (i.e., 
combined credit card debt)?  
$5,201 (7,595) 
Mlog = 5.40 (4.18) 
$5,986 (8,303) 
Mlog = 5.50 (4.30) 
$3,227 (6,785) 
Mlog = 3.95 (4.16) 
How often do you and your spouse pay your joint credit card balances in full? Please write 
N/A below if you do not have joint credit cards. (a seven-point scale, 1 = Never, we always 
carry a balance, 7 = We pay our entire balance every month; Nenkov, Inman, and Hulland 
2007) 
4.11 (2.33) 4.20 (2.47) 5.53 (1.99) 
On average, are you paying off your overall debt ahead of schedule, behind schedule, or are 
the payments about on schedule? (a seven-point scale,1 = Behind Schedule, 4 = About on 
Schedule, 7 = Ahead of Schedule; modified from the FRB Survey of Consumer Finances) 
4.30 (1.44) 4.41 (1.60) 5.26 (1.43) 
 
Notes: (a) LSC stands for low self-control; HSC stands for high self-control. (b) Standard deviations in parentheses.  
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4.5.2 Analysis and results 
I excluded 12 participants who failed the instructional manipulation check (following Nelson and 
Simmons 2009). Including those individuals does not change the results. 
4.5.2.1 Participants’ accuracy in the assessment of their spouses’ trait self-control 
I first assessed the extent to which participants felt they knew their spouse and were 
confident in their ability to judge their partner’s self-control. Results revealed that participants 
felt they knew their spouses relatively well (M = 6.63, SD = .62, vs. 4.00 (scale midpoint), t(192) 
= 59.35, p < .0001) and exhibited relatively high confidence in their ability to judge their 
spouses’ self-control (M = 6.13, SD = .91,vs. 4.00 (scale midpoint), t(192) = 32.64, p < .0001). 
To ensure that participants were indeed accurate in their assessments of the trait self-control of 
their spouses, I recontacted a subsample of our participants and asked them to have their spouse 
fill out a short questionnaire in exchange for small monetary payment (a total of 84 participants 
were contacted and 54 of them responded to our request, yielding a 64.3% response rate). In this 
survey, the spouses of our participants were asked to rate their own self-control using the Brief 
Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al. 2004). There was a high correlation between participants’ 
assessments of their spouses’ self-control and their spouses’ self-reported self-control (r = .72, p 
< .0001). I note that these results are in line with previous work of Righetti and Finkenauer 
(2011), who also demonstrate that people in close relationships can detect their partner’s trait 
self-control. 
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4.5.2.2 Couples’ joint self-control 
I used participants’ ratings of their own self-control and their spouse’s self-control to 
classify the couples as one of the three dyad types (homogeneous low (n = 56), mixed (n = 71), 
and high self-control (n = 66) dyads) in the same way as in study 1B. Three of the couples’ joint 
self-control outcome measures (times eating fast food per month, amount of savings, and amount 
of credit card debt) were significantly positively skewed and therefore were log-transformed. 
I conducted separate ANOVAs on the eight different joint self-control measures using the 
dyad type as the between-subjects factor. Results revealed a significant main effect on each of 
the outcomes of interest (see tables 3 and 4). Follow-up analysis showed that homogeneous high 
self-control couples eat fast food less frequently, had better saving and spending habits, had more 
satisfactory retirement income and more savings, owed significantly less money in joint credit 
card debt, paid their credit card balances in full more frequently, and were more likely to be 
ahead of schedule in paying down their overall obligations (mortgages, student and car loans, 
etc.) than both homogeneous low self-control and mixed couples. Importantly, though, consistent 
with hypothesis 2, there were no significant differences between the homogeneous low self-
control and mixed couples on any of the joint self-control measures (all p = NS).  
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Table 4. ANOVA Results 
  Main Effect of Dyad Type 
Planned Contrasts 
Homogeneous LSC vs. 
Homogeneous HSC Dyadsa 
Mixed vs. Homogeneous 
HSC Dyads 
Homogeneous LSC vs. 
Mixed Dyads 
Times Eating Fast Food per 
Month F(2, 189) = 3.86, p = .02b F(1, 189) = 7.14, p < .01 F(1, 189) = 3.86, p = .05 F(1, 189) = .68, p = .41 
Joint Savings Habits F(2, 190) = 11.55, p < .0001 F(1, 190) = 20.07, p < .0001 F(1, 190) = 13.73, p < .001 F(1, 190) = 1.02, p = .31 
Retirement Income F(2, 190) = 3.64, p = .03 F(1, 190) = 4.08, p = .04 F(1, 190) = 6.48, p = .01 F(1, 190) = .43, p = .51 
Amount of Savings F(2, 187) = 3.01, p = .05 F(1, 187) =5.33, p = .02 F(1, 187) = 3.45, p = .07 F(1, 187) = .11, p = .74 
Joint Spending Habits F(2, 190) = 9.66, p < .0001 F(1, 190) = 18.44, p = .0001 F(1, 190) = 8.51, p < .01 F(1, 190) = 2.48, p = .12 
Amount of Credit Card Debt F(2, 141) = 3.73, p = .03c F(1, 141) = 3.63, p = .06 F(1, 141) = 6.75, p = .01 F(1, 141) = .02, p = .90 
Frequency of Paying Credit 
Card Balances in Full F(2, 141) = 6.25, p < .01 F(1, 141) = 8.88, p < .01 F(1, 141) = 9.17, p < .01 F(1, 141) = .04, p = .85 
Frequency of Paying Overall 
Debt on Schedule F(2, 189) = 7.84, p < .001 F(1, 189) = 12.32, p < .001 F(1, 189) = 11.02, p < .01 F(1, 189) = .15, p = .70 
 
Notes: (a) LSC stands for low self-control; HSC stands for high self-control. (b) Partial data were provided by some respondents on some variables; where data are 
available, they are included in the analysis. (c) Forty-nine participants indicated that they did not possess joint credit cards with their spouses. Therefore, the degrees of 
freedom for the amount of credit card debt and the frequency of paying joint credit card balances in full are smaller than those for all other measures. 
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4.5.3 Discussion 
Replicating studies 1A and 1B, homogeneous high self-control couples appeared to exhibit more 
self-control in spending, saving, and eating than did both homogeneous low self-control and 
mixed couples. However, as predicted and seen in the lab experiments, there were no differences 
between mixed and homogeneous low self-control dyads in any of the self-control domains 
considered. That is, married couples exhibited the same patterns of restraint and indulgence 
across a variety of important self-control domains as did our pairings of participants in the lab. 
Importantly, this study also ruled out the possibility that in the interactions of mixed dyads over 
extended periods of time, the higher self-control partner would become the more trusted voice in 
the decision making due to their observable achievements. Furthermore, in contrast to the one-
shot behaviors examined in the first two studies, in this study all self-control measures were 
cumulative outcomes, which are the result of an aggregation of self-control behaviors across time 
and different situations, and as such are more robust measures of self-control success (Haws et 
al. 2013). 
Given the convergence between spouses’ ratings revealed in the re-contact evaluations 
and the previous work of Righetti and Finkenauer (2011), I have confidence that participants 
reported their spouses’ trait self-control with a reasonable level of accuracy. However, since this 
study relied only on the responses/perceptions of one of the spouses in the couple, it would be 
ideal to obtain individual self-evaluations from both spouses. Thus, the next study demonstrates 
our effects again with married couples, but in contexts in which both spouses report their own 
self-control and actively participate in an experimental decision making process.  
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4.6 STUDY 2B: SELF-CONTROL IN MARRIED COUPLES 
4.6.1 Method 
Study 2B followed a 3 (dyad type: homogeneous low self-control, mixed, homogeneous high 
self-control) group design. I recruited couples (n = 63; Mwives’ age = 41 years; Mhusbands’ age = 43 
years) at church coffee hours, who completed the study in exchange for a payment of $10.  
The couples were presented with an imagination task, in which they were asked to 
imagine as vividly as possible the following scenario: 
“Now please imagine that while looking for a quiet getaway destination for an upcoming 
weekend, you came across a good deal for an amazing 3-day vacation in the Bahamas. 
The price for an all-inclusive vacation for both of you ranges between $1200 and $2200, 
depending on how luxurious a package you choose. The amount of money you have 
allocated for this weekend totals $1000. If you decide to book the 3-day vacation in the 
Bahamas, you would need to put any amount above this (ranging from $200 to $1200) on 
your credit card.” 
 
At the end of the scenario, participants were asked to make a joint decision and indicate 
how much money they were willing to charge on their credit cards in order to purchase the 3-day 
vacation in the Bahamas. The amount of money that participants were willing to put on their 
credit cards (between $0 and $1200; hereafter referred to as the debt amount) was used as a 
measure of the couple’s joint self-control (following Mansfield, Bethpinto, and Parente (2003) 
and Meier and Sprenger (2010)). After completing approximately 2 pages of other attitudinal 
measures, filler questions and demographics, the spouses were separated and privately responded 
to the Brief Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al. 2004). 
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4.6.2 Analysis and results 
I classified the couples post-hoc as one of the three dyad types in the same way as in prior 
experiments – homogeneous low self-control (n = 15), mixed (n = 35), and homogeneous high 
self-control (n = 13) couples. 
To account for the excess number of zeros on the dependent variable and its skewed 
distribution (skewness = 1.10; Shapiro Wilk W = .848, p < .0001), a Zero-Inflated Poisson 
regression (Lambert 1992) was run in which the couple’s debt amount was predicted by the dyad 
type. The results of the regression model indicated a significant main effect of the dyad type, χ2 
(2) = 103.15, p < .0001 (the change in the log-likelihood between the null and the full models). 
Results further demonstrated that the homogeneous low self-control and the mixed couples were 
both willing to charge about 1.3 times more money on their credit cards in order to book the 
indulgent vacation than the homogeneous high self-control couples, b = .26, exp(b) = 1.30, Wald 
χ2(1) = 149.02, p < .0001 and b = .23, exp(b) = 1.26, Wald χ2(1) = 167.29, p < .0001 
respectively. Finally, there were no significant differences between the homogeneous low self-
control and the mixed couples in the amount of debt they were willing to incur (p = .16). 
4.6.3 Discussion 
Study 2B replicated the findings from the first three studies and provided additional support for 
hypotheses 1 and 2. In contrast to study 2A where I relied on the responses of only one of the 
spouses, in this study I collected data from both spouses working together at the same time. 
Furthermore, similar to studies 1A and 1B, in this study I used an observable, close-ended, one-
shot decision as a measure of the couples’ joint self-control, which complements the use of 
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cumulative outcomes in study 2A.  Again, I observe convergent patterns. When presented with a 
hypothetical situation in which the couple had to incur debt in order to purchase an indulgent 
vacation, homogeneous high self-control couples were willing to charge significantly less money 
to their credit cards than homogeneous low self-control and mixed couples. However, as 
predicted, there was no significant difference in the self-regulation exhibited by the latter two 
types of dyads.  
The next three studies attempt to elucidate the mechanism driving these effects. 
Specifically, study 3 aims to provide support for hypothesis 3 and demonstrate that higher self-
control individuals possess greater ability and motivation to engage in prorelationship behaviors 
when making joint decisions with other people. Building on this finding, studies 4A and 4B 
provide additional process evidence using a moderation-of-process design and show that the self-
control behaviors of mixed dyads can be altered predictably by manipulating the motivation 
component of the tendency to engage in prorelationship behaviors.  
4.7 STUDY 3: TRAIT SELF-CONTROL AND PRORELATIONSHIP BEHAVIORS 
4.7.1 Method 
Participants (n = 192, 48% males; Mage = 30.7 years) were recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk and asked to complete a short survey online in exchange for a small payment. 
Participants were first asked to imagine that they are making a joint decision with someone else 
(i.e., their spouse, a friend of theirs, or colleague). Following Ryan and Deci (2000), to capture 
participants’ motivation to act in a prorelationship manner, I asked them to indicate how much 
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they valued each of seven prorelationship behaviors: “Avoiding conflict between me and my 
partner,” “Keeping things smooth between me and my partner,” “Maintaining harmony between 
me and my partner,” “Getting along with my partner,” “ Avoiding tension between me and my 
partner,” “Reaching a decision that my partners is happy about,” and “Acting in a way that 
would be beneficial to the relationship with my partner,” on a seven-point scale, anchored by 1 = 
“Not Important At All” and 7 = “Extremely Important.” To assess participants’ ability to act in a 
prorelationship manner, I asked them to think about their past experiences in making joint 
decisions and indicate how able they usually were to exhibit each of the above seven behaviors 
in such situations using a seven-point scale, where 1 = “Not At All” and 7 = “Very Much.”  
Finally, participants completed a filler task (i.e., rated their enjoyment of different 
pictures), responded to the Brief Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al. 2004), and provided their 
demographic information. 
4.7.2 Analysis and results 
An explanatory factor analysis with a varimax rotation conducted on the fourteen motivation- 
and ability-related items revealed a two-factor structure; all motivation-related items loaded 
significantly on one factor (factor loadings ranging from .70 to .91), while the ability-related 
items loaded significantly on a second factor (factor loadings ranging from .73 and .92). I 
averaged the items that loaded on each of the two factors to create the following composite 
indices: a seven-item scale measuring motivation to engage in prorelationship behaviors ( = 
.94); a seven-item scale measuring ability to engage in prorelationship behaviors ( = .95). 
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Two simple regressions revealed that trait self-control was a significant positive predictor 
of both participants’ motivation, b = .15, t(190) = 2.42, p = .02, and ability to engage in 
prorelationship behaviors, b = .37, t(190) = 5.20, p < .0001.  
4.7.3 Discussion 
Study 3 provided support for hypothesis 3, revealing that high self-control is associated with 
greater motivation and greater ability to act in a prorelationship manner. This means that in a 
mixed dyad (in which the chronic inclinations of the two partners are in conflict), the high self-
control partner will be more likely to assent to their lower self-control partner’s preferences - a 
proclivity which may help explain relationship success (Tangney et al. 2004) but leads to 
suboptimal joint self-regulatory outcomes. In the next two studies I build on these correlational 
findings experimentally.  
4.8 STUDY 4: PROCESS AND INTERVENTIONS 
The objective of the next two studies was to provide more robust process evidence using a 
moderation-of-process design (Spencer, Zanna, and Fong 2005), as well as to test two 
interventions that could improve the self-control of mixed dyads. My theory and findings so far 
suggest that low self-control individuals are less likely to compromise in mixed dyads because 
they possess lower motivation and lower ability to engage in prorelationship behaviors than high 
self-control individuals. In the next two studies I provide process evidence by manipulating the 
motivation component of the tendency to engage prorelationship behaviors. 
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4.9 STUDY 4A 
In study 4A I gave an intervention designed to increase motivation to engage in prorelationship 
behaviors to one of the partners in the mixed dyad (either the low or the high self-control 
partner) or none of the partners. I argue that externally increasing the low self-control partner’s 
motivation to act in a prorelationship manner should prompt them to yield to the beneficial 
influence of their high self-control partner. If the low self-control partner shows willingness to 
compromise, the high self-control partner no longer needs to. As a result, the joint self-control of 
mixed dyads in which the low self-control partner receives the intervention should improve 
relative to homogeneous low self-control and no-intervention mixed dyads, and be comparable to 
that of homogeneous high self-control dyads. In contrast, if the prorelationship account holds, 
externally increasing the high self-control partner’s motivation to engage in prorelationship 
behaviors should not make a difference – the joint self-control of mixed dyads in which the high 
self-control partner receives the intervention should be similar to that of homogeneous low and 
no-intervention mixed dyads and significantly lower than that of homogeneous high self-control 
dyads. 
4.9.1 Method 
Married participants (n = 398, 51% males, Mage = 35.4 years) were recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk and completed the study online in exchange for a small payment.  
Study 4A followed a 5 group design. Three cells should replicate our prior effects: 
(homogeneous low self-control dyad (n = 95), no-intervention mixed dyads (n = 100), 
homogeneous high self-control dyad (n = 100)). However, I also added two cells in which we 
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would test for moderation of prior patterns: mixed dyads in which the low self-control partner 
received the high prorelationship motivation intervention (n = 55), and mixed dyads in which the 
high self-control partner received the high prorelationship motivation intervention (n = 48).  
First, as in study 2A, participants rated their own and their spouse’s self-control using the 
Brief Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al. 2004)   The trait self-control ratings were used to 
classify both the participant and his/her spouse as either low or high self-control individuals as in 
previous studies and identify the type of dyad they were in (homogeneous low self-control, 
mixed, or homogeneous high self-control). The non-participant spouse’s trait self-control rating 
was also used to infer their behavior in the experimental situation, as described below. After 
completing a series of filler tasks, participants were told that in the following task they would 
have to imagine themselves making several joint decisions with their spouse and asked to enter 
their spouse’s name. 
Then before proceeding to the joint decisions, participants who were in a mixed couple 
were randomly assigned to either a high prorelationship motivation intervention or no 
intervention condition. Respondents in the high prorelationship motivation intervention 
condition were asked to read the following paragraph before proceeding to the joint decision: 
“Past research has shown that you perform significantly better if you put more emphasis on 
maintaining harmony and keeping things smooth between you and your partner rather than 
coming to a joint decision that you would personally really enjoy in the short run. It is better 
to avoid conflict and tension, such that your partner is happy with your joint decision. 
Getting along is more important than making a decision that would be pleasant for you in the 
short run.” 
 
Note that the paragraph was created using the exact wording of the items used to measure 
this construct in study 3. Respondents in the no intervention condition were not given such 
instructions.  
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After that, all participants were told that one randomly selected couple would receive a 
$50 gift card of their choice. They were asked to imagine that they had to decide together with 
their spouse which gift card to select (similar to Wilcox et al. 2011) and that their spouse had 
given them one of two recommendations (i.e. a recommendation to indulge or a recommendation 
to restrain). I used the non-participant spouse’s self-control ratings taken earlier in the session to 
realistically represent their behavior in this situation. I thus assigned each participant a 
recommendation consistent with their spouse’s self-control rating (i.e., a recommendation to 
indulge if the participant’s spouse was a low self-control individual; a recommendation to 
restrain if the participant’s spouse was a high self-control individual). 
For instance, first consider a low self-control respondent who rated their spouse as low in 
self-control. This would be classified as a homogeneous low self-control dyad.  In the 
experimental scenario, the participant would be asked to imagine that they are making the 
decisions together with their spouse and their spouse says: “I really want us to go out for dinner. 
Let's indulge ourselves and choose the restaurant gift certificate....” In other words, the low self-
control partner’s behavior in this situation would be exhibited in their preference for indulgence. 
Similarly, consider a homogeneous high self-control dyad consisting of a high self-control 
participant and a high self-control spouse. Participants in such dyads were asked to imagine that 
their spouse made a recommendation to restrain, saying “I really think that we should use the 
money for groceries. Let's be prudent and choose the groceries gift certificate...” Finally, a mixed 
dyad could be composed in one of two ways. A low self-control participant and could have rated 
their spouse as high self-control spouse. In this case, the spouse’s preference would be virtually 
represented by a recommendation to restrain and choose the grocery gift card. Alternately, a high 
self-control participant might have rated their spouse as low in self-control. In this case, the non-
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participant spouse would express a recommendation to choose the more indulgent restaurant gift 
card. Thus, these recommendations allowed me to model the virtual presence of the spouse in the 
decision-making using their trait self-control.  
Participants then indicated the preference they had for the two gift cards in the joint 
decision on a seven-point scale, anchored by 1 = ”Strongly prefer the $50 restaurant gift 
certificate” and 7 = “Strongly prefer the $50 groceries gift certificate,” and the likelihood of the 
pair selecting each gift card on a seven-point scale where 1 = “Very Unlikely” and 7 = “Very 
Likely”. Further, I asked participants to select which certificate the couple would like to receive 
if they were the winner of the lottery. Participants were also given the option to allocate their 
shared $50 award between the two gift certificates. 
At the end of the study, participants rated both the restaurant and the groceries gift card 
on a seven-point scale, anchored by 1 = “Complete necessity – we have to buy them” and 7 = 
“Complete luxury – nice to have but not necessary at all” (used as manipulation checks). They 
also reported how realistic the recommendation given by their spouse was (“If you and your 
spouse were actually making the gift cards decisions together, how likely is he/she to give the 
same recommendation as in this study?” on a seven-point scale where 1 = “Very Unlikely” and 7 
= “Very Likely”) and provided their demographic information.  
4.9.2 Analysis and results 
4.9.2.1 Participants’ accuracy and manipulation checks 
Similar to study 2A, in order to ensure that participants were indeed accurate in their 
assessments of the trait self-control of their spouses, I recontacted a subsample of our 
participants and asked them to have their spouse fill out the Brief Self-Control Scale (Tangney et 
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al. 2004) in exchange for small monetary payment (a total of 123 participants were contacted and 
66 of them responded to our request, thus yielding a 53.7% response rate). Correlational analysis 
revealed that there was a high correlation between participants’ assessments of their spouses’ 
self-control and their spouses’ actual self-control (r = .58, p < .0001), thus confirming that 
participants were indeed accurate in their judgments of their spouses’ self-control and that the 
use of their assessments as proxies of their partners’ actual self-control was warranted. I also 
examined participants’ ratings of how realistic the recommendation they were assigned was. 
Results reveal that the assigned recommendations given in the experimental scenario was 
realistic (M = 5.40, SD = 1.92 vs. 4 (scale midpoint); t(397) = 14.56, p < .0001), which suggests 
that using the spouse’s trait self-control to model their virtual presence was also warranted.    
In addition I checked whether our respondents perceived the restaurant gift card as a 
luxury and the groceries gift card as a necessity. Results revealed that the restaurant gift card was 
considered by our participants to be a luxury (M = 6.18, SD = .99 vs. 4 (scale midpoint); t(397) = 
43.94, p < .0001); in contrast, the groceries gift card was viewed as more of a necessity (M = 
1.39, SD =  .89 vs. 4 (scale midpoint); t(397) = -58.24, p < .0001).  
4.9.2.2 Gift certificate preferences and allocation decisions 
I conducted a one-way MANOVA to account for the significant correlations among the 
five outcomes of interest (all p < .0001). All results supported my predictions (see table 5).  
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Table 5. MANOVA Results 
  Overall Effect 
Gift Card  
Preference 
Likelihood of 
Choosing the  
Restaurant 
Card 
Likelihood of  
Choosing the  
Groceries 
Card  
Restaurant 
Gift  
Card 
Amount 
Groceries 
Gift  
Card 
Amount 
  
Wilk's 
Lambda F-value F-value F-value F-value F-value F-value 
Main effect of dyad type .81 5.46***a 19.98*** 14.18*** 8.49*** 13.18*** 13.18*** 
Planned Contrasts 
homogeneous LSCb vs. no-intervention mixed dyads 1.00 .34 .78 1.10 0.21 .20 .20 
homogeneous LSC vs. homogenous HSC .92 8.99*** 30.75*** 18.34*** 5.08* 16.67*** 16.67*** 
no-intervention mixed vs. homogeneous HSC dyads .94 6.62*** 22.17*** 10.67** 3.28 (p = .07) 13.46** 13.46** 
homogeneous LSC vs.  
mixed dyads (intervention to LSC) .89 11.47*** 42.54*** 33.52*** 23.03*** 28.48*** 28.48*** 
no-intervention mixed vs. 
mixed dyads (intervention to LSC) .91 9.07*** 33.84*** 24.39** 19.73*** 24.91*** 24.91*** 
homogeneous HSC vs. 
mixed dyads (intervention to LSC) .98 2.36 3.42 4.79* 8.53** 3.62 3.62 
homogeneous LSC vs.  
mixed dyads (intervention to HSC) 1.00 .31 .79 .93 .81 1.00 1.00 
no-intervention mixed vs. 
mixed dyads (prorelationship intervention to HSC) .99 .89 2.61 3.33 1.65 1.89 1.89 
homogeneous HSC vs. 
mixed dyads (intervention to HSC) .92 8.22*** 29.37*** 19.94*** 7.56** 18.83*** 18.83*** 
mixed dyads (intervention to LSC) vs. 
mixed dyads (intervention to HSC) .90 11.34*** 40.84*** 33.99*** 24.26*** 29.96*** 29.96*** 
 
Notes: (a) *** p < .0001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. (b) LSC stands for low self-control; HSC stands for high self-control; intervention stands for high prorelationship 
motivation intervention. 
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Replicating prior effects, planned contrasts revealed that homogeneous high self-control 
dyads showed significantly greater self-control than both homogeneous low self-control and no-
intervention mixed dyads on all outcome variables; there was no significant difference between 
the latter two dyad types. However, as predicted, the intervention mixed dyads in which the low 
self-control partner received the high prorelationship motivation intervention showed 
significantly higher self-control than homogeneous low self-control, no-intervention mixed 
dyads, intervention mixed dyads in which the high self-control partner received the intervention, 
and even in some cases the homogeneous high self-control dyads. Conversely, the intervention 
mixed dyads in which the high self-control partner was targeted with the high prorelationship 
motivation intervention exhibited self-control similar to that of homogeneous low and mixed 
dyads, and significantly lower than that of homogeneous high self-control dyads. All means and 
standard deviations are indicated in table 6. 
Table 6. Gift Card Preferences of the Five Dyad Types 
  
Gift Card  
Preference 
Likelihood of  
Choosing the  
Restaurant 
Card 
Likelihood of  
Choosing the  
Groceries 
Card  
Restaurant 
Gift  
Card Amount 
Groceries Gift  
Card Amount 
Homogeneous LSC Dyad 3.66 (2.09) 5.24 (1.63) 4.88 (1.71) $26.26 (16.03) $23.74 (16.03) 
No-Intervention Mixed Dyad 3.93 (2.34) 4.96 (1.99) 5.00 (1.86) $25.21 (16.61) $24.79 (16.61) 
Homogeneous HSC Dyad 5.33 (1.99) 4.09 (1.99) 5.45 (1.83) $16.80 (17.15) $33.20 (17.15) 
Mixed Dyad (Prorelationship 
Intervention to LSC) 5.98 (1.79) 3.40 (2.07) 6.31 (1.23) $11.64 (14.56) $38.36 (14.56) 
Mixed Dyad (Prorelationship 
Intervention to HSC) 3.33 (2.15) 5.56 (1.61) 4.60 (1.93) $29.13 (15.15) $20.89 (15.15) 
  
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.  
 
4.9.2.3 Gift certificate choice 
A logistic regression on participants gift certificate choice (coded as 1 = groceries gift 
card selected and 0 = restaurant gift card selected) also revealed a significant main effect of the 
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dyad type (Wald χ2 (4) = 46.34, p < .0001). The percentages of dyads choosing the groceries gift 
card in each condition are displayed in figure 14. Homogeneous high self-control dyads were 
more likely to select the groceries gift card than homogeneous low self-control dyads (b = 1.27, 
exp(b) = 3.56, Wald χ2 (1) = 17.22, p < .0001) and no-intervention mixed dyads (b = 1.07, exp(b) 
= 2.93, Wald χ2 (1) = 12.72, p < .001); no significant difference existed in the choices of the 
latter two dyads (p = .50). Moreover, the intervention mixed dyads in which the low self-control 
partner received the high prorelationship motivation intervention were more likely to choose the 
groceries gift card than homogeneous low self-control dyads (b = 2.20, exp(b) = 9.03, Wald χ2 
(1) = 23.44, p < .0001), no-intervention mixed dyads (b = 2.01, exp(b) = 7.43, Wald χ2 (1) = 
19.74, p < .0001), intervention mixed dyads in which the high self-control partner received the 
intervention (b = 2.62, exp(b) = 13.71, Wald χ2 (1) = 26.63, p < .0001), and even homogeneous 
high self-control dyads (b = .93, exp(b) = 2.54, Wald χ2 (1) = 4.04, p = .04). Finally, in line with 
my theory, there was not a significant difference in the self-control of intervention mixed dyads 
in which the high self-control person received the intervention and homogeneous low self-
control dyads (p = .26) and no-intervention mixed dyads (p = .09). 
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Figure 14. Gift Card Choice 
4.9.3 Discussion 
Study 4A replicated our previous findings using a consequential decision as a measure of 
participants’ self-control in a joint decision. Most importantly, study 4A provided additional 
process evidence for our findings. In line with my theory, results showed that increasing the 
motivation of the low self-control partner in a mixed dyad to engage in prorelationship behaviors 
led to significantly higher self-control than both homogenous low self-control and no-
intervention mixed pairs. In contrast, externally increasing the higher self-control partner’s 
motivation to act in a prorelationship manner did not lead to a significant change in the 
indulgence of the joint decision. This suggests that even without intervention, higher self-control 
individuals already possess strong prorelationship motivation, consistent with our results of study 
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3 and theoretical account. However, I do note a marginal increase in indulgence in such cases. 
This implies that in situations in which prorelationship motivation is fostered, we may in fact see 
even more assent given to lower self-control partners’ indulgent preferences. Finally, in addition 
to providing support for the prorelationship theoretical account, study 4A also highlighted one 
possible intervention that could be implemented on the low self-control partner in the mixed 
dyad to elevate joint self-control. 
One limitation of study 4A was that it was conducted with virtual dyads where the virtual 
presence of one of the partners (i.e., their behavior in this situation) was modelled using their 
trait self-control. While taking trait self-control as a proxy for an individual decision tendency is 
supported by a large body of research, which demonstrates that low self-control individuals tend 
to lean toward indulgent options in most cases and high self-control individuals tend to exhibit 
better restraint in general (Baumeister et al. 1998; deRidder et al. 2012; Muraven and Baumeister 
2000; Poynor and Haws 2009; Tangney et al. 2004), it is important to also provide process 
evidence using real, in-person dyads.  
In study 4B I designed an intervention focused on decreasing one’s motivation to behave 
in a prorelationship manner. I expect that decreasing the prorelationship motivation of the high 
self-control partner in a mixed dyad should encourage them to reduce their tendency to assent to 
the lower self-control partner’s preferences, thus improving the joint self-control of mixed dyads. 
On the other hand, decreasing the prorelationship motivation of the low self-control partner 
should lead to self-control similar to that of no-intervention mixed dyads.  
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4.10 STUDY 4B 
4.10.1 Method 
Given that the pattern of results observed in homogeneous dyads has been reliably seen across all 
studies, Study 4B focused only on changing the joint decision behavior of mixed dyads. As such, 
I used a 3 group design: (no-intervention mixed dyads, mixed dyads with high self-control 
partner receiving the low prorelationship motivation intervention; and mixed dyads with low 
self-control partner receiving the low prorelationship intervention). I note that I did not give the 
low prorelationship motivation intervention to both partners in the mixed dyad simultaneously 
because I did not expect that this would lead any different joint self-control than the one 
observed in no-intervention mixed dyads (i.e., externally reducing the prorelationship motivation 
of both partners would lead to the higher self-control partner still having higher prorelationship 
motivation that the low self-control partner)  and as such would not have been useful in testing 
the prorelationship account.  
Participants (n = 78, 44% males, Mage = 20.7 years) were students at the University of 
Pittsburgh recruited through a paid-subjects pool and paid $5 for their participation in the study. 
All participants were contacted approximately one week before the study and asked to complete 
online the Brief Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al. 2004) and a set of demographic questions. 
This allowed me to classify participants as either low or high self-control as in the previous 
studies before the study began. Thus, upon arrival in the lab, participants could be assigned to a 
partner who had trait self-control opposite to theirs to create mixed dyads. During the first task 
all mixed dyads were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: (1) dyads in which the high 
self-control partner read a low prorelationship intervention article, while the low self-control 
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partner read a neutral article (n = 15); (2) dyads in which the low self-control partner read the 
low prorelationship intervention article, while the high self-control partner read a neutral article 
(n = 12); (3) dyads in which both partners read the neutral article (n = 12).  
The low prorelationship motivation article was patterned after Gershoff and Johar (2006) 
and used excerpts from several online articles. Here, prorelationship motivation was lowered by 
stressing the importance of becoming an independent person while in college and learning to 
stand one’s ground. The article described how learning to say “no” is one of the most useful and 
important skills students can develop in college, especially when it comes to living a more 
productive and healthy life. Furthermore, it emphasized that if one wants to gain others’ respect, 
it is better to displease them by always standing for and doing what one believes is right than to 
please them by agreeing to do what is wrong. By contrast, the neutral article talked about the 
importance of exploring the city while in college (as in Gershoff and Johar 2006). The article 
discussed the various place that students can visit and the numerous activities that they can do 
while being in college. The exact texts of the articles are available upon request.   
Then during the second task all dyads were asked to make a joint self-control decision. 
Specifically, all dyads were told that one randomly selected pair would receive a $25 gift card to 
a restaurant in the area. Moreover, they were told that gift cards were available for several 
different restaurants, some of which offer mainly healthy, but not so tasty food options, while the 
others offer primarily delicious but more unhealthy options. The dyads were asked to indicate 
what type of a restaurant they would like to receive a gift card for if they were the selected 
winner on a seven-point scale, anchored by 1 = “Very unhealthy but very tasty restaurant” and 7 
= “Very healthy but not so tasty restaurant.” The dyads’ restaurant selection was used as a 
141 
measure of their joint self-control. Finally, all dyads were paid for their participation and 
dismissed. 
4.10.2 Analysis and results 
4.10.2.1 Articles pretest 
To ensure that the low prorelationship motivation article did, in fact, lower 
prorelationship motivations, I conducted a pretest with a separate group of participants (n = 64, 
63% males, Mage = 20.3 years), who were randomly assigned to read one of the two articles used 
in study 4B and rate them on several dimensions (e.g., interesting, convincing, informative). 
Then as a separate task, participants were asked to imagine that they were making a joint 
decision and respond to a set of items designed to measure their motivation to engage in 
prorelationship behaviors (the same items as in study 3;  = .89). As anticipated, individuals who 
read the low prorelationship motivation article had lower motivation to engage in prorelationship 
behaviors (M = 5.41, SD = .81) than those who read the neutral article (M = 5.85, SD = .59), F(1, 
62) = 6.40, p = .01. 
4.10.2.2 Restaurant preferences 
A one-way ANOVA predicting dyads’ restaurant preferences revealed a significant main 
effect of the dyad type, F(2, 36) = 3.51, p = .04, as shown in figure 15. Importantly, mixed dyads 
in which the high self-control partner received the low prorelationship motivation intervention 
selected a healthier restaurant (M = 4.07, SD = 1.22) than both the no-intervention mixed dyads 
(M = 3.17, SD = 1.03), F(1, 36) = 4.17, p = .05, and mixed dyads in which the low self-control 
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partner received the low prorelationship motivation intervention (M = 3.00, SD = 1.13), F(1, 36) 
= 5.86, p = .02. There was no difference in the self-control of the latter two dyad types (p = .72). 
 
Figure 15. Restaurant Preferences 
4.10.3 Discussion 
Study 4B provided further evidence of the mechanism driving the indulgent choices of mixed 
pairs. Specifically, the findings showed that decreasing the motivation of the high self-control 
partners to act in a prorelationship manner led to more restraint in the dyad than in the no-
intervention mixed dyads. However, decreasing the prorelationship motivation of the low self-
control partners in mixed dyads did not make a difference, such that those dyads made as 
indulgent choices as the no-intervention mixed dyads. While the small sample size in this study 
is a concern, taken together studies 4A and 4B provide process evidence in support of the 
prorelationship account. Finally, I note that in the last two studies I used relatively strong 
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interventions to change individuals’ prorelationship motivation and to establish the 
prorelationship account. Future research could examine whether the mixed dyads’ joint self-
control could be improved through more subtle interventions, i.e., “nudges,” such as graphic 
communications or social norm cues. Identifying such interventions may be very useful for 
marketers (e.g., in marketing materials such as financial planning brochures or advertisements).  
4.11 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Seven studies using real and hypothetical self-regulation behaviors, lab-created and virtual 
dyads, as well as actual married couples, all provided convergent patterns of results related to 
dyads’ joint self-control decisions. Homogeneous high self-control dyads exhibited better self-
control than both homogeneous low self-control and mixed self-control dyads. However, in all 
studies mixed dyads made choices consistent with poorer self-regulation than observed in 
homogeneous high self-control pairs and no better than that seen in homogeneous low self-
control pairs. Furthermore, moderation study results suggest that when in a mixed dyad, the 
higher self-control individuals’ motivation to act in a prorelationship manner leads them to 
assent to their lower self-control partner’s indulgent preferences. Consistent with this 
mechanism, I demonstrate that increasing (decreasing) the prorelationship motivation of the 
lower (higher) self-control partner in a mixed dyad leads the mixed dyad to make less indulgent 
choices.  
Thus, I can answer the question in my title: The safest route to success for higher self-
control individuals is to partner with others of the same capacity, whether on short-term tasks or 
long-term life projects. However, higher self-control individuals should be wary of partnering 
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with low-self-control individuals. The likelihood is that their tendency to engage in 
prorelationship behaviors may negate their innate advantages in pursuing long-term goals. 
However, if lower self-control partners in such mixed pairs are externally motivated to act in 
prorelationship manners and compromise with their more assiduous partners, they can gain the 
advantages of being paired with someone who possesses a high degree of self-regulatory ability. 
Similarly, external interventions that decrease the higher self-control partners’ prorelationship 
motivation by stressing the importance of standing one’s ground can also be successfully applied 
to improve the joint self-control of mixed pairs. 
This may come as a surprise to many consumers. A separate study (data available upon 
request) revealed that consumers have inaccurate intuitions about the self-control performance of 
the three different dyads. Specifically, the majority of participants in this study (80%) incorrectly 
believed that the self-regulation of mixed pairs will be better than that of homogeneous low self-
control pairs. Furthermore, when asked about the types of behaviors that would occur in the 
interactions of mixed dyads, participants inaccurately predicted that the high self-control partner 
will persuade the low self-control partner to avoid short-term temptations and tenaciously pursue 
long-term goals, while the low self-control person will in turn give in to the beneficial influence 
of their high self-control partner. Such inaccurate intuitions might lead consumers to form 
suboptimal dyadic arrangements, which could be detrimental rather than beneficial (as 
consumers expect) to the well-being of both partners.  
4.11.1 Theoretical contributions and practical implications 
The present research makes a number of theoretical contributions. First, my work contributes to 
the self-control literature by examining the self-regulation patterns of dyads rather than 
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individuals in isolation. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first work that studies the joint 
self-control of pairs. Furthermore, my findings also suggest that the tendency for high self-
control individuals to have better, more harmonious, more empathetic, and more cohesive 
interpersonal relationships (Tangney et al. 2004), as well as their higher likelihood to engage in 
prorelationship behaviors (Finkel and Campbell 2001; Pronk et al. 2010), may be a double-edged 
sword. Specifically, the tendency of higher self-control individuals in mixed dyads to assent 
rather than exert more persuasion or model good behavior could ultimately impair the dyad’s 
joint self-regulation performance.  
My research also builds directly on recent papers focusing on relationship quality and 
marital well-being (Rick et al. 2011; Vohs et al. 2011). Vohs al. (2011) suggested that 
relationship quality was better when partners’ self-control sums were highest. My work takes a 
slightly different approach and focuses on different outcomes, parsing this “sum” into 
individuals’ distinct contribution to the dyad’s self-regulation decisions. Perhaps because my 
focal outcomes are different, the sum model does not consistently predict my results. However, it 
is reasonable that relationship quality might be related to joint regulatory decisions. Thus, future 
research may explore the components that make the determinants of marital happiness differ 
from those directly related to self-regulatory decisions. In a related vein, Rick et al. (2011) 
demonstrate that a tendency toward mixed tightwad/spendthrift (i.e. chronic over- or under-
spending) combinations in marriage leads to conflict and marital unhappiness. The present 
research differs from and at the same time builds on the findings of Rick et al. (2011) in two 
important ways. First, I use trait self-control, which is a distinct individual difference variable 
from the tightwad/spendthrift tendency (Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein 2008), to classify the 
dyads. Second, I generalize their investigation beyond marriage-related outcomes and 
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demonstrate that such mixed pairs are also suboptimal for the joint self-control of dyads and their 
pursuit of long-term goals. Moreover, unlike both Rick et al. (2011) and Vohs et al. (2011), I 
demonstrate our outcomes with even arbitrary pairings, which increases the practical relevance 
of my theoretical insights.  
This research also offers a variety of promising practical implications, which could 
improve consumers’ well-being in different aspects of their lives. For instance, many individuals 
who struggle with self-control place themselves in groups or “accountability pairs” in an effort to 
improve their behaviors. Similarly, commercial programs designed to help consumers overcome 
various self-control problems also often rely on “accountability pairs”: Weight Watchers 
encourages individuals to sign up in a “buddy system,” and Alcoholics Anonymous pairs 
recovering individuals with those who have already completed treatment. However, my work 
suggests that such “social solutions” for self-control problems might in some cases lead to 
suboptimal results unless they include external interventions for the sub-optimally constructed 
mixed dyads, such as reminders to the low self-control partners in these pairs to focus on 
harmony and the success of the relationship or the high self-control partner to stand their ground. 
Furthermore, in a variety of occupations, people are encouraged to work in pairs to 
maximize their performance outcomes. For example, a popular software development practice 
called “pair programming” requires two programmers to work together with the intention to 
produce better programs with fewer bugs. My findings suggest that such arrangements might not 
be effective in cases in which the partners’ self-control levels are combined in a suboptimal 
fashion (i.e., could lead to more procrastination in the case of programming pairs of mixed self-
control levels) and highlight external interventions that could be used to improve performance. 
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In addition, my findings have implications for the well-being and joint self-control of 
married couples who often make joint decisions regarding the family spending, savings, and food 
choices. Understanding how the combination of two spouses’ self-control levels affects the joint 
decision-making should help couples make better decisions with regards to their spending, 
saving, and eating, and thus improve their overall well-being and marriage quality. For instance, 
about 80% of divorced couples point to financial problems as the primary cause for their 
divorces (Carr 2003). Common wisdom also suggests the financial struggles that couples 
encounter are often the acid test for the stability and quality of their relationships. Given that 
such financial issues often occur because of the couples’ inability to exercise self-control, 
overcoming joint financial self-control challenges successfully could reduce the financial 
problems that couples encounter, helping improve marriage longevity and well-being.  
This work also offers interesting practical implications for marketers. For example, 
financial planners who assist married couples with their retirement decisions should also be 
aware of these findings. Taking into consideration the spouse’s trait self-control levels should be 
helpful to financial planners as they decide how to best help couples make wise retirement 
decisions. For example, in the case of a mixed couple, it might be better to cede control over the 
retirement decisions to the higher self-control partner instead of encouraging joint decision-
making. Furthermore, my findings also highlight that marketers should be careful with using 
“bring-a-friend” marketing campaigns especially for products targeting consumers’ self-control 
problems, such as gym subscriptions. For instance, if a high self-control individual decides to 
bring a low self-control friend and starts working jointly with them, this might ultimately lead to 
failure to achieve the desired fitness goals and cancellation of the subscription.  
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4.11.2 Limitations and future research 
Finally, I note that this research is not without limitations. First, though I obtain results consistent 
with our predicted pattern in all studies, the small cell sizes in studies 1A and 4A are a concern. 
As the smallest cell in study 1A was the homogeneous high self-control cell, in which responses 
offer perhaps the least novel finding, and as the results replicate across contexts and decision 
types, I hope that these results converge to form a convincing picture. However, with access to a 
greater number of dyads, a larger-scale replication would be valuable, and might allow 
exploration of additional moderators that our analysis lacks the power to identify.  
Further, I note in all of our studies we classified participants as low or high self-control 
depending on whether their trait self-control was below or above the mean to identify the 
dyads/couples as one of the three types. This was necessary to create the independent variable – 
dyad type (homogeneous low, mixed, or high self-control), which was the focus of my research. 
It might be argued that a different handling of data would have been more appropriate, such as 
summing partner’s self-control scores and using this variable to predict the dyad’s joint self-
control. However, this would have imposed an additive relationship between the trait self-control 
of the two partners and I did not feel that we can confidently make this assumption. In addition, 
it might be proposed that I treat the partners’ trait self-control levels as continuous variables, 
using these two measures to conduct a regression model in which the dyad’s self-control is 
predicted by both partners’ self-control and their interaction. The interaction term in the above-
described analysis would tell us whether the effect of one partner’s self-control on the dyad’s 
joint self-control is dependent on the other partner’s self-control. While interesting, this is a 
different question than the one explored in the present work, where I take the dyad as the unit of 
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analysis. Future work may adopt such an interactive approach, and may shed additional light on 
social influence effects in self-control. 
Another option would be to consider classifying individuals in a dyad based on their 
relative self-control within the dyad – the higher partner would be Partner 1 and the lower 
partner Partner 2. This would take us away from the research question, as it would lead to a 
design only composed of mixed dyads  (it is highly unlikely that two partners would have exactly 
equal self-control). Further, a partner that might be “lower” in one dyad (for example, if two 
people had self-control scores of 7 and 6.5) might actually be “high” in the data as a whole, 
where the mean might be 4.   
A fourth option would be to use the Actor-Partner Interdependence Model (APIM), 
which has been increasingly used in the social sciences (e.g., Simpson, Griskevicius, and 
Rothman 2012). While this might have appeal, I note that it is not appropriate for my case. In the 
APIM, the dyad is the highest unit of analysis and the individual members are nested within the 
dyad. Using the APIM, one could estimate the effect of a dyad member’s independent variable 
on his own outcome variable (known as an actor effect), as well as on his partner’s outcome 
variable (known as a partner effect; Kenny and Cook 1999). Thus, the APIM is only appropriate 
for analyzing dyadic data in situations when both dyad members respond to the dependent 
variable individually, with the model accounting for the non-independence between the two 
observations due to the dyadic relationship. However, Kenny and Cook (1999) note that the 
APIM cannot be estimated for outcome variables that are measured at the couple level, as is the 
case with couple’s joint self-control in our work. That is, the APIM is the appropriate analytical 
tool for the so called “single decisions, joint consumption” situations in Gorlin and Dhar’s joint 
decisions typology (2012), as opposed to our “joint decisions, joint consumption” context. Thus, 
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using the mean trait self-control scores for the sake of classification was both methodologically 
and conceptually our most appropriate option. Future work may explore means of combining 
dyadic, or even group, self-control levels, in ways that preserve the theoretical meaningfulness of 
each individual’s contribution while also being statistically appropriate for joint decisions. 
I also focused only on comparing the self-control of dyads to other dyads. It would be 
interesting to examine the self-control of the three different dyad types to that of individual 
decision makers. For instance, it could be argued that the homogeneous low self-control pairs 
will exhibit better (worse) self-control than one low self-control individual due to accountability 
(social contagion). Moreover, though in this research I focused only on conjunctive joint tasks 
and decisions, future research could also explore how different combinations of partners’ trait 
self-control impact performance on other dyadic tasks, such as additive, compensatory, 
disjunctive, and complementary tasks (Steiner 1966).  
Furthermore, married couples often differ in the extent to which they make mutual 
decisions. Some couples discuss and make all decisions together as a team, while others prefer to 
separate their responsibilities with each spouse taking individual decisions in their areas of 
expertise (e.g., the wife manages the household eating decisions, while the husbands takes care 
of the finances). Understanding why some couples engage in more collaborative decision-
making than others, as well as under what circumstances each relationship model (joint decision-
making or ceding control of certain decisions in one of the spouses) will be more effective for 
the couple’s long-term well-being could yield important insights.  
Finally, studying the dynamics of self-control in larger groups than dyads is also a 
promising future research direction. Given the prevalence and importance of support groups for 
helping consumers overcome many self-control related problems (e.g., smoking cessation 
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support groups, weight loss and dieting groups), it would be interesting to study the processes 
through which such groups are successful in facilitating consumers’ self-control.  
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APPENDIX A 
ADVERTISING STIMULI AND PRETEST (ESSAY 1, STUDY 2B) 
A.1 AD DESIGNED TO CUE RECALL OF PAST SELF-CONTROL FAILURES 
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A.2 AD DESIGNED TO CUE RECALL OF PAST SELF-CONTROL SUCCESSES 
 
A.3 PRETEST RESULTS 
Measures: 
 
1. Do you think this ad is likely to make people recall ways in which they:  
Failed at meeting savings goals in the past (1) ----- Succeeded at meeting savings goals in the past (7) 
2. Does the person in the ad look as though they:  
Saved only a little bit of money last year (1) ----- Saved a lot of money last year (7) 
3. If you saw this ad, would it make you think about how much you might have succeeded 
at saving a substantial amount of money in the past? 
Not at all (1) ----- Very much (7) 
4. If you saw this ad, would it make you think about how you might have found saving 
large portions of money easy?  
Not at all (1) ----- Very much (7) 
5. Please indicate your evaluation of the ad using the below scale: 
Not appealing (1) ----- Very appealing (7) 
Not at all exciting (1) ----- Very exciting (7) 
Believable (1) ----- Unbelievable (7) 
Informative (1) ----- Uninformative (7) 
6. The message in the ad: (ad persuasiveness index, α = .87) 
Is not persuasive (1) ----- Is persuasive (7) 
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Provides weak arguments (1) ----- Provides strong arguments (7) 
Is not compelling (1) ----- Is compelling (7) 
7. Indicate the extent to which you are interested in the products offered in the ad: 
Not interested at all (1) ----- Very interested (7) 
 
Results: 
Variable Msuccesses ad 
(SD) 
Mfailures ad 
(SD) 
p-value 
Manipulation Checks 
Recall successes at meeting past savings goals 2.92 (1.89) 1.87 (1.31) p < .0001 
Person in ad looks as if they saved a lot last year 4.10 (1.93) 2.02 (1.50) p < .0001 
Ad makes you think about successes at saving 3.37 (1.52) 2.71 (1.44) p = .003 
Ad makes you think that saving a lot is easy 3.22 (1.47) 2.55 (1.28) p = .001 
Confound Checks 
Ad appealing 3.06 (1.53) 2.86 (1.49) p = .38 
Ad exciting 2.92 (1.42) 2.59 (1.20) p = .09 
Ad unbelievable 3.96 (1.47) 3.76 (1.50) p = .28 
Ad uninformative 4.48 (1.55) 4.43 (1.76) p = .84 
Ad message persuasiveness 3.66 (1.34) 3.39 (1.47) p = .20 
Interest in products in ad 2.78 (1.63) 2.51 (1.54) p = .26 
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APPENDIX B 
SOCIAL IDENTITY THREAT MANIPULATION: BUSINESS STUDENTS (ESSAY 2) 
Imagine that you are having a conversation with a friend of yours at the school cafeteria. While 
talking about your schoolwork, your friend mentions a recent article he/she read in the 
newspaper. The article discussed how business students tend to perform worse academically than 
students from other majors. Your friend shows you the article and here are the abstracts that 
he/she was intrigued by and highlighted. Please read these abstracts of the article very carefully 
because you will be asked questions about them later. 
 
“A.D, a business professor at B. University, does not give his business students the same 
exams he gave 10 or 15 years ago. “Not many of them would pass,” he says.” 
“…all evidence suggests that student disengagement is at its worst in undergraduate 
business education.” 
“In their new book “Academically Adrift: Limited Learning on College Campuses,” the 
sociologists Richard Arum and Josipa Roksa report that business majors had the weakest gains 
during the first two years of college on a national test of writing and reasoning skills." 
“Recent statistics disclosed by the Admissions Office at the [participants’ university] 
show that the SAT scores for business students are significantly lower than those of engineering 
students. In 2011, the average SAT score for students admitted to the School of Business was 
2100, while the average SAT score of freshmen at the Engineering School was 2305.” 
 "Finally, the acceptance rate of business students at graduate schools is significantly 
lower than the acceptance rate of engineering students.” 
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APPENDIX C 
PRETESTS AND MANIPULATION CHECKS 
C.1 PRETEST FOR COPING STRATEGY MANIPULATIONS 
Thirty-seven participants (36% female) read the social identity threat scenario and implemented 
one of the two coping strategies as in Experiment 1. Following the threat and coping 
manipulations, participants responded to prompt assessing (a) the effectiveness of the sentence 
completion task at manipulating the target concept and (b) whether the two strategies were 
equally motivating and enjoyable. 
Coping Strategy 
Superior Self 
Manipulation Check 
(α = .91) 
Inferior Others 
Manipulation 
Check (α = .95) Motivation Enjoyment 
Superior Self 5.30a 1.63b 3.40 3.06 
Inferior Others 2.17a 5.00b 2.95 2.73 
Note: Items with same subscripts are significantly different from each other at the p < .0001 level. The Superior Self 
Manipulation Check was measured with two items (“In order to fill out the sentences, I came up with a number of 
positive traits that describe me as a person.”, “I completed the sentences primarily with positive traits and 
characteristics of myself.”) and the Inferior Others Manipulation Check was measured with two items (“In order to 
fill out the sentences, I came up with a number of different groups of people which I do not belong to.”, “I 
completed the sentences primarily with groups of people which I do not belong to”) measured on 1 to 7 scales. The 
Motivation and Enjoyment items were single-item measures.  
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C.2 PRETEST FOR THE ACCESSIBILITY MANIPULATION (STUDY 4C) 
Eighty-one participants (% female) were given the same pronoun counting task as in Experiment 
5B. Then respondents were presented with 10 sentences written in Bulgarian, with one 
underlined word in them. Participants were asked to guess whether the underlined word referred 
to a first-person pronoun (“I”, “me”, “mine”) or a third-people pronoun (“they”, “them”, 
“theirs”). Finally, participants indicated their agreement with the following two items, which 
served as additional manipulation checks: “While reading the paragraph, I thought primarily 
about myself” and “The paragraph made me focus on other people” (a 7-point scale anchored by 
1, “Strongly Disagree”, and 7, “Strongly Agree”). 
Accessibility Condition 
First-Person 
Pronouns 
Third-Person 
Pronouns 
Thought about 
Self 
Thought about 
Others 
Self-Accessibility 4.57a 5.43b 3.43c 3.80d 
Other-Accessibility 4.10a 5.90b 2.68c 4.71d 
Note: Items with same subscripts are significantly different from each other at the p < .05 level. 
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APPENDIX D 
ADVERTISING STIMULI (ESSAY 2, STUDY 3) 
D.1 FOCUS ON SUPERIOR SELF-ASPECTS AD 
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D.2 FOCUS ON INFERIOR OTHERS AD 
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APPENDIX E 
ACTIVATION OF SELF (VISUAL MEASURE; ESSAY 2, STUDY 4A) 
We are interested in how much you thought about yourself, the person you are, as well as the 
traits and abilities that describe yourself, while you were imagining the scenario at the beginning 
of the survey. 
 
When we think about ourselves, who we are, what we like to do, and how we describe ourselves, 
we might only scratch the surface of our self-knowledge, or we might think extensively about the 
many aspects of our personality. The figures below are meant to represent how much 
information about yourself you accessed during the scenario on the previous page. The empty 
figure indicates that “no self-knowledge is vivid in your mind” while the completely filled-in 
figure signifies that “all of my self-knowledge is vivid in my mind”. 
 
Please choose the figure that best describes how much self-knowledge is active in your mind 
right now. 
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